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Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one’s second pre-
ferred option to prevent one’s least preferred option from winning 
when one’s first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be 
effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election 
is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide 
that doing so is useful.
This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior 
in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding 
strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic 
definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at 
least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more com-
mon in electoral systems that have single- member districts that employ 
plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. 
Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered 
elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes 
to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by tak-
ing into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single 
transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two- round elec-
tions, and mixed electoral systems.
Laura B. Stephenson is Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Western Ontario.
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Strategic Voting and Political Institutions
John H. Aldrich, André Blais, and Laura B. Stephenson
In 1999, Israel held an early election. For only the second (and last) time, 
citizens cast two votes.1 One was the usual vote for party representation 
in the Knesset, which allocated seats to the parties in near proportion to 
the percentage of votes they received. The other was a separate vote for 
candidates, with the candidate receiving the most votes directly elected 
as prime minister. Several early candidates for prime minister dropped 
out, leaving three who ran throughout the campaign. The leaders of the 
two dominant parties, Ehud Barak and incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu, 
received the most votes, with Barak winning.2 A third candidate, Yitzhak 
Mordechai, ran as the head of the newly formed Center Party, which had 
broken away from Likud and PM Netanyahu. Mordechai was running rea-
sonably strongly in third place, but with Barak rising in the polls and his 
fortunes declining, Mordechai withdrew his candidacy the day before the 
election.3 Subsequent studies showed that one important factor in citizens’ 
decisions was their perception that Mordechai was increasingly likely to 
lose and that their votes were better spent in support of Barak, whom they 
preferred to Netanyahu and who, unlike Mordechai, could win (Abramson 
et al. 2004).
Such decisions by voters are referred to as “strategic” voting, because 
the choices they make reflect the strategic setting of the campaign. Typi-
cally, the idea is to avoid “wasting” a vote on a candidate or party whom the 
voter likes but who cannot win by giving it instead to a candidate or party 
whom the voter finds less attractive but who may well win, thereby defeat-
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ing an option the voter likes even less. Thus, some voters who disliked 
Netanyahu considered voting for Mordechai, their most preferred choice, 
or Barak, their second choice. In this instance, Mordechai lost support 
right at the end of the campaign as the strategic setting evolved such that 
those who especially disliked Netanyahu settled on Barak. As it became 
clear that Mordechai could not win but that Barak might, even more vot-
ers changed from Mordechai to Barak to avoid wasting votes. Those who 
reasoned in this fashion are said to have voted strategically. Had Mordechai 
stayed in the running, many others would undoubtedly have continued to 
vote for him in spite of the strategic setting.4 Such voters are referred to 
as sincere voters, voting for whom they prefer regardless of the strategic 
context. Sincere and strategic voting have similarities (they are both based 
on preferences, or utilities) but they also differ (since only strategic voters 
form expectations about likely outcomes and act upon those expectations). 
Those expectations combine with their preferences regarding the various 
outcomes to form expected utilities— to determine for which party these 
voters cast their ballots. Sincere voters, by contrast, act on their preferences 
but do not consider expectations in determining their actions.
The chapters in this book study the question of the existence, extent, 
and conditions under which voters reason strategically and thus engage in 
strategic voting in a wide variety of institutional settings and in elections 
in different strategic contexts. This variation provides the opportunity to 
test several theoretical propositions about voters and their inclination to 
engage in strategic reasoning. By examining voters in these different insti-
tutional and electoral contexts, we not only learn about how voters reason 
and thus about their role in democratic politics but also explain more fully 
voting decisions and outcomes in many different elections.
Each of the chapters involves original data, often survey- based but 
including laboratory and survey- embedded experiments. While sources 
vary, more than half the chapters draw their data from the Making Elec-
toral Democracy Work (MEDW) project led by André Blais (2010). This 
project includes detailed analyses of party strategies, voting behavior, and 
laboratory experiments. According to the project’s website (www.chairelec 
toral.com/medw.html),
The goal of the MEDW project is to examine how the rules of the 
game (especially the electoral system) and the electoral context 
(especially the competitiveness and salience of the election) influ-
ence the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between voters and 
parties.
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The nations studied (Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland) 
were chosen to obtain a rich variety of electoral institutions. The data, 
now publicly available (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/MEDW), 
contain key questions that enable researchers to identify the preferences, 
expectations, voting choices, and evaluations of voters across a range of 
elections in different electoral contexts.
This chapter provides a conceptual framework for thinking about vot-
ing and its strategic and sincere forms. It provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding how voters reason through to their choices that applies 
across the various institutional structures that shape elections. This theo-
retical basis, in turn, enables a better understanding of the role the public 
plays in a democracy.5 Voters are often conceived as the target of campaigns 
but only sometimes imagined as active participants in democratic choices, 
alongside parties and candidates. This chapter examines those conditions 
under which voters are central, active strategists in shaping outcomes.
The chapter begins by developing the logic of strategic voting in a 
single- member district system, thus won by whichever party or candi-
date gets the most votes (first past the post, or FPTP). This represents the 
simplest and easiest case for the logic of strategic voting, and similarities 
(and sometimes theoretical isomorphism) exist between strategic voting— 
sometimes called instrumental voting (or voting as an investment)— and 
expected- utility maximization. This problem was developed originally in 
the context of studying turnout by Downs (1957) and Riker and Orde-
shook (1968), leading to what the latter referred to as the calculus of vot-
ing. We prefer to call it the calculus of voting as investment to distinguish 
it clearly from the different but parallel calculus for sincere voting. We 
then develop the logic for sincere voting through the theory of expressive 
voting, which is (in its pure form) simply utility maximization— what might 
be referred to as the calculus of voting as consumption. The final part of 
this section unites the two pure cases of strategic voting and sincere vot-
ing into a general formulation (originally the work of Fiorina [1976]) that 
includes each pure type as a special case. In doing so, we further generalize 
by examining the concatenation of preferences and expectations, illustrat-
ing how these types of voting decisions are related and pointing out two 
further categories of voting decisions.
Part II examines institutional variation as a means of expanding the 
study of strategic voting from its common focus on FPTP systems. While 
part I develops the logic for a single district (or for a presidential elec-
tion, where the nation as a single district selects a single winner via some 
[usually modified] form of FPTP), in part II we note not only that voters 
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choose their own representatives in the legislature but also that selection 
contributes to the collective outcome of what party or parties are chosen to 
lead the legislature (organize the government in a parliamentary setting or 
select chamber leadership in a legislature like the US House of Represen-
tatives). We thus consider the problem of nationwide as well as districtwide 
strategic voting.
We then turn to proportional representation systems in which there are 
several outcomes about which voters might have preferences, thus poten-
tially leading them to think further about strategic actions for achieving 
those outcomes. One is voting in an attempt to ensure that a party crosses 
the threshold of representation and ends up with at least minimal repre-
sentation in parliament. In proportional representation systems, increasing 
the percentage of votes received by a party also increases the percentage 
of seats won, often in a closer- to- matching proportion than under FPTP. 
Thus, a voter might consider how to maximize a party’s representation in 
a parliament. Finally, those who won seats in parliament then must decide 
which party or parties are in government and, if more than one, how cabi-
net portfolios are allocated across the parties in the governing coalition. 
Voters might reason strategically about government formation and per-
haps about other aspects of the governing coalition, such as who will serve 
as prime minister. The final section considers the now- common mixed sys-
tems and how voters might cast their votes strategically in such systems.
Part I: The Microfoundations of Strategic and  
Sincere Voting in FPTP
Theoretical Foundations
There are several places to look when seeking the theoretical foundations of 
vote decisions in FPTP systems. Rational choice theorists, such as Downs 
(1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) 
thought about the act of voting in a way similar to how they thought about 
the actions taken by candidates and parties. That is to say, they thought of 
voters as rational actors. There is thus a firm foundation in decision theory 
for studying the conditions under which expected- utility- maximizing vot-
ers will vote for their most preferred candidate or will instead turn to their 
second- most- preferred candidate instead of the first- ranked candidate as 
the “rational” choice because of the higher probability terms involved.6
There is also a long history of studying considerations about voting 
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choices in game theory as well as in decision theory. Farquaharson (1969; 
written in the 1950s) developed the logic of strategic voting in game theo-
retic terms. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) independently proved 
a very important result that showed that all voting systems are vulnerable 
to strategic action.7 Their theorem provides the foundation for studying 
strategic voting in all kinds of voting institutions because it is an ever- 
present option for voters, no matter how elections are structured. In many 
respects, however, this history goes back even further.
Blais and Degan (forthcoming) assert that “the study of strategic voting 
in political science started with Duverger (1951) and was given its full cre-
dential with the publication of Cox’s (1997) seminal Making Votes Count.” 
Duverger argued that plurality voting systems, which exist in many Anglo- 
American democracies, should logically lead to a two- party system for two 
reasons. The first is the mechanical effect, or the fact that the party that 
wins a plurality of votes overall almost always wins a higher proportion of 
seats than of votes.8 The second is the psychological effect, which is that 
voters, knowing the rules, do not want to waste their votes on parties or 
candidates that have no chance of winning. Voters consequently focus on 
the two leading candidates, reasoning that one of them will win and no one 
else will.9
Riker (1982) made the fullest argument that it was important to under-
stand Duverger’s results in rational choice theoretic terms (even though 
Duverger resisted the use of rational choice theory). Cox (1997), however, 
should justly be credited with being the first to fully derive Duverger’s Law 
from game theoretic foundations with purely strategic voters; indeed, the 
voters, not parties or candidates, are the driving force in this result.10 Even 
more generally his “m + 1” rule holds that in equilibrium, rational voters 
support a number of parties equal to the number of seats being chosen (m, 
or district magnitude) plus one, so that in single- member districts, the vot-
ing equilibrium m + 1 is 2. He further showed that the law applies only to a 
single district at a time, thus requiring a second provision— an aggregation 
rule to go from a single district to a full legislature (see also Palfrey 1984, 
1989 [using a one- dimensional spatial structure]; Aldrich and Lee 2016 
[expanding that perspective]).
The Vote Decision in FPTP Systems
Downs (1957) and then Riker and Ordeshook (1968) developed the cal-
culus of voting, which is a statement of voting as an act of expected- utility 
maximization applied to the two- party FPTP case. McKelvey and Orde-
6 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
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shook (1972) expanded the model to the more general, or n- candidate, 
case. It posits a single goal for voters: trying to make a candidate into a win-
ner. This is sometimes referred to as thinking of one’s vote as an “invest-
ment” decision, investing the currency of a single vote in the election to try 
to produce a favorable result. It is, however, also a simple case of decision 
making under risk, and voters are assumed to be expected- utility maximiz-
ers. That is, voters must consider the likelihood that their vote will affect 
the outcome. If they prefer a party with no chance of winning, voting for 
that party does little to maximize expected utility.
Applying this to the two- candidate FPTP case, citizens vote for the 
more preferred candidate, since there are only two candidates in the race 
and one must win; the only interesting question is whether the citizen votes 
or abstains. In a contest with three or more candidates, however, a citizen 
may vote for the most preferred candidate or, under certain conditions, for 
the second- most- preferred candidate. A voter will never vote for the least 
preferred candidate. (For the full decision- making problem for this case, 
including abstention, see the appendix.)
In sum, the key here is that it is assumed that all voters value outcomes 
solely in terms of who wins their district. If there are three parties— X, Y, 
and Z— voters think of outcomes solely as whether X, Y, or Z wins. Hence, 
it follows that the only thing that matters in terms of voting is whether 
one’s vote affects which candidate wins in the district. This exclusive focus 
is why voters turn from preferred candidates to less valued ones if they are 
more likely to win and why this exclusive focus leads to two viable par-
ties (that is, Duverger’s Law), but only in a given district. This is the pure 
theory of instrumental voting, based on the assumption that who wins and 
who loses is the single attribute of elections that matters to voters.
The Calculus of Voting as Investment
Under what conditions would someone vote for a second- most- preferred 
candidate? For example, there are three candidates, and a voter prefers 
them in alphabetical order— that is, receives the greatest utility if candidate 
X is in office, next most if Y wins, and least if Z wins. We can assign a util-
ity of 1 to the victory of X, 0 to Z, and s to Y such that 0 < s < 1 (putting 
the candidate values in the correct order and simplifying the arithmetic). 
But, of course, one’s vote does not determine the outcome unless that vote 
makes or breaks a tie. So, for outcome- oriented voters, we need to calculate 
a set of expectations about the closeness of the contest among the three 
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candidates.11 In Downs (1957) and in Riker and Ordeshook (1968), atten-
tion is also given to the costs of voting, C. Furthermore, both consider 
the benefits that may come from the act of voting per se— what Riker and 
Ordeshook call the “citizen duty” term. Such benefits include the satisfac-
tion of having done one’s duty as a citizen (or avoiding the costs of guilt 
from failing to do one’s duty by abstaining), D.
Important though C and D might be for understanding abstention, 
they do not affect the choice of voting among the candidates, because these 
terms are the same whether one votes for candidate X, Y, or Z and thus 
cancel out. As the appendix shows, the expected- utility- maximizing choice 
comes down to the question of how much one likes the second choice com-
pared to the first (Is s close to 1, close to 0, or in between?) and the rela-
tive chances of making or breaking ties involving candidates X and Y. In 
particular, a voter chooses candidate Y— that is, casts (what appears to be) 
a strategic vote— if and only if s is larger than the ratio of tie- making and 
- breaking chances for candidate X to the tie- making and - breaking chances 
for candidate Y. Thus, if X has a better chance of beating Z than does Y, 
one never votes for Y. To put it algebraically, if Pi,j indicates the probability 
of making or breaking a tie between candidates i and j, then one votes for 
one’s second choice candidate if and only if s > (PX,Z + PX,Y,Z)/PY,Z— that is, 
when s is greater than the ratio of the chances of making or breaking a tie 
between X and Z or among all three candidates compared to the chances 
of making or breaking a tie between Y and Z. This follows from the classic 
form of the calculus (where R is the reward or expected utility of voting): 
R = PB + D − C.
What we call strategic voting is simply selecting the best choice in 
expected utility when there are more than two candidates. Rational 
expected- utility- maximizing voters sometimes find it in their best interests 
to vote for their most preferred candidate; sometimes their best interests 
dictate that they vote for their second- most- preferred candidate, depend-
ing on how much they like the candidates and how close the contest is. The 
key is that voters are deciding how best to utilize their vote to be instru-
mental in affecting the outcome.
The concern often expressed about the calculus of voting applied to 
abstention— that the probability of making or breaking a tie in a large 
electorate is extremely small— does not apply to strategic voting. Because 
whether one votes for the first- or second- choice candidate depends upon 
a ratio of probabilities, it does not matter whether the numerator and 
denominator are both large or both small numbers; what matters is how 
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much larger one is than the other. The absolute size of probability terms 
matters a great deal in asking whether one votes or abstains, but once one 
is in the voting booth, only the relative size of probabilities matters.
The Calculus of Voting as Consumption
This theory posits that a rational, expected- utility- maximizing voter simul-
taneously chooses whether or not to vote and for whom to vote. Thus, the 
concern that voters do not (and maybe cannot) determine their choice on 
what are likely to be very small probability terms is worth considering. 
Indeed, citizens might find close elections exciting, but it is hard to imagine 
anyone saying they are voting because they think it plausible that doing 
so will make or break a tie. Why, then, do voters vote? From the view of 
voting as consumption, voters have a different goal. They are not voting to 
determine who wins or loses— or at least, that is simply one (likely small) 
component of their choice. Rather, their goal is to express their support for 
their preferred candidate. Consumers in economic theory do this all the 
time; they pay for tickets to go support their preferred athletic team, for 
example, or give money to the local classical station during fund- raising 
periods simply to express their support for such a valued commodity. Even 
more commonly, consumers buy groceries to consume them directly and 
not as an investment in the future of farming. That is, rather than valuing 
actions by their strategic effect on who wins or loses, the “expressive” voter 
values outcomes differently. This voter cares primarily (and in the “pure” 
theory, exclusively) about asserting support for the most preferred candi-
date or party— sincere voting.
In the purest case of expressive voting, the voter gets a benefit (a util-
ity value), B, for voting for a preferred option (in the investment voting 
example, above, we set B = 1) and only for voting for that candidate. This 
differs from the expected- utility case, where a value is realized if and only 
if a candidate wins the election; with expressive voting, if you abstain, even 
if your candidate wins (or if you vote for another candidate), you get zero 
expressive benefit.12 Put alternatively, the outcomes of value in the pure 
strategic voting case are who wins and who loses the election. The out-
comes of value in the pure sincere voting case are who one actually sup-
ports and who one does not support.
The pure case of expressive voting is simple. Vote for the preferred 
candidate, X, and get B (and possibly the benefit for doing your duty, D, 
and pay cost, C); vote for candidate Y or Z and get 0 (plus, possibly, D−C); 
and abstain and get 0 (and receive no D and pay no cost, C).13 Thus, it is 
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always better to vote for one’s most preferred candidate, no matter the cir-
cumstances. The only interesting question under this conceptualization of 
expressive voting is whether the person votes rather than abstains, which 
happens when B + D > C.
This expressive voting account may sound simple, perhaps simplistic. 
Vote only for your favorite candidate. And vote if you like your candidate 
a lot and if you feel you should do your duty. Abstain only if the cost of 
voting is (relatively) high. As simple as that may sound, Brennan and Ham-
lin (1998) and Brennan and Lomasky (1997) develop complex theories of 
choice and elections from expressive voting accounts, paralleling the spa-
tial and related models that depend on expected- utility- maximizing voters, 
including Cox (1997).14
Distinguishing Voting Types
The difference between strategic and sincere voters comes down to the 
considerations that factor into the vote decision— more precisely, whether 
the choice is based solely on preferences regarding candidates or parties or 
on preferences and expectations regarding outcomes. It can be visualized 
as follows in table 1.1.
Square 1 applies to the case when individuals take into consideration 
both their preferences regarding the candidates and their expectations 
about the outcome of the election. This case corresponds to voters who 
care only about the result of the election in their constituency and evalu-
ate outcomes accordingly. It is thus the case where strategic voting comes 
into play via expected- utility maximization. Voters are using their ballot 
to affect the outcome of the election and therefore are voting on the basis 
of their preferences regarding outcomes rather than just their preferences 
regarding candidates or parties, or expectations. In square 2, voters ignore 
expectations and act purely to express their preferences with regard to can-
didates or parties. While they may care who wins their district’s seat, they 





Yes 1.  Strategic, also 
Instrumental
 2.  Sincere, also 
Expressive
No 3.  Bandwagon, 
also Underdog
4. ?
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evaluate turnout and vote considerations only in terms of their preferences 
regarding the options on the ballot and thus are expressive or sincere vot-
ers. Even someone who prefers a small, niche party’s candidate who has no 
chance of winning will support that candidate, knowing that the candidate 
will lose, because the voter likes this candidate best.
If a voter considers only the likely outcome of the election, without car-
ing about personal preferences regarding the candidates/parties (or if she is 
indifferent between some or among all options), then her vote choice would 
correspond to square 3. One can imagine someone who likes to be on the 
winning side, regardless of who the candidate is, or someone who only 
supports an underdog candidate so he/she does not “feel bad” about having 
such low support (Simon 1954; Lanoue and Bowler 1998). At least some 
voters in US presidential nomination contests consider whether to back 
one candidate or another based on how strongly they are performing and 
how well they might do in the general election— the famous “momentum” 
factor. In such cases, some voters end up voting for what might be their 
least preferred alternative in the primary (say, Romney in 2012), because he 
appears the most likely to win that November. Square 4, on the other hand, 
is harder to define. For our purposes, the crucial feature of these individu-
als is that they consider neither of the two elements— preferences regard-
ing candidates/parties and expectations regarding outcomes— that we have 
identified as pertinent to vote choice. One can imagine voters who simply 
copy others in their household or sell their vote, which would lead to a spe-
cific choice that cannot be discerned from knowing personal preferences 
and/or expectations regarding outcomes. It is also possible that someone 
might decide to vote (possibly out of a sense of duty) but does not know 
whom to vote for and thus makes a random choice. Most studies consider 
only the options that include preferences regarding defined quantities, and 
given the range of motivations that might explain a voter with this profile, 
we set aside such consideration here.
Sincere and Strategic Voting
So far we have considered different types of voting as if they are mutually 
exclusive. However, there are two important exceptions. First, how can we 
distinguish the motivations of voters who support a first preference if it 
is also one of the top two most viable options (in an FPTP election)? In 
some configurations of preferences and expectations, we can distinguish 
strategic from sincere voters (for example, we would take all those who 
voted for the second- most- preferred party as at least potentially strategic 
but certainly not as sincere voters). But we cannot tell whether those who 
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support a top- two party as their preferred option are strategic or sincere 
voters. Both kinds of voters would choose the same action; the different 
calculi predict observationally equivalent outcomes. Indeed no fewer than 
two- thirds of all voters in a three- candidate contest have identical choices 
derived from strategic as well as sincere preferences. All those who prefer 
the strongest- running candidate and those who prefer the second strongest 
candidate should vote for their most preferred option whether reasoning 
from sincere or from strategic premises. So, when estimating rates of stra-
tegic voting, the best we can say is that we are estimating “pure strategic 
voting,” and possibly compare that to the rate of “pure sincere voting.”
Second, there is nothing to say that voters cannot receive pleasure from 
voting for their favorite candidate and value the fact that their vote helps 
make that candidate into a winner (and, at the least, certainly does not make 
it any less likely that the candidate wins). There is no reason to believe that 
citizens are either purely strategic (that is, purely investment) or purely 
sincere (that is, purely consumption) voters. On the contrary it makes sense 
to suppose that voters value shaping outcomes and also supporting their 
favorite party/candidate. While Brennan and colleagues argue for this mix-
ture, they do the hard work of theorizing about the pure case of expression 
to show its richness. Even earlier, however, Fiorina (1976) developed this 
hybrid account as a generalization of the calculus of voting.15
So, if the reward for voting for a Downsian, purely strategic, or 
expected- utility maximizer is
R = PB + D − C,
and for a Brennan- esque, purely expressive, or utility- maximizing voter is
R = B + D − C,
then for a voter who is both an instrumental consumer and an investment 
voter, the reward should be
R = PB + B + D − C.
Part II: Extensions across Outcomes and Institutions
In the abstract, the emphasis on preferences and expected utility regarding 
outcomes is equally applicable across all electoral rules, and as the Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) shows, there 
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are always reasons in every electoral system for deviating from the purely 
sincere choice. Voters have preferences regarding candidates/parties and 
have expectations about the chances of each winning. But institutional 
rules shape a variety of different kinds of outcomes and thus ways in which 
“winning” is defined. In this section, we generally consider all voters to be 
instrumental, using the calculus of voting with regard to outcome. What 
differs, however, are the definitions of winning and thus the outcomes about 
which voters have preferences and expectations. The relevant institutional 
rules are primarily those defining the electoral system and the party system. 
We focus here mostly on different electoral systems. We also recognize 
that ingrained in all systems are several different types of outcomes that 
may concern voters— direct winners in a constituency, legislative control, 
and government formation. The existing work on strategic voting in FPTP 
systems tends to concentrate on the constituency level, which makes sense 
because that level is where the vote is directly invested. But just as decisions 
about investing in any specific stock may be shaped in part by expectations 
about the performance of the national economy, so might decisions about 
investing the vote in any specific district race be shaped in part by expecta-
tions about the performance of the national government. It thus becomes 
pertinent to consider different institutional configurations and how those 
shape the importance of outcomes at other levels.
National Outcomes under FPTP
The citizen is a potential voter not only in a district but also in a coun-
try. Both Canada and the United Kingdom essentially have unicameral 
national governments. As a result, if one party wins a majority of the seats, 
it forms the government, selects the cabinet and prime minister, and so on. 
But even in a separated- power system such as the United States, the major-
ity party in the House of Representatives selects the Speaker of the House, 
who may wield considerable partisan authority over the agenda and help 
determine outcomes that flow from the House. And, in both cases, if no 
one party holds a majority of the seats, a coalition of parties may form and 
determine the government, or a minority may try to govern (in a minority 
government). As a result, voters may care not only about who wins their 
constituency but also about who controls the chamber. (For the United 
Kingdom, see Abramson et al., this vol.)
In such a system, the citizen votes directly for a candidate in the dis-
trict. The citizen is more likely to vote if that election is predicted to 
be close. The citizen votes only indirectly for the government. That is, 
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the party that carries that particular district has one more seat in the 
legislature and thus one more step toward forming a majority in the 
chamber. Abramson et al. (this vol.) basically investigate three UK par-
ties. Since World War I, the “third party” (in this case, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party) has not come close to winning a majority in the Commons 
and rarely has kept the Conservatives or the Labour Party from winning 
an outright majority of seats. But in the 2010 election, the Lib Dems 
appeared to have a real chance to move as high as second place in the 
Commons and their leader seemed to have a plausible chance at becom-
ing prime minister— at least for a short while.
Taking this example for simplicity, then, the citizen was choosing among 
at least nine possible outcomes; party X wins in the district, X forms the 
government; X wins in the district, Y forms the government; X wins in 
the district, Z forms the government, and so on with Y or Z winning the 
constituency’s seat. Citizens are assumed to have candidate/party prefer-
ences and expectations regarding these nine outcomes and choose so as to 
maximize expected utility. (Of course, there are more possible outcomes, 
and the actual result in the 2010 UK election was a coalition government 
formed of the Conservatives and the Lib Dems.) We might well imag-
ine a voter caring about who forms the government and runs the politi-
cal system. However, that voter will be inclined to vote on the basis of 
the local constituency only if the contest is competitive; if it is, the voter 
might select the second- choice contender if the most preferred party has 
no chance of winning.
The voter’s actions also contribute to the national outcome, but 
again, only if the contest is close. Thus, the voter could decide to cast a 
constituency- level “tactical” vote (that is vote for the second- place party, 
following Abramson et al.’s terminology [this vol.]) if the constituency con-
test is close. But the voter could cast a national- level tactical vote if the 
parties are expected to be close in terms of numbers of seats won nationally 
and if the voter’s constituency is also competitive. In other words, casting a 
strategic vote in the constituency involves the straight P term— the close-
ness of the race in the district. Casting a strategic vote with respect to the 
nation involves both the expected closeness in the district and the expected 
closeness in the legislature. We thus expect that district closeness will mat-
ter more in determining the casting of a strategic vote than will national 
closeness, which involves a combination of two (likely small) probabili-
ties, in interaction. Psychologically, we might also expect that the indirect 
nature of the national outcomes reduces their saliency to the determina-
tion of the vote, relative to the more immediate case of an expected close 
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contest in the constituency (though the media are likely to pay more atten-
tion to the national than to the local outcome).
Two- Round Systems
Two- round elections are particularly popular for the election of a presi-
dent, and we thus start with this simplest situation. We also focus on the 
most frequent rule, which is that an absolute majority of votes is required 
for election in the first round and that if a second round is necessary, only 
the top two candidates can participate. In that case, the only outcome that 
matters is who will be elected president. Because the second round has only 
two choices, strategic and sincere voters alike vote for the more preferred 
option. Strategic voting in the binary case is sincere voting.
The most obvious type of strategic voting in the first round in such a 
context is strategic desertion of the weak candidates. Supporters of these 
candidates must decide whether to vote sincerely for their preferred option 
or to cast a strategic vote for the preferred candidate among those who have 
some chance of winning. The logic is exactly the same as in an FPTP election.
The existence of two rounds, however, opens up the possibility of at 
least two additional types of strategic moves. The first type is when there 
is certainty about who the top candidate in the first round will be (and cer-
tainty that this candidate will not obtain an absolute majority of the votes) 
but uncertainty about which other candidate will be allowed to participate 
in the second round. In such a context, some supporters of the strongest 
candidate may want to focus on the race for the second position and cast 
a strategic vote for a candidate who has some chance of making it to the 
second round and who is very unlikely to be able to defeat the strongest 
candidate in the second round. In this situation, the voter strategically des-
erts a strong candidate to support a weaker one. Those who oppose the 
strongest candidate, conversely, may support a candidate expected to have 
the best chance of defeating the certain candidate. In both cases, such vot-
ers are taking into account the possible outcomes of both the first and 
second rounds when making up their mind about how to vote.
A second possibility emerges when there is certainty about the two can-
didates who will make it to the second round. In this context, some of the 
supporters of these two candidates may wish to signal their preferences 
among the weaker candidates. This can be the case, for example, when a 
voter likes a policy stance of one of these weak candidates and wishes that 
the preferred strong candidate would pay more attention to that policy 
position. This seems to have been the case for some Jospin supporters in 
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the 2002 French presidential election: they voted for a more leftist candi-
date because they mistakenly believed that Jospin would reach the second 
round and hoped to prevent Jospin from moving too much toward the cen-
ter (Blais 2004). This appears similar to sincere voting, and indeed it might 
be— but not always. That is, a voter wishes to vote strategically but calcu-
lates that expectations are so nearly certain that it is better to vote purely 
for a desired policy than to invest the vote strategically by supporting the 
more preferred of the top two contenders so that the candidate makes it to 
the second round. It can differ from the single- round FPTP case of strate-
gic voting, however, if the voter prefers, for example, the moderately liberal 
strong contender who is certainly expected to make it to the second round 
but the voter wants to send a signal to that candidate. By voting for a more 
liberal candidate not expected to advance, the voter can signal to the pre-
ferred and strong candidate that if policies must be modified to gain sup-
port, the candidate should work with the Left and not the middle or Right.
The same possibilities apply to single- member district two- round leg-
islative elections, since the presidential election is a single- member  district 
election. In legislative elections, however, as in the case of FPTP elections, 
voters may care not only about who wins in their district but also about 
which party will gain a majority of the seats or even whether the govern-
ment will be a majority or minority one. This creates additional incentives 
for strategic voting if and when voters take into account the possible out-
comes of the national race.
Divided Government
In the specific case of France, with its semipresidential system, there is 
also the issue of divided government (called cohabitation in France). There 
is divided government when the party that has a majority of seats in the 
National Assembly differs from the party of the president.16 But since the 
presidential and legislative elections are not simultaneous, voters already 
know who will be the president for the next five years when they vote 
in legislative elections, and expectations about the other election thus do 
not come into play. Therefore, the voters have only two choices if they 
care about the president- legislature combination: divided government or 
single- party government. The key is that the outcome of interest for the 
voter— in this case, whether there is cohabitation— has only two options. 
With only two choices, there is no room for strategic voting as we have 
defined it.17 The United States extends this consideration of divided gov-
ernment by having three electoral units, each of which has a role in passing 
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any legislation, thus expanding the array of strategic choices for voters. 
We do not consider this case further, but see Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 
1996); Fiorina (1991, 1992).
In the case of a parliamentary system, the issue of divided government 
takes a slightly different form. Divided government then means that the 
largest party holds only a minority of the seats, as happened in the 2010 
elections in the United Kingdom considered by Abramson et al. (this vol.). 
As a result, passing any legislation requires the formation of a multiparty 
coalition after the election, either on a case- by- case basis between a minor-
ity government and one or more parties not in government or via a last-
ing coalition of parties to forge a majority government, with the party of 
the prime minister needing the support of some other party to remain in 
power or to pass legislation. Some voters prefer minority or majority gov-
ernments. Daoust (this vol.) considers how such preferences affect voting 
behavior in Canadian elections. Voters who prefer minority governments, 
like those who prefer divided government, may decide not to support a 
party that is perceived to have a good chance of gaining a majority of the 
seats. Voters who prefer majority governments may wish to support the 
only party seen as having a good chance to win a majority, even if that party 
is not their most preferred party. There is thus the possibility of strategic 
voting, since voters’ decisions hinge on both their preferences and their 
expectations about election outcomes. Unlike in the case of cohabitation 
or midterm divided government in a presidential system, there is no cer-
tainty about how one’s vote would contribute to the outcome. But out-
side of Canada and the United Kingdom, most parliaments are decided by 
either proportional representation or a mixture of FPTP and proportional 
representation voting. We now turn to strategic voting under proportional 
representation and under mixed systems.
Proportional Representation (PR)
The wide array of PR systems all share two features. First, they con-
tain multimember districts. In some cases, districts are a whole country 
(for example, Israel, the Netherlands); in others, the country is divided 
into regions (for example, Spain, Norway). Second, seats are distributed 
based on the proportion of support shown for a party. As was the case 
under FPTP and two rounds, strategic voting may occur in PR because 
of expectations about the outcome in the district, in the legislature, and 
in the government.
While some observers claim that strategic voting is associated with 
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FPTP but not with PR voting procedures, the Gibbard- Satterthwaite 
theorem tells us that logically there are opportunities for strategic voting 
in every system, including PR. What makes FPTP special in this sense is 
that the logic of wasted voting is very easy to see and implement. Indeed, 
parties and candidates often pursue campaign strategies that remind voters 
about this logic and instruct them on what to do. The situation is more 
complex with PR voting. Empirically, the evidence seeming to support 
“wasted” voting may well be as clear and compelling under PR as under 
FPTP (see Abramson et al. 2010; Riera 2016, table 1.1). Table 1.2 offers a 
simple example, the 1999 Israeli election. In that election, Israelis cast two 
votes, one for prime minister under pure FPTP rules and one for repre-
sentation in the Knesset under what are among the purest cases of PR rules 
in use. Nearly everyone who preferred Barak or Netanyahu most intended 
to vote for him. Many Mordechai supporters also intended to vote for 
him, but one in four reported an intention to cast a strategic vote for their 
second- choice candidate. That is the kind of evidence we would expect 
given the circumstances of the campaign at the time of the survey and 
assuming that voters are purely investment- oriented. But Israelis also cast 
a vote for the Knesset under highly proportional rules. Table 1.2B shows 
that, if anything, the results are even stronger in support of the “wasted 
voting” account in the Knesset election.
At least three kinds of outcomes under PR might motivate strategic 
TABLE 1.2. Preference and the Vote in Israel for Prime Minister and for 
Knesset Representation
A) Voting for PM via FPTP, 1999
Vote intention for
Highest Preference Barak Netanyahu Mordechai
Barak 95.6% 3.2% 1.3%
Netanyahu 5.3% 94.3% 0.4%
Mordechai 8.5% 15.9% 75.6%
Source: Abramson et al. 2010, table 2E.
B) Voting for the Knesset via PR, 1999
Vote intention for
Highest Preference One Israel Likud Center
One Israel 96.3% 1.6% 0.0%
Likud 1.8% 93.6% 0.9%
Center 25.3% 6.0% 61.5%
Source: Compiled by authors from Israel Election Study 1999; Jewish respondents only.
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voting. First, voters might support a party to ensure that it achieves repre-
sentation in the parliament. Generally, that means that a party must pass a 
voting threshold— that is, receive at least a legally specified minimum pro-
portion of the vote— to obtain any representation. Israel previously had a 
relatively low 2% threshold; 5%, as in Germany, is more typical; Sweden’s 
threshold is 4%, while Turkey’s is 10%. An extreme example of threshold 
politics is presented by the United States and its presidential primary sys-
tem. In 2016, for example, thresholds were often as high as 15%; in other 
years, they have reached 20%. The higher the threshold, the harder it is for 
small and new parties to achieve representation (or in the US primary case, 
for presidential candidates to win delegates). Indeed, a threshold of 50% 
means that the PR system has become identical to a majority voting sys-
tem. Theoretically, the set of outcomes over which a PR voter has prefer-
ences is rather like that of FPTP. There are two outcomes— the party does 
or does not achieve the threshold— and the citizen evaluates by prefer-
ences and expectations accordingly. While breaking the threshold is often 
a stated goal of a party and often claimed to motivate voters, if the party 
is anywhere close to the threshold in popular support, it is very difficult 
to measure reliably such a rare circumstance with very low percentages of 
support for a party just at the threshold in a survey. This consideration may 
be very important, but it also can only be investigated via a special research 
design (see Freden 2016).
A second outcome is the number of seats a party wins. For a supporter 
of a given party, the most obvious formulation is that supporters desire 
their party to win more rather than fewer seats. That is, at least over the 
empirically relevant range of likely outcomes, preferences regarding those 
outcomes are monotonically increasing in the number of seats the pre-
ferred party wins. In Israel, with one nationwide district and thus with all 
120 seats allocated in close proportion to the percentage of votes received, 
the set of outcomes is finite but dense (that is, there are many different 
outcomes, each one differently valued, such as my party wins 2 seats, it wins 
3, . . . . m, it wins 119, it wins 120) and preference is increasing with each 
new seat won. In that respect, utility is approximately continuous and for 
this reason is considered to have very little room for the logic of “wasting” 
a vote. Every vote contributes to increased representation, and thus we 
expect that voters will vote for their preferred party in the hope of helping 
it win just one more seat. In such cases, strategic and sincere voters vote 
exactly the same. Of course, all PR systems deviate from a pure one- to- one 
relationship between seats and voters, and this discrepancy provides room 
for strategic considerations.
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More important, unlike Israel, most other PR systems have voters 
select more than one but less than every member of Parliament (often 
in the range of 5 to 10). It is in this case that the Cox m + 1 result really 
takes effect, so that if m is 5, there is strategic room for up to 6 parties to 
survive and win up to 5 seats. And here there is room for strategic voting 
in quite the same way as under FPTP. With so many parties able to win 
seats, however, fewer and fewer voters will back a party that is unlikely to 
win one seat and thus be a prime candidate for the “wasted vote” logic. 
Alternatively, a voter in a multimember district may have near- certain 
expectations for how many seats the preferred party will win and so may 
vote strategically to influence the outcome of a close race. For example, 
if there are four parties and four seats and party A is certain to win two 
seats and party B one, then the voter may choose between parties B and 
C if the race for the fourth seat is close.
But there is an FPTP- like situation in every parliament, and this FPTP- 
like argument is particularly compelling in unitary governments (that is, 
in cases where one chamber of the parliament is dominant in governing). 
After the election determines the allocation of seats, the parties in the par-
liament must select a government with a cabinet and prime minister, and 
this selection is clearly FPTP— that is, only one government forms at a 
time. It is quite reasonable to imagine that voters do care what government 
forms, who chooses policies for the nation, and who leads the nation as 
prime minister (and who occupies other important posts, such as finance 
or defense minister). Thus, the third outcome to consider is government 
composition. In PR systems, where coalition government is the norm, 
considerations of composition take the form of voting to affect the ruling 
coalition. There are two ways that this can be strategic. The first is that a 
voter may desert a sincere preference for a larger party to support a small 
party in the hope that the small party will become a member of a preferred 
coalition (known as rental voting; Meffert and Gschwend 2010). If expec-
tations for a preferred major coalition party winning are high, this might 
be a consideration. This could result, inter alia, in moving the center of the 
governing coalition in a direction favored by the strategic voter (see, for 
example, Duch, May, and Armstrong 2010). The other form of strategic 
voting would be deserting a first- preference small party to support a major 
party that is likely to head a coalition in the case of a close race between 
two potential coalition heads (that is, between the two leading candidates 
for prime minister). Lagos (this vol.) examines this possibility using data 
from the 2016 election in Spain.
Overall, PR systems introduce many different outcomes regarding 
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which voters might have preferences. All of these preferences have the 
potential for strategic behavior, or using a vote in an instrumental way that 
takes into account both party preferences and expectations. To appreciate 
the range of ways that voters may use their vote instrumentally, we need to 
recognize the great range of outcomes that matter to voters.18
Mixed- Member Systems
Having discussed outcomes and potential strategic behaviour in FPTP, 
two- round, and PR systems, it is now necessary to consider the other major 
electoral system type, mixed- member systems. There are two main types of 
mixed systems: parallel, where the two systems work independently of each 
other (sometimes called Mixed- Member Majoritarian), and compensatory, 
where the number of seats allocated to each party is basically determined 
by the list vote (sometimes called Mixed- Member Proportional). In the 
majority of mixed systems, one vote determines the outcome of a single- 
member  district election (usually the FPTP rule), and the other vote is cast 
to support a party, which in turn will affect the proportional allocation of 
second- tier seats. Thus, the outcomes that may affect vote choice in mixed 
systems combine the outcomes for FPTP and PR systems separately.
In parallel mixed systems, each vote may be sincere or strategic on its 
own terms. In compensatory systems, however, a voter knows that the con-
stituency vote will count toward the allocation of seats determined by the 
party vote. This opens up the possibility of using one vote instrumentally 
based on expectations regarding the outcome of the other vote. The prac-
tice of allowing candidates to stand for election for both types of seats at 
the same time can also contribute to this phenomenon, bringing elements 
of personal voting into play (see Gschwend 2007).
The presence of ticket- splitting (for example, voting for a given party in 
the list PR vote and for a candidate of another party in the FPTP district 
vote) is sometimes interpreted as an indicator of strategic voting. Plescia 
(2016) compellingly demonstrates that this is a mistake. In many cases, 
people vote for the candidate of another party simply because they have 
distinct preferences about the parties and the local candidates. Plescia (this 
vol.) shows that this is particularly the case in Japan, where many voters 
have distinct preferences regarding the local candidates. In their analysis 
of Germans’ two votes, Harfst, Blais, and Bol (this vol.) make the same 
point. In addition, they show that it is possible to cast a straight ticket for 
the same party and for both votes to be strategic. In short, ticket- splitting 
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and strategic voting are two different phenomena that need to be clearly 
distinguished.
Strategic voting is likely to be more frequent in mixed systems. This 
is so almost by definition since the presence of two votes increases (by 
100%) the opportunity to cast a strategic vote. But it is also quite possible 
that having two votes makes people think a bit more about how to make 
both votes count. Gschwend (2007) and Plescia (2016, 55) have argued that 
strategic voting in FPTP local district ballots (a common feature of mixed 
systems) is more frequent precisely because it is less consequential and thus 
less psychologically costly for voters with strong partisan preferences.
Part III: Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a general framework for assessing the strategic qual-
ity of vote decisions. Identifying a voter’s goals within the context of a 
given electoral system and thinking through how preferences and expec-
tations may affect actions taken to achieve those goals leads to a better 
understanding of what behavior is sincere and what is strategic. It also leads 
to different conceptualizations of what constitutes strategic voting.
In the chapters that follow, each study presents an analysis of strategic 
behavior in a specific institutional context. FPTP, PR, mixed, and approval 
voting systems are examined in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, 
Japan, Switzerland, Spain, and Germany. Each chapter takes a unique 
approach to a specific case.
Three chapters consider the balance between local and national con-
siderations. Abramson et al. examine the 2010 UK election, building on 
the classic calculus- of- voting model by relaxing two assumptions and thus 
allowing for uncertainty about outcomes and introducing national consid-
erations into voters’ decision making. Using both micro and macro models, 
they find evidence that both local and national considerations are relevant 
for voters, although to different degrees. Local considerations are the main 
factor, but national considerations also produce strategic incentives, and 
such incentives are amplified when local and national considerations push 
behavior in the same direction.
Lago’s chapter also addresses national considerations. The 2015 Span-
ish election failed to produce a viable government— no party commanded 
the support of enough legislators to govern effectively. As a result, Spain 
held another election in May 2016. Going into that contest, it might have 
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seemed logical that voters would have had the national situation in mind 
and would want to elect legislators who would lead to a clear win for a 
party. To this end, Lago analyzes the effects of local and national consid-
erations on voters’ strategic behavior. Surprisingly, however, he finds very 
little effect, although the outcome of a minority or majority government 
seemed to be a pressing concern.
Daoust’s chapter considers the influence on strategic voting of pref-
erences regarding minority or majority government at the national level 
in a single- member district system, where strategic behavior should be a 
local calculation. He looks at the 2015 Canadian election, in which expec-
tations of a minority government were common. The country had expe-
rienced minority governments in 2004, 2006, and 2008, and these expe-
riences informed voter preferences. He finds that minority government 
preferences do matter, although the local calculus dominates voter con-
siderations. His findings are commensurate with those of Abramson et al., 
although Daoust uses different analytical techniques and different mea-
sures of national considerations.
Blais et al. also consider the 2015 Canadian election but do so from a 
different part of the voting calculus. Instead of considering voters’ prefer-
ences, the authors focus on whether providing more information that could 
shape expectations affects strategic behavior. They present the results of an 
experiment that randomly showed voters the latest local or national poll 
results. Given the prominence of expectations in the theory of strategic 
voting, receiving information that a preferred party is unlikely to win should 
inspire strategic behavior. Somewhat surprisingly, they find no effect of the 
experimental treatment. This result raises questions about the origins of 
perceptions and the importance of wishful thinking.
Plescia’s chapter also looks at the role of information in the calculus 
of voting. She examines strategic behavior in the single- member district 
ballot of lower house elections in Japan. Her analysis demonstrates voters’ 
ability to use contextual information— in this case, the number of qual-
ity challengers— to understand the strategic incentives to coordinate. This 
kind of indirect information gathering should inspire researchers to look 
for the cues that voters are likely to use to figure out the nature of electoral 
competition in their district.
The remaining four chapters look at the incidence of strategic behav-
ior in complex contexts. Focusing on Belgium, Verthé and Beyens ana-
lyze whether coalition viability affects voting behavior when coalitions are 
the norm but the party system is complicated. They seek to understand 
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whether voters would try to use their vote strategically even when there 
are two separate party systems, different language groups, and a constitu-
tional requirement for language representation in government. They find 
that voters are still affected by viability and preferences. Indeed, for those 
who have an incentive to vote strategically, the distance between their first 
and second party preferences is a key factor. Voters therefore consider not 
only which parties might have a chance of being in government but also 
whether they like the alternatives well enough to support them and avoid 
wasting votes.
Harfst, Blais, and Bol take a close look at strategic voting in a mixed elec-
toral system. They distinguish three separate types of strategic behavior— 
strategic local desertion (in the FPTP ballot), strategic list desertion (in the 
PR ballot), and strategic coalition insurance voting (in the PR ballot)— a 
common expectation in Germany, where coalition government is the norm. 
Assessing the FPTP and PR votes for the 2013 German election individu-
ally, the authors find that people can and do vote strategically, sometimes 
only on one ballot and sometimes on both.
Van der Straeten, Lachat, and Laslier look for evidence of strategic 
behavior in approval voting in Switzerland. They find that even when vot-
ers appear to have no strategic incentives, there is evidence of strategic 
behavior along the lines put forth by Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016). 
This lends support to the chapter’s overall conclusion that any time a voter 
considers the outcome of the election when making a choice, strategic 
thinking is involved.
Finally, Lebon et al. consider the choices of voters confronted with three 
voting rules that allow them to use their vote in different ways. The results 
demonstrate that voters do not always behave as one might predict. They 
consider alternative explanations for the observed behavior that recognize 
that some parties that are popular (evaluated positively) are also small and 
so do not receive the expected support. They also find that neither strategic 
voting nor sincere voting paradigms can entirely explain voters’ choices.
Understanding the incidence of strategic voting in elections, then, 
requires that we expand our thinking to consider voters’ many preferences 
regarding various electoral outcomes and the ways that voters imagine 
they can use their votes instrumentally. Strategic voting indeed has many 
faces, because the instrumentally oriented voter may have a diversified set 
of goals and the choice of the optimal decision is bound to depend on the 
prevailing political institutions.
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A P P E N D I X
N O T E S
 1. The first such election was 1996. Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated as the time 
for the election campaign neared. While there were likely to have been several 
candidates, the assassination changed the dynamics, with the result that only two 
candidates, Shimon Perez (standing in for Rabin as head of Labor) and Benjamin 
Netanyahu (Likud) ran, and Netanyahu won.
 2. Barak was the head of the Labor Party, running in a coalition with smaller 
parties and called on the ballot “One Israel.” Netanyahu was head of the Likud 
Party.
 3. In the last two weeks of the campaign, his support fell from nearly 20% to 
about 5%.
 4. Still others might have found that the strategic setting inclined them to 
remain supportive of Mordechai, such as those who really did not like Barak much 
better than Netanyahu. And, of course, all those who preferred Barak from the out-
set would stay with him because the strategic setting reinforced their preferences. 
Such voters are sometimes said to have “straightforward” strategies in that their 
strategic and their sincere choices are the same.
 5. For a recent review of empirical findings that often parallels our theoretical 
review, see Riera 2016.
 6. See McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972. For an early empirical application of 
this calculus to voting behavior in Britain, see Cain 1978; for Canada, see Black 
1978.
 7. They actually proved that all voting procedures are consistent with the con-
ditions of Arrow’s theorem (2012), but that includes all systems under consideration 
here.
 8. Imagine a nation with two single- member districts. Party A wins both dis-
tricts with 51% of the vote in each. Party A thus wins 100% of the seats with 51% 
of the vote, while Party B wins 0% of the seats with 49% of the vote. Rarely is the 
result so extreme, but it is common for the plurality- winning party in the nation 
to win far more seats than votes. In the United Kingdom, for example, no party 
has won a majority of the votes nationwide since World War II, but only twice 
has the plurality- winning party failed to win a majority of the seats. In the United 
States, there is considerable public opposition to politicians’ construction of ger-
rymandered electoral districts that seek to capitalize on the mechanical effect to the 
benefit of the majority party.
TABLE A1.1
 1 ahead 2 ahead 3 ahead 1– 2 tie 1– 3 tie 2– 3 tie 1– 2– 3 tie
Vote for:        
1 1−C+D+B S−C+D 0−C+D 1−C+D+B 1−C+D+B S/2−C+D+B 1−C+D+B
2 1−C+D+B S−C+D 0−C+D 1−C+D 0.5−C+D S−C+D S−C+D
3 1−C+D+B S−C+D 0−C+D 1−C+D 0−C+D 0−C+D 0−C+D
Abstain 1 S−C+D 0 1 0.5 S/2−C+B (1+S)/3
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 9. That is so unless the third- strongest contender is nearly tied with the second- 
place party, as was more or less true for Mordechai early in the 1999 Israeli prime 
ministerial election. This psychological effect underlies all of the results in Cox’s 
(1997) classic book.
 10. Palfrey (1984, 1989) was the first to derive a two- party system from rational 
choice theoretic principles, but he did so with both “strategic” and “sincere” voters, 
so that the driving force was not the electorate’s decision making.
 11. Harsanyi (1977) developed game theory with Bayesian expectations among 
citizens (more generally, all players), with the resulting advances in game theory 
yielding him a Nobel Prize.
 12. This expressive term differs from the Downs– Riker/Ordeshook “citizen 
duty” or D term, which comes from voting, no matter for whom. This expressive or 
B term comes only from supporting the appropriate candidate.
 13. Alternatively, the theory might be modified so that a voter who chooses Y 
might get s. With s < B, the purely expressive voter would not choose to vote for Y, 
since that action is dominated by voting for X.
 14. Their accounts also differ substantially from the standard Downsian spatial 
model in terms of candidate strategies.
 15. He developed a theory of party identification, which is where the expressive 
values were located. We simply take his model and apply the expressive term as 
something that any voter (not just partisans) might value.
 16. This is much less likely to occur since legislative elections now take place 
immediately after the presidential election. In the wake of that institutional change, 
the party of the president has always won the next legislative election, partly because 
the presidential party benefits from a honeymoon and partly because most voters 
prefer unified government.
 17. Strategic voting in the presidential election may still occur on the basis of 
expectations about the outcome of the following legislative election. For example, 
some voters who prefer unified government may decide not to support their pre-
ferred candidate in the presidential election because they believe that the party of 
that candidate is too weak to win a majority of the seats in the following legislative 
election. We are not aware of any study that has explored that possibility. However, 
it is similar to the theory applied to divided government in the United States devel-
oped and tested by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 1996) and Fiorina (1991).
 18. The major difference with respect to strategic voting is that under PR, there 
are many ways— and many reasons— for casting a strategic vote, and these differ-
ences may lead to conflicting outcomes, so that some voters cast a strategic vote in 
one direction while some do so in the other direction. Formally, there are equilib-
rium solutions for strategic voting under FPTP but not (or not yet proven) under 
PR. This difference is especially acute because there are so many reasonable moti-
vations for considering the strategic setting and for evaluating the diversity of pos-
sible outcomes.
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The Effect of National and Constituency 
Expectations on Tactical Voting in the  
British General Election of 2010
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Aaron M. Houck, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto,  
and David B. Sparks
The 2010 elections in the United Kingdom provided voters with numer-
ous and diverse opportunities to reason strategically. The Liberal Demo-
crats (Lib Dems)— traditionally finishing a distant third in terms of seats 
in Parliament— vied with Labour to be the principal competition to the 
Conservatives, who failed to win a majority of seats, creating a rare case of 
what the British call a hung parliament.1 These conditions varied across 
constituencies at the district level, and we exploit this variation to study 
the incidence of “tactical” voting. But the national outcome also presented 
strategic considerations for voters, and these conditions varied to some 
extent over the course of the campaign, giving voters interviewed at differ-
ent times different sets of national considerations for tactical voting. This 
presents us with the opportunity to investigate how both local and national 
considerations may shape strategic reasoning among voters and relate to 
each other and to the final choices of voters on Election Day.
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The Problem
Statement
The logic of strategic voting, developed in detail in chapter 1, is simple. 
Strategic voters seek to use their votes to shape the outcome, if at all pos-
sible, rather than to “simply” express their preferences.2 If voters value 
their votes in terms of affecting collective outcomes, they will avoid “wast-
ing” their votes on candidates with no chance of winning. More precisely, 
strategic voters will cast their votes for the candidate who maximizes the 
expected utility, which is a product of the utility they derive from the can-
didate’s winning and their expectations that their votes will be pivotal for 
the candidate’s victory. Though all voters may be strategic and make such 
calculations, only a subset of the electorate faces a strategic context that 
compels them to be “tactical” voters— that is, voters who deviate from 
voting for their most preferred candidate or party. Decades of study have 
confirmed the empirical manifestation of strategic voting, especially in 
observing the regularity of tactical voting under the theoretically predicted 
circumstances. Particularly in “first past the post” (FPTP) electoral systems 
(but also in other electoral systems, including proportional representation), 
candidates expected to lose the race tend to lose supporters who cast tacti-
cal votes for less preferred but more viable candidates (see, e.g., Abramson 
et al. 2010; Riera 2016).
The apparent simplicity of the calculus of voting obscures understudied 
complications to the practice of strategic voting, even in the fairly clear 
strategic considerations presented in modern Westminster systems. Voters 
in such systems cast ballots only for local candidates, but in the aggregate 
their votes determine which party or parties form(s) the national govern-
ment. Thus, such strategic voters may be expected to choose among the 
candidates with these dual considerations in mind. It would be surprising, 
for example, if voters’ opinions about prime ministerial candidates failed 
to enter their thinking, and there is evidence that expectations about the 
national outcome also shape their understanding of the strategic context 
of the campaign. This may be no surprise, because media coverage of elec-
tions focuses heavily on the national race, meaning that voters have good 
information to develop national- level expectations,3 while the amount and 
quality of information available to develop constituency- level expectations 
is varied and often of low quality. In sum, a voter’s strategic context is deter-
mined by both national- and constituency- level expectations and prefer-
ences, and it is a testable question as to how they shape voting behavior.
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Data
We evaluate this approach using data collected from individual Eng-
lish respondents during the 2010 British election campaign. This elec-
tion provides a particularly valuable empirical test of the national- and 
constituency- level components of strategic voting. First, if it is correct to 
rely solely on constituency- level information in calculating tactical voting, 
the 2010 UK contest constitutes a strong test of the assumption, as it is a 
case where voters who might rely on national- level information concern-
ing various parties’ realistic chances of forming a government should have 
been more reluctant than usual to vote tactically, at least for a good part of 
the campaign. The 2010 election was typical in that there was very little 
chance that any one party would win an outright majority of the votes. But 
the 2010 election was atypical in that for the first time in many years, the 
heretofore perennial third- place- finishing Lib Dems were, for at least a 
short while during the campaign, statistically tied with and possibly even 
ahead of Labour in the public opinion polls and thus in second place. At 
that point, according to the theory of strategic voting, no vote for any of 
the three parties would be wasted. The viability of the Lib Dems became 
particularly apparent following the first debate on April 15, three weeks 
prior to the election. An unexpectedly strong performance by Lib Dem 
party leader Nick Clegg resulted in the party’s brief surge toward the top 
of the polls. Clegg’s and the Lib Dems’ chances subsequently declined, but 
they ended up in a governing coalition with the plurality- winning Conser-
vatives. Even so, voters reported taking tactical votes away from the Lib 
Dems, as would be the tactical choice in most British elections since World 
War II.
Second, the 2010 British Election Study (BES) provides an ideal dataset 
to explore the phenomena of tactical voting at the national and local levels. 
More than 7,000 respondents in England were asked to provide evalua-
tions of the three main parties as well as an estimate along two 11- point 
(0– 10) scales of the likelihood of the parties’ winning the national elec-
tion and the local seat. These data allow us to estimate and analyze voters’ 
individual expected- utility calculations using their own expectations rather 
than relying on external (and in the case of local races, infrequent) poll 
results. We can also then aggregate these individual choices to examine 
the overall occurrence of tactical voting. The dynamics of the campaign 
itself— especially the Lib Dems’ surge and decline in the polls— provides 
variation in respondents’ expectations, which allows us to better test our 
theoretical predictions.
Revised Pages
 Effect of Expectations on Tactical Voting in the British General Election 31
Third, the United Kingdom has been one of the primary locations for 
the empirical study of strategic and tactical voting. Evidence of tactical vot-
ing has been found in a variety of voting systems, including runoff systems 
and proportional representation (Abramson et al. 2010; Riera 2016). But 
many scholars expect that tactical voting should be most common in FPTP 
systems like that of the United Kingdom (for early tests, see Black 1978; 
Blais and Carty 1991; Cain 1978). And with a virtually unitary government, 
the single vote cast for a candidate for the House of Commons is the basis 
for determining that nearly unitary government.
These effects are magnified in the United Kingdom because what 
Duverger (1959) referred to as the “mechanical effect” of single- member 
districts that has translated a plurality winner in terms of votes into a 
majority winner in terms of seats in the great majority of elections since 
World War II, thus both justifying and magnifying his “psychological 
effect.” Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between vote and seat pro-
portions in British general elections since 1945. The top two lines show 
how the plurality- winning party (either the Conservatives or Labour) won 
a higher percentage of seats than votes and how that result frequently 
translated a sub- 50% vote share into a single- party majority in Parliament, 
thus indicating the relevance of the mechanical effect. The two lower lines 
show how that legislative seat bonus came at the expense of the third- place 
party (always the Lib Dems or their predecessors), which has consistently 
received a smaller percentage (and often a much smaller percentage) of 
seats than of votes.4 If anything, the seats/vote splits for the Lib Dems 
appear to be growing farther apart over time, suggesting that the mechani-
cal effect, as Duverger proposed, has been supplemented and strengthened 
by the psychological effect, revealed as tactical voting. That is, it appears 
that a significant number of voters abandon the Lib Dems in districts 
where they have little chance of winning. And, if anything, it appears that 
over time voters are learning when to avoid “wasting” their vote.5
Scholars have shown that in recent British elections, a significant subset 
of the electorate who preferred electorally unviable parties voted consis-
tent with the logic of tactical voting based on their understanding that the 
FPTP system would deny their preferred party representation. Evidence of 
tactical voting has been found in the British elections of 1970 (Cain 1978), 
1977 (Fieldhouse, Shryane, and Pickles 2007), 1983 (Fisher 2004; Franklin, 
Niemi, and Whitten 1994; Heath et al. 1991; Lanoue and Bowler 1992; 
Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992), 1987 (Heath et al. 1991; Heath and 
Evans 1994; Lanoue and Bowler 1992), 1992 (Fisher 2004), 1997 (Fisher 
2004; Myatt and Fisher 2002), 2001 (Clarke et al. 2004; Fieldhouse, Shry-
Fig. 2.1. Seat and Vote Percentages, First- and Third- Place Parties, UK 
Elections, 1945– 2010
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ane, and Pickles 2007; Fisher and Curtice 2006), and 2005 (Fisher and 
Curtice 2006; Kiewiet 2013).
The Theory of Strategic and Tactical Voting,  
with Two Modifications
The Standard or Classical Model of Strategic Voting
The theory of strategic voting has been formalized by scholars examining 
the “calculus of voting” (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972). Under this the-
ory, voters maximize the expected utility of their votes calculated by mul-
tiplying the voter’s utility from that candidate’s winning by the expectation 
that the vote will be pivotal or decisive. Thus citizens’ vote choices are a 
function of both their preferences among the candidates and their expecta-
tions about the election outcome. We will thus consider two utility order-
ings of candidates: a simple or pure utility ordering that considers only 
preferences (that is, “sincere” preferences) and an expected- utility ordering 
that combines preferences with expectations. When the two orderings dif-
fer and when an expected- utility- maximizing voter votes for the candidate 
at the top of the expected- utility ordering instead of the candidate at the 
top of the ordering based purely on preferences, we say that the voter is 
voting tactically.
Because tactical voting applies only to supporters of trailing candidates, 
many strategic voters will still vote for their most preferred party. In a three- 
party local race, the two parties with the greatest chance of winning will, 
by definition, be the first choice of at least two- thirds of the electorate (and 
typically will be favored by more than two- thirds), assuming that all voters 
have reasonably accurate expectations about the campaign. Consequently, 
no fewer than two- thirds of the voters in each constituency should vote for 
the party or candidate they most prefer whether for sincere or strategic 
reasons. The exception to this “straightforward” strategy occurs only in 
the narrow circumstances described by Kselman and Niou (2010), when 
the second- most- preferred party is seen as more likely than the most- 
preferred party to defeat the least favorite party (see chapter 1).
Testable Hypotheses Drawn from the Classical Model
There are many empirical tests of the strategic voting model, particularly 
using data from the United Kingdom. The best of these tests are based 
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on testable hypotheses that flow from the classical model of the multican-
didate calculus of voting. We draw here from Kselman and Niou (2010; 
see also Niou 2001), who emphasize the drawing of empirically testable 
hypotheses from the strategic calculus. Their work helps to sharpen our 
theoretical understanding of this well- documented phenomenon. Their 
formal model of voting in a three- party FPTP system, for example, dem-
onstrates that tactical voting can occur only when the voter’s second- most- 
preferred candidate is more likely to win than the favorite candidate.6 We 
extend their hypotheses to cover both national and local strategic consid-
erations, thereby providing a novel mechanism for sorting constituency- 
and national- level incentives for tactical voting. We find strong support 
for our conclusions that both levels of incentives help to explain variation 
in the patterns of tactical voting across England and that voters’ individual 
strategic considerations vary according to informational and viability con-
texts. Before we develop this empirical model, we first introduce our two 
modifications.
Two Modifications of the Classical Model
We believe that voters are influenced by strategic considerations. We also 
believe that the rigidity and determinism of the “classic” statement of the 
calculus of voting in multicandidate contests needs to be relaxed some-
what, much as the behavioral revolution in economics has relaxed par-
ticular assumptions of the rigid, classical rationality model. We propose a 
weakening of two assumptions to the strict, standard model.
First, in any expected- utility model, the estimated probability of an out-
come is assumed to be known with certainty. We imagine instead that vot-
ers are uncertain about this number— that is, they act as if their reported 
likelihood were the mean of a subjective probability distribution. We 
assume, therefore, that there is a stochastic term associated with the prob-
ability terms, reflecting that uncertainty. In practice, we use this assump-
tion solely to assert that voters do not have deterministic expected- utility 
values for the casting of votes for party x rather than y but rather have an 
expected value with variance reflecting uncertainty.
The second weakening of the standard calculus is that voters’ estimates 
of closeness draw from the full campaign— that is, their expectations about 
outcomes are derived from information that might be available about races 
at both the local and the national levels. Further, voters care not only who 
their local MP will be but also which party or parties form the govern-
ment and who becomes prime minister. Indeed, both are found empirically 
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to be important independent determinates of voters’ choices (see Blais et 
al. 2006 on coalitions; Bean and Mughan 1989 on prime ministerial can-
didates). National effects enter the strategic vote in two ways. One way 
is fully within the model: the classical model includes national closeness 
but does so only interactively. A voter might vote strategically if the cir-
cumstances are correct in the constituency, just as usual. Empirically, this 
would show up as voting strategically based on preferences regarding the 
local candidates and/or their parties and the closeness of the vote in the 
constituency. There would be no effect of national closeness on the vote. If 
the national conditions are also ripe for casting a strategic vote, then this 
would show up— and in the classic model would only show up— when it is 
simultaneously appropriate to vote strategically in the constituency and in 
the nation.7 Our relaxation of the classic model says that preferences might 
have a modest direct effect on preferences about the national outcome and 
closeness at the national level. This is not surprising if there is some varia-
tion in citizens’ calculations about closeness in the local electoral district. A 
Bayesian subjective probability distribution of outcomes would have some 
probability of a close outcome happening locally even when the occasional 
polls and conventional accounting of the local race point to that probably 
being very small. But even a very small probability can sustain a (small) 
effect on the national race, even when a voter thinks a close race locally is 
unlikely. Voters may hedge their bets by voting based on national consid-
erations “just in case” (and contrary to what they believe is most likely) the 
local race turns out to be competitive and thus relevant for national seat 
totals. While this model would formally result from an interaction between 
local and national effects, our data (indeed all existing data of which we are 
aware) do not give us sufficient information about the (assumed) subjec-
tive probability distribution of local outcomes to observe this interaction. 
Instead, it would show up empirically as a (modest) apparently direct effect 
of a national basis for a strategic voter’s casting of a tactical vote.
These two modifications are based on the notion that voters may make 
what they believe to be strategic decisions in an environment of incom-
plete information. Existing research (e.g., Blais and Bodet 2006; Blais and 
Turgeon 2004; Lanoue and Bowler 1998; Murr 2013) finds that at the 
national level, polls are a key driver in how voters perceive the competi-
tiveness of the overall election, while at the local level, voters rely on cues 
such as (and perhaps especially) incumbency to make their decisions con-
cerning candidate viabilities in the constituencies.8 Thus, voters may have 
more confidence in their national- level expectations and take that greater 
certainty into account when deciding how to vote.
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These ideas lead to two empirical implications. First, it is appropriate 
from the strategic voters’ perspective to have a stochastic term in the esti-
mation with respect to subjective estimates of probabilities of outcomes. 
That is, while empirical estimations always have such a stochastic term, it is 
justified as a consequence of sampling error. We assume that this is inher-
ent in the choice process itself.9 Second, people care about the national 
outcome as well as the local one— that is, they care about what govern-
ment will form, who will lead it, and perhaps other features of the national 
election. This means that a strategic voter considers both the national and 
local races. Empirically, if this is true, we should expect at least a modest 
interaction effect, as one can be decisive nationally only if one is also deci-
sive locally, and the effect is likely modest, because the probability of being 
decisive nationally is much smaller than locally, ceteris paribus. Under our 
first modifying assumption, we would observe a direct effect of national 
closeness— likely a very much weaker effect, as it may appear to be a direct 
effect primarily because the voter who said the election was not likely to be 
close locally nonetheless is assumed to have a small but still positive prob-
ability of it being close.
Empirical Tests of the Theory of Strategic Voting
We test a theory of strategic voting that predicts that voters will cast their 
votes for the candidate who maximizes their expected utility, where utility 
is derived from both the local and the national outcomes (that is, who wins 
the district and who forms the government). Our theory implies a series of 
testable hypotheses.
We derive our first set of hypotheses about strategic voting in the 
aggregate. These predictions rely on a relatively weak set of assumptions 
about the data- generating process, requiring only ordinal data about vot-
ers’ preferences and expectations. Our second set of hypotheses is the 
consequence of assuming fuller information about the strategic context at 
the microlevel of the individual. This model makes stronger assumptions 
about the measurement of individual voters’ cardinal preferences regard-
ing candidates and expectations about the election outcomes but yields a 
larger and stronger set of implications.
We use survey data from the BES to explore the incidence of tactical 
voting in the 2010 British General Election.10 We limited our analysis to 
respondents from English constituencies and to those who reported a vote 
intention for one of the three major parties.11 Each respondent’s preferences 
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over the three major parties is determined by comparing the feeling ther-
mometer scores given each party.12 Respondents’ preference rankings of the 
parties are compared with their reported vote intention. The reported inten-
tion of tactical voters will deviate from their “sincere” preferences: that is, 
they will report an intention to vote for their second choice instead of their 
most preferred candidate.13 We used the comparison between preferences 
and intended votes to create two new variables, topvote and secondvote for each 
respondent. The variable topvote is a dichotomous indicator of whether a 
respondent reports an intention to vote for the most preferred party. The 
variable secondvote is similarly a dichotomous indicator of whether a respon-
dent intends to vote for the second- most- preferred party, and it serves as the 
key dependent variable in the hypotheses and analyses.14
The BES included a question asking respondents about the rationale 
behind their vote intention. Two of the available responses implicated tac-
tical considerations: “I really prefer another party, but it stands no chance 
of winning,” and “I vote tactically.” Of the respondents who indicated an 
intention to vote for their second- most- preferred party, 61.4% chose one 
of those two responses.15 Among all other voters, only 9.8% (708 of 7,257 
respondents) chose one of those two responses.16 This suggests that our 
secondvote variable provides a good indication tactical voting.
Macrolevel Hypotheses
Our first test of the model of strategic voting describes how we expect 
tactical voting to vary by strategic context in the aggregate using the less 
demanding information from our survey respondents. Like Kselman and 
Niou (2010), we consider respondents’ personal assessments (preferences 
and expectations) of the various parties and then identify these assessments 
by the individual’s preference ordering of the parties (rather than by, say, 
party name). Thus for one voter, the Conservatives might be the most pre-
ferred party (Party 1), and for another voter, the Conservatives might be 
Party 3 (that voter’s third choice— i.e., least favorite party). We can then 
identify each voter’s strategic context by listing whom the voter expects to 
come in first, second, and third. Thus, a voter with a strategic context of 
(1,2,3) faces a situation in which the favorite party has the best chance of 
winning, the second choice has the second- best chance of winning, and the 
least- favorite party has the worst chance of winning, while (2,1,3) denotes 
the case where the second- choice party is expected to win, the first choice 
is expected to come in second, and the third- ranked party is expected to 
come in third place in the vote.17
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Kselman and Niou (2010) consider a three- party contest in one single- 
member district. They prove that of the six possible combinations of 
expected order of finish among the ranked parties,18 only three provide a 
voter with any incentive to vote tactically for their second- choice party— 
those in which the voter’s second- choice party is expected to have a greater 
likelihood of winning than the voter’s first- choice party. That is, tactical 
voting is a theoretical possibility only for orderings (2,1,3), (3,2,1), and 
(2,3,1), and if a voter with an ordering of (1,2,3), (1,3,2), or (3,1,2) votes for 
the second- choice party, it must be for reasons other than strategic consid-
erations. Kselman and Niou note that among the three scenarios in which 
tactical voting is possible, the conditions under which it is a possibility are 
narrower for ordering (2,1,3) than for either (2,3,1) or (3,2,1). Based only 
on the theoretical work of Kselman and Niou, one could place the various 
possible orderings of three parties into three categories based on incen-
tives to tactically vote for a second- choice party. The (1,2,3), (1,3,2), and 
(3,1,2) orderings would be classified as providing zero incentive; the (2,1,3) 
ordering would be classified as having weaker incentives; and the (2,3,1) 
and (3,2,1) orderings would be classified as having stronger incentives. But 
given our behavioral assumptions about voters’ probability estimates— 
that is, our inclusion of a stochastic term allowing for possible errors in 
estimating the parties’ likelihood of winning— even the zero incentive 
ordering includes some possible (albeit minimal) incentive for tactical vot-
ing. Accordingly, we adjust our three categories of incentives to minimal, 
moderate, and strongest. The “minimal” class thus includes (1,2,3), (1,3,2) 
and (3,1,2); the “moderate” class includes (2,1,3); and the “strongest” class 
includes (2,1,3) and (2,3,1).
But these three categories— like the work of Kselman and Niou— 
consider only the case of a single district. In empirical cases, the single dis-
trict is embedded in the national contest, and as in the United Kingdom, 
it is possible to imagine casting the decisive vote in the district and in the 
nation. With perfect knowledge of the true probabilities, one cannot cast 
a decisive vote in the nation unless one does so at the district level too.19 
However, with any uncertainty about the true probabilities, the assumption 
about subjective probability distributions means that there is some nonzero 
probability of being decisive, no matter what the most likely case may be. 
(That is, even voters who think that they will not be decisive at the local level 
have a nonzero probability of being so.) Thus, there may be a small prob-
ability of casting a decisive vote in the nation but not the district, at least 
in terms of how voters respond to the survey questions asked. The result of 
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adding the national level is that the table is now three- by- three. We applied 
the formal logic of Kselman and Niou to this case (it flowing obviously, 
given their original results) with one exception. By assumption, the national 
effect is necessarily small, unless it interacts with a genuine incentive to 
cast a tactical vote locally. That is, we build into the model our assumption 
that tactical voting nationally requires interaction with the local conditions, 
whereas the reverse is not true. Voters have incentives to vote tactically in 
the district based only the strategic circumstances in that district, no matter 
the national conditions. This results in the three- by- three array reported 
in table 2.1, where the entries denote our extension of the Kselman- Niou 
formal derivations. The numbers in the cells reflect our expected ranking 
of each of the nine cells in terms of the likelihood (and thus incidence) 
of tactical voting. Thus, the bottom- right cell, in which voters would face 
the strongest incentives at both the local and national levels, is assigned a 
1, because we would expect those voters to have the highest incentives to 
vote tactically. The 2 cell— in which voters still face the strongest incen-
tives at the local level but only moderate incentives at the national level— is 
directly above cell 1 because our theory suggests that constituency- level 
incentives will dominate national- level incentives. The three lowest- rated 
cells— those labeled 7, 8, and 9— all come in the first column of the table, 
where the constituency- level incentives are minimal, but within this column 
the incentives fall along with the national- level incentives.
TABLE 2.1. Theoretical Expectations of 
Incentives to Deviate from First Preference by 
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Taken together, two hypotheses concerning voter preferences and party 
viabilities follow from our extension of Kselman and Niou’s framework to 
differentiate between perceived competitiveness at the national and con-
stituency levels:
H1. Tactical voting across the respondents as a whole will conform 
to the relative ordering described in table 2.1. That is, the inci-
dence of secondvote equaling 1 will be lowest for the cell labeled 9 
and highest for the cell labeled 1.
H2. A voter’s choice to vote tactically, as measured by the inci-
dence of secondvote equaling 1, will depend on the anticipated 
outcomes in the nation as a whole and within the voter’s con-
stituency.
These macrolevel hypotheses describe how we expect the incidence of 
tactical voting to be distributed across the 2010 British electorate in the 
aggregate. Specifically, we expect that national- as well as constituency- 
level incentives will drive voters’ decisions to vote tactically, although as 
the rank- ordering of cells indicates, we anticipate fewer tactical votes as a 
consequence of national conditions than of local conditions.
Microlevel Hypotheses
For our macrolevel model of the aggregate levels of tactical voting across 
strategic contexts, we created ordinal rankings of voters’ preferences among 
the three major parties and expectations about their electoral chances. But 
the data provide more information than simple ordinal rankings. The 2010 
BES survey asked respondents to provide both types of measures on 11- 
point scales that we can treat as cardinal. We can then use these interval 
measures to create expected- utility variables and thus to test a microlevel 
model of individual decisions to vote tactically.
The theory of strategic voting implies that only some (indeed perhaps 
none) of those who prefer the trailing parties should vote tactically. For 
example, if voters like (or dislike) their second- and third- most- preferred 
parties roughly equally, that small difference would obviate the rationale 
for voting tactically. Or if a voter’s second- most- preferred party has just 
about the same chance of winning as the favorite party (as in a landslide 
being won by the least- preferred party), that vote would be wasted in either 
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case, and the voter could continue to vote for her favorite, if likely third- 
place- finishing, party. To put these and other similar comparisons together, 
voters will vote tactically only if the expected utility of voting for their 
second choice is larger than the expected utility of voting for their first- 
choice party.
We can put these informally discussed hypotheses together into a 
clearer form. Notationally, let p denote probability terms, b denote prefer-
ence terms (measured in cardinal utilities), and let subscripts 1, 2, and 3 
denote the parties in the order of voter preference. We are concerned with 
the expected utility of voting for Party 1 compared to that for voting for 
Party 2, and so on. Hence, we use the term p12 to represent the difference 
in the probability of Party 1 winning if the voter votes for that party and 
the probability of Party 2 winning if the voter votes instead for that party. A 
large value for p12 indicates an expectation that Party 1 is much more likely 
than Party 2 to win, ceteris paribus; a negative value implies an expectation 
that Party 2 will outperform Party 1. Similarly, b12 represents the differ-
ence in utility if Party 1 is elected and if Party 2 wins— it indicates just how 
much the voter prefers Party 1 to 2. Values for b12 will always be positive, 
but larger values indicate a stronger preference for Party 1, while values 
closer to 0 suggest more indifference between the parties. The full term, 
pb12, is the product of the expectation differential and the utility differential 
for Party 1 and Party 2.20 The variable pb13 is the analogous term expressing 
the product of the expectation and utility differentials of Party 1 and the 
least- preferred party, and pb23 is the comparison between the second- and 
third- most- preferred parties. With this notation, we can write the follow-
ing equation:
Pr(secondvote = 1) = f(pb12, pb13, pb23 ) (1)
Furthermore, we can derive the following hypotheses, where the variable 
to be explained is the probability of voting for the second- most- preferred 
party (or where secondvote equals 1):
H3. As pb12 increases, the chances of voting for the second- most- 
preferred party (Party 2) should decrease (that is, the incentives 
to vote tactically should decrease), whether that is because Party 
1 has an increasingly large chance of winning, because the voter 
has an increasingly strong preference for that party over the 
second- most- preferred party (Party 2), or both.21
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H4. As pb13 increases, the chances of voting for Party 2 should 
decrease (as the incentives to vote tactically should decrease), 
whether that is because Party 1 has an increasingly large chance 
of winning, because the voter has an increasingly strong prefer-
ence for that party over the least preferred party (Party 3), or 
both.
H5. As pb23 increases, the chance of voting for Party 2 should 
increase (and the incentives to vote tactically should increase), 
whether that is because Party 2 has an increasingly large chance 
of winning, because the voter has an increasingly strong prefer-
ence for Party 2 over Party 3, or both.
This microlevel model allows us to make predictions about the proba-
bility that individual respondents will vote for their second- most- preferred 
party. Specifically, the model predicts that voters will be most likely to devi-
ate from their sincere preferences when the theory of strategic voting sug-
gests that they have the strongest incentives to vote tactically.
Together, our models’ macro- and microlevel predictions for the 2010 
British election offer more precise expectations for the incidence and dis-
tribution of tactical voting than previous work examining the theory of 
strategic voting. The specifications of the microlevel models are, to a large 
extent, similar to those employed by those studying strategic voting in 
other elections (e.g., Abramson et al. 1992; Merolla and Stephenson 2007). 
The difference is that we compare estimates obtained when using voter 
assessments of both national- and constituency- level viabilities.
Results and Analysis
The percentage of voters who reported that they intended to vote for the 
party they liked the most varied considerably throughout the campaign. 
Figure 2.2 presents the topvote proportion over time for the electorate 
overall and for each party. The plot shows that in the early stages of the 
campaign, the Conservative Party was receiving the intended vote of a high 
proportion of its supporters, Labour was capturing a smaller proportion 
of the intended votes of its supporters, and the Lib Dems were receiving 
a much lower proportion of the intended votes of their supporters, just as 
the theory of strategic voting predicts given that the Lib Dems were in 
third place in most English constituencies. In other words, early on in the 
race strategic Conservative voters and Labour voters could vote straight-
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forwardly, while only Lib Dem voters faced any strategic incentives to vote 
tactically. This changed following the first televised debate, which featured 
a strong performance by Lib Dem prime ministerial candidate Nick Clegg. 
The consequence was a dramatic change in the strategic setting, making 
the Lib Dems a strategically viable choice in many districts. At the same 
time, Labour usually fell into a near tie or even into third place. As a further 
result, the Lib Dems began capturing more of the intended vote of their 
supporters. For the remainder of the campaign, the Conservatives contin-
ued their strong performance among their supporters, while Labour and 
the Lib Dems captured similar but lower proportions of the intended vote 
of their supporters.22 All of these findings are exactly what we would expect 
overall if voters were strategic. Of course, more precise information about 
individual constituencies will render a more exact reflection of the strategic 
context respondents to the BES faced in their respective districts.
Most respondents for whom we have data reported an intention to 
vote for their most preferred party (7,237 of 7,660, 94.5%). Of the 423 
respondents who reported an intention to deviate from their top choice, 
396 (93.6%; 5.1% of the total respondents) indicated that they would be 
voting for their second choice, while just 27 (6.4%; 0.35% of the total 
respondents) indicated an intention to vote for their third choice. Thus, 
most voters voted for their most preferred party (whether sincerely or stra-
tegically), while within the pool of possible tactical voters, the vast major-
ity were voting for their second- most- preferred party, as predicted by the 
theory of strategic voting.23
The second component of voters’ expected- utility calculations are their 
estimations of the efficacy of their votes— that is, the likelihood that it will 
affect the outcome. Like the vast majority of scholars who have studied 
this problem, we assume that this personal efficacy of an individual’s vote 
is closely related to and thus proxied by the perceived closeness of the 
contest: the closer the vote is expected to be in the nation or the constitu-
ency, the more likely that one vote will affect the outcome. The BES asked 
respondents to estimate the likelihood that each party would win their 
individual constituencies as well as the likelihood that each party would 
win the national election. We used these measures to estimate voters’ con-
stituency- and national- level expectations.24
Macrolevel Results
We first consider the evidence supporting the claims of the macrolevel 
model regarding aggregate levels of tactical voting across the different 
strategic contexts the voters faced. Table 2.2 fills in the cells of the three- 
Fig. 2.2. topvote Proportion by Party and by Date
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by- three table presented in table 2.1 using the actual observed proportion 
(and percentage) of respondents in each strategic context who reported an 
intention to vote for their second- choice party. The results in Table 2.2 
support H1 (the hypothesis that the incidence of tactical voting should fol-
low the rank- ordering of cells in table 2.1). Looking first at constituency- 
level incentives, we see that the incidence of tactical voting increased as 
expected— that is, tactical voting percentages increase across each row 
from minimal through moderate to the strongest incentives. Just 1.39% of 
voters who found themselves in the strategic context with minimal incen-
tives to vote tactically reported an intention to vote for their second- choice 
party.25 In contrast, 8.76% of those facing moderate incentives voted for 
their second- choice party, and 27.1% of those facing the strongest incen-
tives did so. The differences between these categories are statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, as predicted, voters’ decisions about voting tactically do 
appear to be based on their expectations regarding the outcome within 
their local constituency.
Table 2.2 also supports the hypothesis that voters’ strategic calculations 
were influenced by their national- level expectations. Voters in the strategic 
context with minimal national- level incentives to vote tactically did so just 
TABLE 2.2. Proportion and Percentage of Voters 
Reporting an Intention to Vote for Their Second- Choice 
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3.99% of the time, while those facing moderate and the strongest such 
incentives did so 14.0% of the time and 15.5% of the time, respectively. 
The differences in proportion between minimal national incentives and 
both moderate and the strongest national incentives are statistically sig-
nificant. The differences in the incidence of secondvote among voters fac-
ing moderate and the strongest incentives is not statistically significant, 
although, as predicted, the rate of voting for the second- choice party was 
higher in the strongest incentive category than in the moderate category. 
The data thus support the inference that both constituency- and national- 
level expectations factored into voters’ decisions to vote tactically for their 
second- choice party.
Table 2.2 provides further evidence in support of H2 (tactical voting 
depends on the interaction between national and local strategic condi-
tions). Table 2.2 supports this interaction between the constituency- and 
national- level incentives and the incidence of secondvote across the nine dif-
ferent strategic contexts, and table 2.3 illustrates this phenomenon a bit 
more directly. It shows the ordering of the actual rate of tactical voting 
across these nine different contexts; that ordering can then be compared 
with the theoretical expectations set out in table 2.1. Of the nine different 
contexts, just one was out of order according to our theoretical expecta-
tions (the actual cell with the sixth- highest incidence of secondvote was asso-
ciated with the strategic context we expected to have the eighth- highest 
rate). Table 2.3 also reports for each cell— starting with the cell labeled 1 
at the bottom right— which cell next in the ordered ranking is the first to 
have a statistically significant different rate of secondvote. Thus although 
the difference between cells 1 and 2 is as expected, it is not statistically sig-
nificant; however, the difference between cells 1 and 3 is both as expected 
and statistically significant. Given the overall rate of tactical voting,26 the 
small number of respondents who fell into some of the various strategic 
contexts,27 and the fine grain of our theoretical predictions, table 2.3 offers 
strong support for the notion that tactical voting depends on both constit-
uency- and national- level incentives and the idea that constituency- level 
incentives tend to dominate strategic considerations regarding an inten-
tion to vote for a second- choice party. Moreover, the fact that most voters 
voting for their second- choice party were found in the strategic contexts 
with the highest incentives for tactical voting indicates that in the 2010 
British election, strategic considerations trumped any other voter moti-
vations for deviating from their most preferred parties, such as casting a 
protest vote or a bandwagon vote.28
A sharp decline occurred in the absolute number of respondents in each 
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category of increasingly favorable incentives for tactical voting. About 60% 
of all respondents fell into the cells where we expected that strategic voters 
would engage in nearly no tactical voting. Conversely, only 4% of respon-
dents faced a strategic context in which the incentives to vote tactically 
were the strongest. It is thus unsurprising that the overall percentage of 
those casting tactical votes is relatively low, even if every voter in Eng-
land reasoned strategically. The great majority faced the straightforward 
strategy of voting for their sincere (that is, most preferred) choice. The 
vast majority of voters perceived themselves as facing a strategic context 
offering relatively weak or even no incentives to vote tactically. Careful 
examination of the full data array indicates that the variation in tactical 
voting seems to result more from constituency- level factors than national 
factors (see Lanoue and Bowler 1998 for similar findings from Canada). 
This is a helpful observation because, while reasonable observers disagreed 
about the outcome expected nationally, the only “true” variation in national 
competitiveness was genuine (but relatively modest) variation over time 
in expectations about the election results. Conversely, considerable true 
variation occurred in competitiveness across the various constituencies.
Finally, the concentration of the highest proportion of tactical voting 
in the cells marked strongest also supports the idea that an interaction 
occurred between strategic considerations at local and national levels. As 
table 2.3 shows, tactical voting increased far greater than merely linearly 
TABLE 2.3. Actual Ordering of Incidence 
of secondvote (and Next- Ranked Cell with 
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and was especially high only when conditions were ripe for tactical voting 
at both levels. Thus, in addition to concluding that the local level provided 
the stronger context for strategic reasoning to induce tactical choices, we 
may also conclude that the strategic context’s support for tactical voting at 
both the local and national levels raised the incidence of reported tactical 
voting to quite high levels— that is, to where more than a third of such 
relevant respondents chose to vote tactically.
Microlevel Results
To test our microlevel model of individual tactical voting and the related 
hypotheses, H3– H5, we estimate a series of models of tactical voting using 
individuals’ expected- utility differentials.29 That is, we estimate a probit- 
regression form of equation 1 using the approach developed by Abramson 
et al. (1992). The right- side variables are the 2010 BES data on feeling ther-
mometers (for the b terms) and constituency- and national- level electoral 
expectations (for the p terms).30 The models include covariates measuring 
the strength of respondents’ reported partisan identification for the most 
preferred party (pid1, ranging from 0 to 3), a dummy variable indicating 
whether respondents were contacted by the most preferred party (contact1), 
and a dummy variable indicating whether respondents were contacted by 
the second- most- preferred party (contact2).31 The coefficient estimates for 
the pb variables provide the direct test of H3– H5.
We first estimated separate models for constituency- and national- level 
expectations. We then created two dummy variables, tactnat and tactcon, 
indicating whether the respondent voted in a strategic context— nationally 
and locally, respectively— that suggested tactical voting and ran two addi-
tional models including them. Table 2.4 presents the results.32 We pro-
ceeded in this fashion because of the high level of multicollinearity that 
led to explosive increases in standard errors of estimates and related signs 
of very high levels of multicollinearity (see the appendix to this chapter). 
Thus, the inclusion of tactnat and tactcon presents the only viable way of 
including the two levels in one model. It represents a sort of fixed effect 
for one level, allowing fuller tests of hypotheses of variables measured at 
the other level.
As expected, all four models found a negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between secondvote and the pb13 terms (supporting H4), 
and the coefficients appear to be large. Again as expected, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between secondvote and the pb23 terms 
(supporting H5) was estimated for the constituency- level measure, but the 
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counterpart at the national level was small, incorrectly signed, and not sig-
nificantly different from 0. Three of the four models estimate a negative 
relationship between secondvote and the pb12 terms (supporting H3). None 
of these estimated coefficients, however, is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. Thus, there is clear positive support for the overall microlevel 
model, but the results vary with respect to individual terms.33 In particular, 
there is greater (if not quite complete) support for the constituency- level 
measures than for the national- level measures, for which only the estimate 
coefficient for the pb13 term was large and statistically significant.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for tactnat in Model 
3 supports H1 and the idea that national- level incentives matter for tacti-
cal voting, even in the presence of and controlling for constituency incen-
tives (which supports H2).34 Thus the data from the 2010 BES suggest 
TABLE 2.4. Probit Regression Results
Probit Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −1.27* −1.19* −1.37* −1.76*
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15)
pb12con −0.09 0.43  
  (0.73) (0.93)  
pb13con −4.38* −4.64*  
  (0.38) (0.49)  
pb23con 5.14* 5.58*  
  (0.58) (0.72)  
pb12nat   −1.39 −0.19
    (0.84) (1.03)
pb13nat   −1.76* −1.86*
    (0.45) (0.57)
pb23nat   −0.23 −0.15
    (0.72) (0.93)
tactnat   0.27*  
    (0.10)  
tactcon   1.11*
    (0.11)
pid1 −0.32* −0.25* −0.28* −0.31*
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
contact1 −0.32* −0.58* −0.30* −0.31*
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
contact2 0.51* 0.71* 0.44* 0.46*
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
N 3,704 3,766 2,413 2,471
AIC 1270.78 1462.33 841.88 892.90
BIC 1,444.86 1,636.87 1,027.11 1,078.90
log L −607.39 −703.16 −388.94 −414.45
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * indicates significance at p < 0.05.
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that the behavior of the British electorate was consistent with our theory 
of strategic voting. To examine the nonlinear relationship between the 
independent variables and secondvote in our probit regression, figure 2.3 
illustrates a series of first- differences plots using Model 3. The plots show 
how the presence of national- level incentives to vote tactically affect the 
predicted values for secondvote over a range of values for a selected compo-
nent of the pbxy terms while holding all else constant.
35 We achieve this by 
simulating 1,000 times the predicted probability that a respondent would 
declare an intention to vote for Party 2 across specified values for the 
independent variables using the probit model.36 For example, figure 2.3(b) 
contains curves showing the relationship between pb13 and secondvote for 
voters with national- level incentives to vote tactically and for voters with-
out such incentives. Both curves show the theoretically expected negative 
relationship between pb13 and secondvote— as the expected utility from Party 
1 increases, the likelihood of voting for Party 2 declines. The predicted 
values for secondvote are lower for the range of pb13 when tactnat is 0, which 
Fig. 2.3. Predicted Probabilities Showing Effects of National- Level Incentives
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is also consistent with our expectations. Similarly, figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(c) 
each depict two curves— one with tactnat equal to 1 and one with tactnat 
equal to 0— showing the relationship between pb12 and pb23, respectively, 
and secondvote, holding all other variables constant. The upward slope of 
the curves for pb12 in figure 2.3(a) is contrary to our expectations but sta-
tistically insignificant, and it nevertheless shows the theoretically expected 
relationship between the existence of national- level incentives and likeli-
hood of voting for Party 2. Figure 2.3(c) conforms to all our expectations.
High collinearity led us to run separate estimations using the respon-
dents’ national- and constituency- level viability assessments. One reason 
this is not surprising is that one component of the pb terms, the respon-
dents’ evaluations of the parties, is the same across contexts. Nonetheless, 
we both assessed the predictions of our microlevel models and assessed 
whether improved predictability occurs when results from the model 
employing national viability assessments are considered.
We assessed the predictions of our microlevel models by comparing the 
predictions of the regressions with the actual results observed in our sam-
ple. To do so, we reconsidered table 2.2, our reporting of secondvote, sorted 
by strategic context. We repopulate the table cells using several methods: 
by performing a series of 100,000 draws of secondvote values from the full 
sample (excluding entries for which data were incomplete); by filling all 
cells with the mean value of secondvote (5.17%); by filling all cells with the 
modal value of secondvote (0); by filling the cells with the values predicted by 
the model using only constituency- level expectations (Model 1); by filling 
the cells with the values predicted by the model using only national- level 
expectations (Model 2); and by filling the cells with the values predicted by a 
model using both constituency- and national- level expectations (Model 3). 
We then calculated the root- mean- square error (RMSE) for each method 
compared with the actual results from table 2.2. Figure 2.4 presents the 
results. The plot shows the density plot of the RMSEs for the 100,000 
bootstrapped cells. The Average Deviation vertical line depicts the RMSE 
from using the mean value of secondvote to fill all cells. The No Deviation 
vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the modal value of secondvote 
for all cells. The Constituency Only vertical line depicts the RMSE from 
using the predictions from the model using only constituency- level expec-
tations. The National Only vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the 
predictions from the model using only national- level expectations. And the 
National + Constituency vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the 
predictions from the model using both constituency- and national- level 
expectations.
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Figure 2.4 shows that the predictions of all three models significantly 
outperform either null hypothesis (that is, either the mean or modal val-
ues of secondvote). Moreover, all three models outperform an overwhelming 
majority of the predicted probability tables generated by randomly per-
muted data. Among the three models, National + Constituency has the 
most predictive power. Both Constituency Only and National Only esti-
mates of tactical voting based on the strategic context help explain the vari-
ance in tactical voting. But the difference between Constituency Only and 
National Only confirms our earlier finding— consistent with our theory— 
that constituency- level incentives tend to drive the decision to vote tacti-
cally more than do national- level incentives.
Conclusion
Some observers argue that voters in a democratic society should reveal 
nothing but their true preferences in the voting booth. But voters value 
their votes and when the appropriate circumstances present themselves act 
in a way to make those votes consequential. That is, they engage in the 
same sort of trade- offs between policy and winning that torture practicing 






















































Fig. 2.4. Comparison of RMSE
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have concerns about “wasting” their votes by casting a vote for a party with 
no chance of winning. The 2010 British election and the 2010 BES dataset 
present a rich and varied context in which to rigorously test fine- grained 
predictions derived from the theory of strategic voting. We find strong 
support for four of our five hypotheses, which together provide a quite 
precise explanation of how individuals’ decisions to vote tactically vary by 
strategic context.
Most English voters in the 2010 UK election faced a strategic context 
that allowed them to vote straightforwardly in accordance with their sin-
cere preferences. After all, the theory of tactical voting suggests that vot-
ers have incentives to strategically deviate from their top- choice candidate 
or party when they believe their second- choice option has a better chance 
of defeating their last- choice alternative. In the 2010 UK election, then, 
the phenomenon of tactical voting occurred infrequently among Conser-
vative voters, because their party typically ran first or second in the polls. 
Among Labour and Lib Dem voters, however, the strategic context more 
often suggested voting against the worst option than voting for the favorite 
option. Moreover, such voters took into account likely national outcomes 
in addition to the probable election results in the local constituency. Fully 
understanding the strategic context facing potential tactical voters in the 
2010 UK election requires looking at the relative preferences regarding the 
candidates and the relative expectations for the various candidates in both 
local and national races. The evidence presented here suggests that voters 
were aware of their electoral context and voted tactically (or not) in accor-
dance with the predictions of a rational- choice theory of strategic voting.
This chapter constitutes a novel attempt to tease out how national- 
and constituency- level expectations factor into strategic voting. By taking 
advantage of a very large dataset, we show that both constituency- and 
national- level expectations influence vote intentions and model voting 
behavior utilizing both constituency- and national- level expectations con-
sistent with the calculus of voting. Our models confirm that the combi-
nations of constituency- and national- level expectations and preferences 
predict whether or not voters intend to vote for their favorite party. We 
find evidence that although constituency- level viability estimates are more 
powerful, national- level expectations do drive decisions to vote tactically 
even in noncompetitive constituencies. Thus, empirical models that rely 
solely on constituency- level factors to explain tactical voting and estimate 
its effects on national elections (see, e.g., Kim and Fording 2001) may 
underestimate the frequency and impact of tactical voting. Similarly, stud-
ies seeking to estimate the effects of tactical voting on national results that 
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restrict their analyses to voters who expect their preferred party to fin-
ish third (and thereby exclude voters who expect that their favorite party 
will finish second behind their second- most- preferred party nationally or 
locally; [e.g., Kiewiet 2013]) may also be underestimating the effects of 
tactical voting.
As we hypothesized, respondents are most likely to vote for a party 
other than their most preferred when both national- and constituency- 
level expectations predict tactical voting because the favorite party is in last 
place. While constituency conditions outweighed national conditions in 
determining the casting of a tactical vote, as our theory implies and figure 
2.4 makes clear, both were shown to be significant and substantial forces in 
shaping strategic voting decisions. We also find tactical voting when only 
constituency expectations or national expectations predict such behavior, 
including when the favorite party is expected to finish second behind the 
second- most- preferred party.
The theory of strategic voting assumes that voters struggle with a diffi-
cult calculus in making voting decisions. To vote rationally and strategically, 
a voter needs to know the relative standing of the parties. Fluid national 
polls and highly variable constituency- level considerations complicate 
such calculations. Nevertheless, we found that tactical voting conformed 
to a variety of sometimes quite specific, testable hypotheses derived from 
rational- choice theory. Voters, like all other political actors, tend to make 
trade- offs based on rational calculations in their political best interests.
A P P E N D I X
This study presents evidence that constituency- and national- level con-
siderations influence voters’ strategic decisions regarding voting. Ideally, 
we would be able to show additional evidence for such interactions via our 
probit regressions. In fact, we ran several additional models that included 
terms to estimate the interactions between constituency- and national- 
level expectations. One such model simply interacted the various constitu-
ency and national pb terms; another interacted simply the constituency and 
national p terms; and a third interacted the constituency and national p 
terms, normalized across the various comparison pairs (12, 13, and 23).
The interactive terms did not add to our model’s explanatory power. 
Of the nine interactive terms tested across the three models, only one was 
statistically significant. The standard errors associated with the estimated 
coefficients for these interactive terms were quite high.
Not surprisingly, issues with multicollinearity appear to be to blame. 
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When we calculated the correlation coefficient between the variables 
included in our models, we found high values. These high correlations 
existed within our base model: the pb12 term for the constituency level was 
correlated with the corresponding national- level term at 0.471. The simi-
lar measures for the pb13 and pb23 terms were 0.384 and 0.290, respectively. 
And the correlations between the pb12 and pb13 terms were high (0.544 for 
the constituency term, 0.643 for the national term) because they incorpo-
rated much of the same information. This is an unavoidable artifact of our 
modeling approach as well as our data. The b terms we used for individu-
als were based on feeling thermometer scores for the various parties— the 
BES did not collect different scores for the particular candidates. And the 
respondents’ expectations regarding the outcomes in their local constitu-
encies and the national race also tended to be highly correlated.
But the correlations between the base pb terms and the interaction terms 
was even higher. For example, the interaction between the constituency- 
level pb12 term and the interactive pb12 term we created for the normalized 
model was 0.850, while the similar terms for pb13 and pb23 were 0.893 and 
0.881, respectively. These high correlations resulted in multicollinear-
ity issues that forced us to abandon our hopes of modeling interactions 
between constituency- and national- level incentives.
N O T E S
 1. A hung parliament is simply a case in which no one party wins a majority of 
seats in Commons and therefore can form the government on its own. Since World 
War II, no party has won a majority of the vote, but the leading party almost always 
sees its plurality of votes translated into a majority of seats. The 2010 election was 
one of those rare exceptions: the Conservatives held a large plurality of seats and 
formed a majority government by coalescing with the Lib Dems, who had finished 
third in votes and in seats.
 2. As Brennan and Hamlin (1998) show, what they call expressive voting is nei-
ther simple nor simple- minded. What this chapter calls strategic voting, they refer 
to as instrumental voting. They carefully consider the possibility that everyone 
might simultaneously have a mixture of instrumental and expressive considerations, 
and they outline models for that circumstance, much as Fiorina (1976) does (see 
chapter 1).
 3. Murr (2013, 15) finds that in UK elections between 1974 and 2005, if British 
citizens used even a randomly selected national campaign poll to predict the even-
tual winner of the election, then they would be correct at least 80% of the time.
 4. Kiewiet (2013), however, finds that many Labour voters responded to 
constituency- level signals to cast tactical votes for the Lib Dems from 1983 to 
2005.
 5. This is similar to what Reed (1990) found with respect to the slow develop-
ment of Duvergerian results in postwar Japan.
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 6. Most previous work on tactical voting asserted that it is restricted to support-
ers of parties that are expected to finish third out of three parties (see, e.g., Alvarez, 
Boehmke, and Nagler 2006; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), but Kselman and Niou 
(2010) demonstrate that voters have incentives to cast rationally tactical votes in 
some circumstances where the most preferred party is second to the second- most- 
preferred party (see also Blais and Nadeau 1996, which looks at tactical voting 
among voters whose second- most- preferred party has a higher expectation of win-
ning than their most preferred party).
 7. That is, voters perceive their chances of being pivotal in the nation as the 
chances of being pivotal in selecting the local candidate and the chances that that 
winning candidate is pivotal in the parliament in terms of government formation.
 8. These scholars assume that the voters have some knowledge about the close-
ness of the race in their constituency, but the scholars can only observe incumbency, 
a variable that makes a great deal of difference in the chances of a nonincumbent 
party winning that seat.
 9. We assume that there is a normally distributed variance in estimation, as 
reported by the “how close” measure. Obviously, if we had available complete sub-
jective probability distributions, we could exploit a more fully developed treatment 
of the assumed stochastic term.
 10. This chapter employs data from the 2010 “rolling cross- sectional” Campaign 
Internet Panel Survey (CIPS) wave of the 2010 BES. After completing a precam-
paign survey over the Internet, respondents were asked to complete the CIPS at a 
randomly selected time so that representative subsamples of the panel responded 
on each day of the campaign. Respondents were then asked to complete a follow- up 
survey after the election. CIPS had a total sample size of 14,973, and respondents to 
the internet waves of the BES are randomly selected from YouGov’s pool of more 
than 350,000 Britons. The survey firm employs complex recruitment techniques, 
matching methods, and weighting procedures to produce representative samples of 
target populations. On the similarity of results obtained via this and probability- 
based sampling methods for the 2005 BES, see Sanders et al. 2007.
 11. We excluded respondents who expressed a vote intention for a party other 
than the three national parties because the BES did not include feeling thermome-
ters for smaller parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party or British 
Independence Party. The survey did include feeling thermometers for the Scottish 
National Party and Plaid Cymru, but we excluded non- English respondents from 
our analyses because of the unique regional effects of these two parties.
 12. Some respondents reported the same feeling thermometer scores for differ-
ent parties (i.e., ties). With only 11 unique scores to assign with the feeling ther-
mometers and at least three parties to score, respondents might tie two parties even 
if they had a slight preference for one over the other. When a respondent reported 
an intention to vote for one of the tied parties, we used that vote intention to break 
the tie. In all other cases, the ties remained. This is a conservative procedure in that 
ties were broken, if at all, in a direction that limits the extent of tactical voting at 
least as observed in the data.
 13. Of course, voters may deviate from their true preferences for reasons other 
than tactical voting, and just because voters cast a vote for their top choice does not 
mean they are not behaving strategically.
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 14. Less than 0.40% of respondents (27 out of 6,791) indicated an intention to 
vote for their third- favorite party.
 15. Among the 396 voters voting for their second- favorite party, 170 said they 
“really prefer[red] another party” and 73 said they “vote[d] tactically.” Among the 
remaining such voters, 67 said “the party has the best policies,” 32 said “the party 
has the best leader,” and 54 cited “other reasons.”
 16. This difference is statistically significant with a two- tailed p- value of less 
than 0.0002. The 95% confidence interval around the difference in percentages of 
51.6% is 46.6% to 56.5%.
 17. While two voters may face the same strategic context of, say, 1,2,3, which 
party is designated 1— that is, the most preferred— can differ from voter to voter. 
Further, the expectation gap between the first- and second- place parties may dif-
fer considerably from voter to voter. But for this macro model, we are concerned 
only with ordinal rankings. The cardinal expectation (and preference) scores will be 
considered in the micro model.
 18. Those six orderings are (1,2,3), (1,3,2), (2,1,3), (2,3,1), (3,1,2), and (3,2,1).
 19. Casting a decisive vote in the nation means that the voter cast a decisive vote 
in the district and that the candidate who thereby won became the MP whose seat 
transformed his/her party into a majority within the Commons.
 20. Thus pb12 = (p1 − p2)*(b1 − b2).
 21. More technically, it is increasing not in probabilities of a party winning but of 
a vote being pivotal in creating a winner. These two probabilities will be the same 
(we assume) as the probability of winning increases from 0 to 0.5. Since virtually no 
one believed any party had a probability of winning greater than 0.5 in this election 
(at least when constraining probabilities to sum to one), the two probabilities are 
purely monotonically increasing in each other, so we use the simpler (and empiri-
cally available) measure of the probability of a party winning the election.
 22. Given that the BES interviewed across the full campaign period, these 
changes indicate that prospective voters faced changing national conditions, which 
means that true changes in expectations occurred over that time. This empirical 
variation provides us with unusual leverage. In addition, the BES interviews were 
done to reflect a (small) random sample of the respondents each day.
 23. In specifying our independent variables, we follow Abramson et al. 1992 and 
develop measures of tactical voting derived from measures of respondents’ reported 
feelings about the national parties and their expectations regarding the electoral 
performance of the parties. However, the BES did ask a more direct question about 
voters’ motivations for casting their ballots. Among English voters, 5.1% stated 
they had “voted tactically,” and another 7.4% reported voting the way they did 
because their truly preferred party had “no chance of winning.” On the similarities 
and differences in the conclusions about tactical voting with the direct and indirect 
measurement, see Blais, Young, and Turcotte 2005.
 24. The 2010 BES includes data on the respondents’ constituencies, including 
the breakdown of the vote. Media lists of battleground constituencies drawn during 
the 2010 campaign closely correspond to the constituencies that had the smallest 
winning margins in 2005. See, e.g., http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/
results/
 25. Kselman and Niou (2010) argue that no tactical voting can occur in such 
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cells and that any secondvotes in such cells must result from other reasons, such as a 
protest vote or a bandwagon vote. Given our relaxation of the perfect knowledge 
of probabilities assumption regarding voters’ estimates of the parties’ chances, our 
theory, in contrast, permits some (albeit very little) tactical voting within such stra-
tegic contexts.
 26. In cells with the highest incentives for and incidence of tactical voting, 
we observed nearly 40% of respondents reporting an intention to vote for their 
second- choice party.
 27. Of the 2,976 respondents for whom data are reported in table 2.2, 1,774 
(59.6%) were within a strategic context that provided minimal incentives at both 
the constituency and national levels to vote tactically, while just 4.10% were within 
a strategic context that provided the strongest incentives from constituency- and 
national- level considerations.
 28. Of course there were additional (and new) parties (e.g., the United King-
dom Independence Party) that could have attracted protest votes that the three 
long- standing UK parties did not. United Kingdom Independence Party, which 
was sparked when Nigel Farage took over as its leader in 2009, continued to influ-
ence British politics at least through the Brexit vote, after which Farage resigned as 
leader, leaving the party’s future uncertain.
 29. That is, we estimate a model explaining secondvote as a function of pb12, pb13, 
and pb23 where pbxy is equal to
(px − py)*(bx − by)
 30. Kselman and Niou argue that models of tactical voting that include voters 
who face no incentives to vote tactically are misspecified, but because our model 
estimates both straightforward and tactical strategic voting, we model all voters, 
not just those who face some incentive to vote tactically.
 31. Other covariates considered but rejected for failing to improve model fit 
include measures of attention to the 2010 campaign, education level, income, and 
reported feelings of political efficacy.
 32. These models were estimated using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 
2012) in the R computer language (R Core Team 2012).
 33. The set of pb variables collectively is statistically significant.
 34. Of course, the very large and statistically significant coefficient for tactcon in 
Model 4 further supports H2.
 35. Because the various pbxy terms contain the same components (e.g., both pb12 
and pb13 have as components p1 and b1), we had to construct specific scenarios to 
illustrate the effects of only one of the pbxy terms. To create the plot showing the 
effects of varying pb12, we varied b1, the feeling- thermometer score for Party 1, and 
left constant p1, the expectation that Party 1 will win. But to eliminate any effects 
of pb13, we set p1 equal to p3. We followed an analogous procedure for the other two 
plots, varying b1 and setting p1 equal to p2 to show the effect of pb13 and varying b2 
and setting p1 equal to p2 to show the effect of pb23.
 36. The range of these 1,000 simulated plots provides an illustration of the con-
fidence intervals of our estimates. We present the 90% confidence interval around 
our estimates.
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Strategic Voting in Changing Times
The 2016 Election in Spain
Ignacio Lago
As chapter 1 discussed, there are both nationwide and district- level logics 
for strategic voting. The 2016 election in Spain offers an interesting sce-
nario for examining the rationales behind them. Proportional representa-
tion (PR) elections in Spain have given rise to a considerable amount of 
district- level strategic voting since the 1970s (Cox 1997; Gunther 1989; 
Lago 2008, 2012; Selb 2012). As most of the districts select five or fewer 
seats, there is room for strategic voting to affect the allocation of seats 
among parties. However, the government composition has been much less 
relevant in voters’ calculus of voting. All elections have led to single- party 
governments. For decades, even when no party received a majority, it was 
relatively easy for the party with a plurality to get the support of subna-
tional parties in exchange for increased regional power and without having 
to make substantial changes to national economic or social policies.
The December 2015 election dramatically changed the institutional 
incentives for strategic voting. First, two new parties, the far- left Podemos 
(We Can) and the center- right Ciudadanos (Citizens) emerged as strong 
competitors, though with unequal results across districts. Second, for the 
first time after the twelve national elections held since the restoration of 
democracy, the parliament failed to choose a prime minister, resulting in 
an early election in June 2016. Thus, the 2016 election was Spain’s first in 
which possible agreements between national parties to form a government 
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were an issue during the campaign, thereby increasing the possibility of 
strategic voting.
This chapter examines the strategic behavior of voters in the June 2016 
election to determine how quickly voters’ calculus of voting is updated 
in an established democracy when incentives for strategic voting change. 
Specifically, the chapter investigates whether voters strategically deserted 
Podemos and Ciudadanos in districts where they had poor chances of win-
ning seats, and whether voters coordinated around those parties with bet-
ter chances of being in the government after the election. In other words, 
this chapter discusses two of the three kinds of outcomes under PR that 
might motivate strategic voting discussed in chapter 1— supporters’ desire 
to have their party win more seats, and voters’ seeking to affect which par-
ties will be in government after the election. The data come from an Inter-
net survey conducted by the Making Electoral Democracy Work project 
(www.chairelectoral.com/medw.html) during the election campaign.
Arguments
The electoral system for Spain’s lower chamber (Congreso de los Diputa-
dos) provides strong incentives for strategic voting to affect the allocation 
of seats among parties. Elections occur under the d’Hondt formula, with 
closed party lists and a 3% threshold at the district level (which might 
matter only in the two biggest districts, Madrid and Barcelona). The 350 
MPs in 2016 were elected in 52 districts with magnitudes ranging from 
1 (Ceuta and Mellila) to 36 (Madrid). The mean district magnitude was 
6.73, and the median was 5. Most of the districts (27 of 52) selected 5 
or fewer seats. For decades, Spain has had two major political parties, 
the center- left Socialist Party (PSOE) and the center- right Popular Party 
(PP); a minor party, the formerly communist United Left (IU); and many 
subnational parties, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 
the eleven elections held from 1977 to 2011, the best third- party results 
were the IU’s 10.64% of the votes and 21 seats in 1996. Not surprisingly, 
a substantial body of research has provided robust evidence of strate-
gic voting in small districts, in particular among IU supporters (García 
Viñuela and Artés 2012; Gunther 1989; Lago 2008, 2012; Selb 2012). In 
Gunther’s words (1989, 842),
This prima facie case for the presence of sophisticated voting is 
strongly corroborated when the voting behavior of these respon-
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dents is broken down by province in accord with the number of 
deputies sent to the Cortes from each district. Respondents with 
highly favorable attitudes toward the third- and fourth- place par-
ties in large provinces were about twice as likely to vote for them as 
sympathizers of those same parties in small provinces.
Conversely, which parties would be in government had never been 
an issue, since all previous Spanish elections had led to single- party gov-
ernments, with the winning party taking between 159 seats (1993) and 
202 seats (1982) in the first eleven elections held after the restoration of 
democracy (a majority requires 176 seats). When the party winning the 
election did not reach the majority of seats, the shared expectation was that 
getting the support of subnational parties would be relatively easy. Both the 
PSOE and the PP behaved in this way. To the best of my knowledge, the 
only estimates of strategic voting to affect the government formation are 
provided by Lago (2005). Most Spanish elections between 1979 and 2000 
show no evidence of this type of strategic voting, and in general terms, 
national- level strategic voting is much weaker than it is at the district level.
Although institutional arrangements have remained unchanged, in the 
2016 election the incentives for behaving strategically at both the district 
and national levels changed substantially. The emergence of Podemos and 
Ciudadanos, mainly as a consequence of the economic crisis and wide-
spread corruption (Orriols and Cordero 2016), in the December 2015 
election had tremendous effect. As table 3.1 shows, they received 20.8% 
of the votes and 69 seats and 14.1% of the votes and 40 seats respectively. 
Their vote shares exhibit a larger variation across districts than do the 
shares of the two largest parties. While Podemos and Ciudadanos got seats 
in 71% and 50% of the districts, respectively, this share was substantially 
higher for the PP (94%) and the PSOE (96%). In other words, the number 
of voters who had the incentive to vote strategically substantially increased 
over previous elections. Table 3.2 displays the voters’ left- right placement 
of the four main parties.
For the first time since the restoration of democracy, the 2016 elec-
tion presented voters with clear incentives to coordinate around those 
parties with a better chance of joining the government after the election. 
The inability to choose a prime minister after the December 2015 elec-
tion became a crucial issue in the 2016 campaign. After the 2015 election, 
Felipe VI first nominated Mariano Rajoy, the leader of the PP, to form 
a new government, but Rajoy turned down the mandate, postponing his 
candidacy by arguing that he had a verified majority against him. Felipe’s 
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next choice, PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez, accepted the mandate but failed 
to pass an investiture vote on March 2, winning support from only 131 
MPs (PSOE + Ciudadanos + a minor regional party, Canary Coalition) 
and being rejected by 219. At the same time, as figure 3.1 shows, the PSOE 
trailed Unidos Podemos in the polls conducted before the election, the 
first time the PSOE had fallen behind another leftist party since the res-
toration of democracy. In sum, PSOE supporters had room to engage in 
strategic behavior if they cared about the parties that would be in govern-
ment after the election.
In the 2016 campaign, party leaders clearly stated their goals for gov-
ernment formation after the election. The PSOE leader declared, “We will 
not support a PP government or support [Podemos leader] Pablo Iglesias 
as the president.”1 However, according to Iglesias, “Everyone is clear that 
we will not have an absolute majority. Any formula of government implies 
an agreement, and  .  .  . we want to govern with the PSOE.”2 Rajoy pro-
posed “a grand coalition with the PSOE.”3 And Ciudadanos’s leader, Albert 
Rivera, declared his party’s willingness “to sit down and negotiate with PP 
and PSOE a plural, broad, and overarching government. But only if it is to 
change things.”4
TABLE 3.1. Results of Spanish National Elections, 2015 and 2016
Party







































aIn 2015, Podemos + En Comú + Compromís + En Marea; in 2016. Podemos + En Comú + Compromís 
+ En Marea + UP − UPeC.
bUnidad Popular: Izquierda Unida + Unidad Popular en Común.




Podemos PSOE Ciudadanos PP
Mean 3.14 4.03 5.36 6.62
Std. Dev. 1.61 1.70 1.40 1.45
N 503 283 250 337
Source: Data from MEDW survey, 2016.
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So did the supporters of Podemos and Ciudadanos and the PSOE 
respond to the incentives to behave strategically? The incentives for dis-
trict- and national- level strategic voting differ for the supporters of the 
three parties. First, I expect that district- level strategic considerations 
should be more important for Unidos Podemos than for Ciudadanos’s 
supporters for two reasons. First, Spain has for decades had more leftist 
parties than rightist parties, meaning that voter coordination around viable 
parties has been an issue for leftist voters but not for rightist voters. In 
addition, in 2016 Podemos and IU formed a preelectoral coalition, Unidos 
Podemos, and strategic voting has been widespread among IU supporters 
for decades. All else equal, Unidos Podemos’s supporters should be more 
aware of the incentives to behave strategically than the Ciudadanos sup-
porters. Moreover, Unidos Podemos is a viable competitor in more dis-
tricts than Ciudadanos. I do not expect that voters strategically deserted 
the PSOE for district- level considerations because it was viable in more 
districts than Podemos (2015) or Podemos plus IU (2016).
Second, voters motivated by the desire to affect the government com-
position had more incentives to strategically desert Ciudadanos than Uni-
dos Podemos in favor of the PP and the PSOE, respectively. According to 
the twelve surveys published between mid- May (when Podemos and IU 
agreed to form their coalition) and six days before the election (see figure 
Fig. 3.1. Pre- election Polls (%). (Data from http://www.argos.gva.es/es/
encuestas/)
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3.1), Unidos Podemos was ahead of the PSOE by between 1 and 6 points. 
However, Ciudadanos supporters had strong incentives to vote strategi-
cally. The 15- point difference in the December 2015 election remained 
more or less constant during the 2016 campaign. As table 3.3 shows, when 
asked about parties’ chances of being in the government after the election 
(with 0 = very unlikely and 10 = very likely), voters clearly saw Unidos 
Podemos’s chances as greater than those of the PSOE. Similarly, PP sup-
porters saw their party’s chances as 1 point greater than those of Ciudada-
nos. Both differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, 
in contrast with the 2015 election, Unidos Podemos supporters faced no 
incentives to vote strategically for the PSOE, which was doing slightly bet-
ter in polls.
Data and Methods
The survey was conducted June 13– 26, 2016, and closed before the elec-
tion started on June 26. A representative sample of 2,278 people were inter-
viewed online.5 The questionnaire included vote intention and two ques-
tions regarding respondents’ perceptions of the various parties’ chances of 
joining the government after the election and of winning at least one seat 
in the respondent’s district.6
The empirical analysis focuses on those voters who had the opportunity 
to vote strategically— that is, those respondents whose first preference was 
Unidos Podemos, Ciudadanos, or PSOE.7 There are three dichotomous 
dependent variables. When explaining pre- election vote intention for 
Unidos Podemos, the variable takes the value 1 if the respondent intends 
TABLE 3.3. Preferred Party’s Chances of Joining the 
Government after the Election (mean value)
Party













N = 790 
 Podemos 7.49
(2.13)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; ***p < 0.01.
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to vote for Unidos Podemos and 0 if the respondent intends to vote for 
another party. When explaining pre- election vote intention for Ciudada-
nos, the variable takes the value 1 if the respondent intends to vote for Ciu-
dadanos and 0 if the respondent intends to vote for another party. Finally, 
when explaining pre- election vote intention for the PSOE, the variable 
takes the value 1 if the respondent intends to vote for the PSOE and 0 if 
the respondent intends to vote for another party.
As table 3.4 illustrates, the great majority of respondents intended to 
vote for their first preference, especially in the case of Unidos Podemos. 
In other words, at a first glance, relatively little strategic voting occurred. 
Given that the dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regressions 
have been run with clusters for districts.
The two key independent variables are voters’ perceptions of Unidos 
Podemos, Ciudadanos, and PSOE’s chances of joining the government 
after the election and of winning at least one seat in the respondent’s 
district. Both are measured using a scale going from 0 (very unlikely/no 
chance at all) to 10 (very likely/certain to win). There are three controls in 
the models. First, the party’s rating using an 11- point feeling thermometer 
ranging from 0 (dislike) to 10 (like) is included. We know that the forma-
tion of electoral expectations is particularly sensitive to wishful thinking: 
voters with strong partisan preferences tend to overestimate the chances of 
their preferred party (Mutz 1998, chapter 6; Blais and Bodet 2006; Guin-
joan et al. 2014; Meffert et al. 2011). Second, the models include a political 
awareness scale going from 0 (no information at all) to 2 (maximum level of 
information).8 Third, the age (in years) of respondents is included.
Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics for the variables. As the table 
shows, 95% of respondents whose first preference was Podemos intended 
to vote for Unidos Podemos, 79% of respondents whose first preference 






Podemos Ciudadanos Other Total
PP 327 0 0 8 13 348
PSOE 3 267 1 16 12 299
Unidos 
Podemos
0 5 417 1 12 435
Ciudadanos 20 11 9 229 23 292
Source: Data from MEDW survey, 2016.
Note: Numbers in each cell indicate the number of individuals.
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was Ciudadanos intended to vote for Ciudadanos, and 93% of respondents 
whose first preference was the PSOE intended to vote for the PSOE. The 
empirical analysis tests the extent to which strategic considerations affect 
those who stick to their first preference.
Table 3.6 shows how those individuals whose first preference is 
Podemos, Ciudadanos, or the PSOE rated the four main parties’ chances 
of winning seats in the respondent’s district. Both Podemos and PSOE 
TABLE 3.5. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unidos Podemos vs Other party (N = 429)
Vote intention 0.95 0.20 0 1
Podemos’s rating 8.51 1.59 1 10
Unidos Podemos’s chances of joining government 7.38 2.08 0 10
Unidos Podemos’s chances of winning seats 8.38 2.16 0 10
Information 1.08 0.53 0 2
Age 42.64 13.86 18 81
Ciudadanos vs Other Party (N = 277)
Vote intention 0.79 0.41 0 1
Ciudadanos’s rating 7.87 1.76 0 10
Ciudadanos’s chances of joining government 6.55 2.09 0 10
Ciudadanos’s chances of winning seats 7.58 2.54 0 10
Information 1.07 0.53 0 2
Age 46.28 13.42 18 80
PSOE vs Other Party (N = 249)
Vote intention 0.93 0.25 0 1
PSOE’s rating 8.10 1.48 4 10
PSOE’s chances of joining government 6.93 2.08 0 10
PSOE’s chances of winning seats 8.45 1.96 0 10
Information 1.00 0.57 0 2
Age 49.29 12.72 18 80
TABLE 3.6. Respondents’ Assessments of Parties’ Average Chances of 





























Source: Data from MEDW survey, 2016.
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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supporters gave the highest chances of winning seats to their favorite party, 
while Ciudadanos supporters credited better chances to the PP than to 
Ciudadanos. In general terms, respondents’ assessments of a party’s chances 
declined as the ideological distance between the respondent and the party 
increased. This finding provides evidence of wishful thinking and strong 
ideological preferences.
Results
Table 3.7 shows the results of the estimates. In all the models, the party’s 
rating has the expected positive sign, but the findings are statistically sig-
nificant (at the 0.01% level) only for Unidos Podemos and Ciudadanos. 
The more respondents like Unidos Podemos and Ciudadanos, the higher 
their probability of voting for them. The gap between the ratings of the 
favorite party and the other three main national parties is much lower for 
the PSOE’s supporters than for the Podemos and Ciudadanos supporters, 
meaning that the party’s rating does not significantly increase the prob-
ability of voting for the PSOE. The level of political information and age 






















































Pseudo R2 0.44 0.09 0.06
N 424 274 247
# of clusters 43 46 45
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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do not significantly affect the probability of supporting Unidos Podemos, 
Ciudadanos, and the PSOE.
When explaining why respondents intended to vote for Unidos 
Podemos instead of any other party, Unidos Podemos’s chances of winning 
at least one seat in the respondent’s district (Model 1) positively affect the 
probability of supporting Unidos Podemos and are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level: the better the chances attributed to Unidos Podemos, the 
more likely a respondent is to support the party. Figure 3.2 shows the effect 
of the variable. For those respondents whose first preference is Unidos 
Podemos and who think that the party has no chance of winning a seat in 
the district (value 0), the probability of supporting the party is 0.82; for 
those who think that the party is certain to win seats (value 10), it is 0.98. 
However, Unidos Podemos’s chances of joining the government after the 
election do not make a difference for respondents: the variable is not sta-
tistically significant, and the coefficient is close to 0.
When explaining the decision to support Ciudadanos rather than 
another party, Ciudadanos’s chances of being in government and of win-
ning at least one seat in the district do not significantly affect the vot-
Fig. 3.2. The Impact of the Chances of Winning a Seat in the District on the 
Probability of Voting for Unidos Podemos
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ing decision. The two variables are far from statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. Similarly, the PSOE’s chances of joining the gov-
ernment and of winning at least one seat in the district are not relevant 
when accounting for the decision to vote for the PSOE or any other party. 
Thus, district- level factors are more relevant than national- level factors in 
explaining strategic voting in Spain. This finding is in line with the evi-
dence provided by Daoust (this vol.) for Canada.
Parties’ chances of winning seats in the district have differing impact 
for Unidos Podemos and Ciudadanos for two reasons. First, Ciudadanos’s 
supporters are not completely aware of its chances of winning the seat, 
since voter coordination around viable parties has not been an issue for 
rightist voters. Table 3.8 examines the accuracy of assessments of Unidos 
Podemos’s and Ciudadanos’s chances of winning a seat in the district. I 
regress the 0– 10 scale on a dummy variable capturing whether the party 
won seats in the district in the 2015 election.9 If voters are well informed 
about parties’ viability, attributed chances in those districts in which the 
party won seats should be greater than in those districts in which the party 
won no seats.
As table 3.8 shows, the chances of Unidos Podemos are 3.25 points 
greater in districts where it won seats than in those where it did not, and 
the variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, there is no 
statistically significant difference in Ciudadanos’s chances in the two types 
of districts. In addition, many districts have very few respondents whose 
first preference is Ciudadanos. Those districts where Ciudadanos won no 
seats in 2015 had only 55 Ciudadanos sympathizers, and only 1 voted for 
the PP. Those districts where Ciudadanos won at least one seat in the 2015 
election had 191 Ciudadanos sympathizers, 25 of whom voted for the PP.
Finally, it is puzzling that the parties’ chances of joining the govern-
ment make no difference for voters in an early election held after the par-
TABLE 3.8. Accuracy of Expectations, 2016
 Unidos Podemos Ciudadanos












# of Clusters 47 50
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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ties failed to reach an agreement to choose a prime minister. Table 3.9 
examines the importance of the formation of a government for voters in 
2016 relative to 2011. Respondents in both Catalonia and Madrid cared 
more about which parties formed the government in 2011 than in 2016, a 
result that warrants further research.
Conclusions
Spain’s June 2016 election provides an ideal scenario to see how quickly vot-
ers react to a dramatic change in the incentives to behave strategically as a 
consequence of the emergence of new national parties winning seats in many 
but not all districts and the failure to elect a prime minister six months ear-
lier. The pool of voters with incentives to vote strategically— to affect both 
the allocation of seats among parties and the formation of a government— 
substantially increased in comparison with previous elections.
The study finds only a small amount of planned strategic deser-
tion when explaining the decision to vote for Unidos Podemos instead 
of another party: the probability of voting for Unidos Podemos slightly 
increases along with the respondent’s belief that the party is more likely to 
win a seat in the district. However, there is no evidence of strategic deser-
tion motivated by the desire to affect the government composition or stra-
tegic consideration at the district level when accounting for the decision of 
supporting Ciudadanos and the PSOE.






















Source: Data from MEDW survey, 2016.
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. N = number of respondents. The election was held on 
November 20, 2011. The data for 2011 come from pre- election surveys in Barcelona and Madrid 
conducted between November 10 and November 18, with representative samples of 773 (Barce-
lona) and 976 (Madrid) individuals interviewed. All surveys conducted by Harris/Decima (now 
Nielsen), relying on panels of respondents. The sampling was based on a stratified, quota- based 
approach. Quotas were set by controlling for age, gender, and education status. For further details 
see www.chairelectoral.com/medw.html
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Three reasons explain the very low amount of strategic desertion over-
all. First, voters do not seem particularly concerned about which parties 
join the government. In line with the experimental evidence provided by 
Blais et al. (this vol.), Spanish voters did not update and use the infor-
mation about the parties’ chances of being in government when making 
vote choices. Second, Ciudadanos’s supporters were much less aware than 
Podemos’s supporters of the incentive to behave strategically at the district 
level. Finally, wishful thinking and strong ideological preferences hamper 
strategic behaviors.








 5. The analysis is weighted for age, gender, region, and education.
 6. The operationalization of strategic voting in this chapter is slightly different 
than in other chapters as a consequence of the availability of data. For example, 
respondents’ beliefs about parties’ chances of being in government are available 
only for their preferred party. The variables in the models capture preferences and 
beliefs only about the preferred party.
 7. The specific question in the survey capturing the first preference is categori-
cal: “All in all, which party do you like the most?”
 8. The survey includes two questions about factual political knowledge: “Please 
indicate whether the following statement is true or false: A party needs to get at 
least 3% of the votes across the whole country in order to be represented in Parlia-
ment” and “Please indicate whether the following statement is true or false: The 
leader of the party with most votes automatically becomes the Prime Minister.” 
Each right answer scores 1; wrong answers or “don’t know/no answer” score 0.
 9. A focus on the results of Podemos or of Podemos and IU together makes no 
difference.
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Support for Minority Government  
and Strategic Voting
Jean- François Daoust
First- past- the- post (FPTP) electoral systems are known to produce single- 
party majority governments (most of the time). This winner- take- all system 
is largely responsible for the fact that Canada had a majority government 
20 out of 28 times in the twentieth century by allocating a disproportionate 
bonus of seats to large parties. However, things changed at the beginning 
of the twenty- first century: in three consecutive elections between 2004 
and 2011, no party won a majority of seats, and the 2004 election produced 
the first minority government since 1979. This new dynamic might have 
changed voters’ calculus of voting as they integrated considerations related 
to the possible formation of a minority government. That is, Canadians 
had been accustomed to majorities, but the events of the 2000s might have 
caused them to rethink their expectations.
The 2015 Canadian election is particularly well suited to explore this 
possible new dynamic because polls predicted an unprecedented three- way 
horse race between the main parties— the Conservative Party of Canada 
(CPC), the New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP), and the Liberal Party 
of Canada (LPC)— each of which led in the polls at least once during the 
campaign. The NDP was ahead at the beginning of the campaign, while 
the Tories and Liberals competed for first place during the final weeks. 
This environment provided a nearly perfect “coordination dilemma” (Cox 
1997), as the Left was divided between the Liberals and the NDP and faced 
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a united right in the CPC. The stage was set for voters to at least consider 
the possibility of voting strategically, providing a unique opportunity to 
understand voters’ strategic motivations. Poll results illustrated this situ-
ation throughout the campaign. As figure 4.1 shows, in the middle of the 
campaign, no party had a significant lead. However, in the last weeks, it 
became clear that the NDP could not form the next government because 
the party was trailing in Ontario, which sends the most representatives to 
the parliament. By early September, the number of people intending to 
vote for the NDP declined dramatically, while the Liberals seemed to gain 
from those desertions.
As chapter 1 discusses, the study of strategic voting developed under 
FPTP assumptions (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). The logic 
appeared very simple, with the focus on single- member districts (or for 
presidential elections, the nation conceived as a single district). Strategic 
voting has been defined as a vote that takes into account the preferences 
regarding candidates and expectations regarding outcomes. It is often eval-
uated as a two- step process (Blais and Nadeau 1996), where the researcher 
Fig. 4.1. Poll Results and the Decline of the NDP. (Note: each observation 
represents a poll result.)
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first scrutinizes whether voters have incentives to desert strategically (that 
is, their preferred parties are not viable) and then examines whether voters 
supported their preferred party between the viable parties.
In its purest form, strategic voting thus derives from a local calculus 
only, since voters cast a single vote that counts solely at the local level. 
However, as chapter 1 suggests, this vote at the local level could impact 
national considerations. For instance, the selected (local) representative 
will contribute to collective national outcomes such as the selection of the 
prime minister in a parliamentary system or the leadership of the House 
in a presidential system. Hence, at least indirectly, local votes can shape 
national outcomes. While chapter 1 suggests that national considerations 
might matter for strategic voting, this chapter argues that the preference 
for minority government is one of the national considerations that affects 
a voter’s calculus. Because minority governments have become more com-
mon, at least in the Canadian case, preferences about the size of the gov-
ernment could also matter.
This chapter considers theoretical arguments related to minority gov-
ernments and coalitions and their impact on strategic voting. The chapter 
then tests these arguments via two different approaches using data from 
the Making Electoral Democracy Work project. The conclusion discusses 
the relevance of national considerations even in FPTP electoral systems.
National Determinants of Strategic Voting
We already know quite a lot about the individual determinants of strategic 
voting as commonly defined and as referred to in chapter 1 (see table 1.1). 
Political sophistication is one of the most studied determinants of strategic 
voting. Most of the time, the relationship is positive: more sophisticated 
voters are more likely to vote strategically (Black 1978; Blais and Turgeon 
2004; Merolla and Stephenson 2007), although some authors find null 
results (Blais and Gschwend 2011; Daoust 2015; Duch and Palmer 2002). 
Partisanship is also known to impact the proclivity to vote strategically. 
The literature is unequivocal: voters who are more partisan are less likely 
to vote strategically as the expressive costs of desertion increase (Gschwend 
2007; Plescia 2017, 155). Somewhat related to partisanship, the intensity 
of preferences is known to negatively influence voters’ proclivity to cast 
strategic votes— that is, more intense voters are less likely to desert their 
preferred options (Blais 2002). This is a direct impact, but there is also an 
indirect one. Voters who really like a party or a candidate are more likely 
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to display wishful thinking and to believe that their preferred choice has 
some chance of winning (Blais and Turgeon 2004). Hence, such voters do 
not find it rational to desert.
However, given the likely outcome of a minority government, some 
national considerations might influence voters to desert strategically even 
in FPTP electoral systems where voters cast only one vote and this vote is 
at the local level. By national considerations, I mean considerations that are 
not related to the local level— that is, the constituency. This is even more 
likely because the Canadian media typically cover national polls and focus 
on which party is leading nationally and whether it has enough support to 
form a majority government.
There are many theoretical reasons to believe that national consider-
ations may influence voters’ choices in Canada. First, voters who believe 
that it is better to have a government with a majority of seats may desert 
their first choice to increase the chances of another party winning at least 
170 of the 338 seats. This assumes, of course, that for some voters, the 
utility of having a majority rather than minority government outweighs 
the expressive benefits of voting for their first choice. Second, when they 
integrate new considerations, voters are more tempted to change their 
votes. It appears that such was the case in 2015, when political pundits 
talked a lot about the possibility of a minority government and the pos-
sibility of a two- party coalition, which has only happened once (during the 
First World War). We know that novelties bring voters to reconsider their 
choices (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), which means that those 
who have stances on new issues are more likely to change their behavior.
Furthermore, voters may have different preferences regarding major-
ity or minority governments. First, there are strategic considerations. On 
the one hand, supporters of small parties could benefit from a minority 
government by exerting a greater influence in the legislation than their 
share of seats might suggest (Thomas 2007). On the other hand, support-
ers of major parties might also prefer a minority government in a particu-
lar context: for example, if they expect their preferred party to lose the 
upcoming election. “For them, a minority outcome might be preferable 
to a legislature controlled by their major party opponents.” (Dufresne and 
Nevitte 2014, 828). Finally, Russell (2008) argues that minority govern-
ments are viewed as being more associated with open- style democracy and 
more consensual politics, with a tighter process of checks and balances and 
a government more likely to compromise or bargain. Hence, on top of 
strategic considerations, some voters’ principles might lead them to view 
minority government as better.
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Institutional rules shape a variety of outcomes and thus ways in which 
“winning” is defined. In the Canadian case, it is necessary to take into 
account the decision- making calculus utility function associated with pos-
sible outcomes at the local and the national levels, since citizens vote at the 
district level as well as indirectly for the government. Preferences about 
majority versus minority governments shape this utility function. For 
example, a supporter of the NDP may prefer a victory by the party at both 
the local and national levels but likely does not expect the NDP to form 
the next government. If this voter also prefers minority governments, she 
may consider deserting her preferred option in order to support a party 
that could form a minority government at the national level. As the LPC 
is spatially closer to her than the CPC, the two most preferred outcomes 
are likely
NDP(Minority) > LPC(Minority)
However, even if she prefers minority government to majority government, 
she may prefer a majority government by her preferred party over a minor-
ity government by her second choice. Hence, the preferred outcomes are
NDP(Minority) > NDP(Majority) > LPC(Minority)
In both cases, if the voter concludes that the two first options are not 
possible, since the NDP will not win the most seats, she rationally turns 
to the third option. This is a case of national strategic voting because it 
is shaped by preferences regarding the formation of the national govern-
ment. The analysis in this chapter identifies exactly this kind of vote: stra-
tegic voting as a consequence of national considerations. More precisely, 
the chapter analyzes strategic voting resulting from preferences regarding 
minority government.
Data and Case Study
To tackle the possibility that attitudes toward minority government affect 
strategic voting, I use the Making Electoral Democracy Work datasets 
(Blais 2010) for the Canadian election of 2015. The project conducted 
three surveys in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, with 1,879, 1,891, 
and 1,864 respondents, respectively, in the first wave conducted in the two 
weeks before Election Day. A second wave of the surveys was conducted 
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during the two weeks following the election, with a return- to- sample rate 
of 73%. I weighted the data so that the reported vote matches the official 
outcome in each province. This is necessary because third parties are over-
represented and their supporters are more likely to desert strategically.
In the 2015 Canadian federal election, incumbent prime minister 
Stephen Harper of the CPC lost office to the LPC and its leader, Justin 
Trudeau. As table 4.1 shows, the Conservatives received 32% of the votes 
and 29% of the seats. The Liberals won with 39% of the votes and 54% 
of the seats. The NDP came third, garnering 24% of the votes and 20% 
of the seats. In Quebec, the Bloc Québécois received 20% of the votes and 
13% of the province’s seats. Finally, the Greens obtained 3% of the votes 
and one seat (in British Columbia, where the party is strongest). No other 
party received more than 1% of the votes at the national level.
Strategic Voting in the 2015 Canadian Election
Tackling national strategic voting ideally requires measures of preferences, 
expectations about election outcomes at the local and national levels, and 
vote choice. The Making Electoral Democracy Work data provide these 
measures. To calculate strategic voting, I rely on the approach proposed by 
Blais and Gschwend (2011), counting as strategic voters anyone who does 
not vote for their preferred party, leader, or local candidate. This strongly 
TABLE 4.1. Votes and Seat Shares, 2015
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Note: Cell entries are vote shares (%). Seat shares (%) are in parentheses.
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correlates with other measures of strategic voting and is the best option 
offered by the data.
Empirically, the approach consists of three steps, as I successively take 
into account party, leader, and local candidate preferences. The preferred 
party is the one that scores the highest on a 0– 10 party- liking scale. In the 
case of ties, respondents were asked a follow- up question where they had 
to indicate which party they like the most. The same applies to the pre-
ferred leader. In the case of a tie, the preferred leader is the one whom the 
respondent thinks would be the best prime minister. Finally, respondents 
were asked if they liked a particular candidate in their district, and if so, 
from which party.
A vast majority of voters— 77% of the electorate— supported their pre-
ferred party. This means that 23% of voters did not do so. This proportion 
goes down to 18% when the condition of not voting for the preferred 
leader is added. Finally, when those who supported their preferred local 
candidate are removed, 14% of the total electorate satisfies these three 
TABLE 4.2. Strategic Voters
Proportion of voters who did not vote for their preferred party 22.6%
Proportion of voters who did not vote for their preferred party or their  
preferred leader
17.8%
Proportion of voters who did not vote for their preferred party, their  
preferred leader, or their preferred local candidate
14.4% 
TABLE 4.3. Preferred Party and Vote Choice among Strategic Voters































































Note: Number of observations are in cells with the percentages in parentheses. The preferred 
party is indicated by the column and the vote choice by the row. Hence, the diagonal entries would 
represent sincere voting.
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criteria, which do not capture pure strategic voting but do identify a voting 
behavior that is highly correlated with strategic voting. The three steps are 
described in table 4.2.
Table 4.3 compares sincere preferences and actual votes for the 456 
strategic voters, showing which party they preferred and which party they 
supported. Because nearly all voters do not expect the Greens to be a viable 
option, they are disproportionately represented. Overall, most of the stra-
tegic desertion comes from NDP and Green supporters, and most goes 
to the Liberals. More specifically, 64% of the Conservatives who voted 
strategically opted for the Liberals, as did 77% of NDP strategic voters 
and 52% of strategic Greens. Finally, small variations occurred among the 
three provinces. More strategic voting occurred in British Columbia (17%) 
and less in Ontario (11%), with Quebec right in the middle (14.5%). Sec-
ond, the Liberals benefited less from strategic voting in Quebec, since stra-
tegic voters from the Bloc Québécois were slightly more likely to choose 
the NDP than the Liberals.
The Impact of Attitudes toward Minority Government  
and Coalitions
To isolate the impact of opinions regarding minority government, different 
conditions were elaborated, and they strongly suggest that voters deserted 
for national considerations. For each party, I isolated voters who were 
defined as strategic, who did not expect their preferred party to win the 
most seats, and who preferred a minority government. I repeat the exercise 
for each party. Voters were asked “Which party do you think will win the 
most seats in this election?” and “Do you think it is better to have a major-
ity government, a minority government or does it make no difference?” 
Table 4.4 displays the results.
A substantial proportion of voters— 92 of the 452 strategic voters (20%; 
3% of the total electorate)— satisfy all the criteria. The criteria I use are 
consistent with an interpretation that some of the strategic voters were 
mobilized by national considerations.1 Minor parties such as the Greens 
are overrepresented because they are more likely to express positive atti-
tudes toward minority government. Among Greens supporters, 43% saw 
minority government as the best option, while only 13% of the Conserva-
tives’ electorate did so.
To determine whether attitudes toward minority government have an 
independent impact on strategic voting, I run a logistic regression using a 
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dependent variable coded 1 if the voter is a strategic deserter and 0 oth-
erwise. Table 4.5 shows the results. The main independent variable of 
interest is minority government. It is a dummy coded 1 if the respondent 
believes that it is better to have a minority government and 0 if the respon-
dent answers that a majority is better, believes that it makes no difference, 
or does not know. Among the electorate, 28% believes that a minority gov-
ernment is better.
I also control for the impact of sociodemographic variables, prefer-
ences for parties and leaders, political information, and partisanship. Age is 
a continuous variable from 18 to 94; sex is a dummy, with female as the ref-
erence category; and education is a dummy coded 1 if the respondent has 
completed at least some university. Political information is an index that 
asked the respondent to identify pictures of leaders from the major par-
































* p > .05; ** p > .01; *** p > .001.
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ties (appendix to this chapter). Partisanship captures the effect of feeling 
close to a party. Party polarization is the absolute difference between the 
score attributed to the preferred party and the score attributed to the sec-
ond preferred party. Leader polarization is the absolute difference between 
the score given to the preferred leader and the score given to the second 
choice leader. These indicators of preference must be taken into account 
because the expected- utility- maximizing choice reflects the intensity of 
voters’ preferences.
Furthermore, identifying whether national considerations affect stra-
tegic voting requires controlling for the fact that some voters have local 
incentives to desert. Hence, the Local not viable variable is a dummy con-
trolling for voters whose preferred party is not viable in the local context— 
that is, when their preferred party is perceived as not among the district’s 
top two contenders.
The results display strong support for the influence of attitudes toward 
minority government on strategic voting. The Minority government vari-
able is significant at p < .01. Furthermore, it is positive, meaning that vot-
ers who believes that it is better to have a minority government are more 
likely to desert strategically. However, the magnitude of the impact is quite 
limited, which is not surprising and is in line with the previous test that iso-
lated national strategic voters using particular criteria. Voters who believe 
that minority governments are better have a 17.5% chance of deserting, 
whereas those who do not share that belief have a 12.6% of doing so. The 
attitude toward minority government thus increases the likelihood of stra-
tegic desertion by 4.9 percentage points. In light of the fact that 14.4% of 
voters were defined as strategic, we can say that around 5% of voters are 
strategic because of national considerations. It is also likely that the indi-
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rect nature of the national outcomes reduces their saliency to the determi-
nation of the vote relative to the more immediate case of an expected close 
contest in the constituency.
Table 4.4 indicates not only that national determinants have an impact 
on strategic voting but also that the local level and context matter. First, 
the Local not viable variable illustrates that voters whose preferred options 
are not viable in their districts are far more likely to desert. This strongly 
suggests the existence of strategic voting as a consequence of local con-
siderations and that it is twice as important as national considerations in 
the voter’s calculus. Context also matters, as shown by dummy variables 
demonstrating that the extent to which voters act strategically is not uni-
formly distributed in the country. Both Ontario (5.2 percentage points) 
and especially Quebec (2.8 percentage points) display less strategic voting 
than does British Columbia.2
Finally, individual determinants are also part of the story. Indeed, feel-
ing close to a party increases the expressive cost of strategic voting and 
is thus negatively associated with strategic voting, but that association is 
not significant. Furthermore, the level of political information is negatively 
correlated with strategic voting, a finding that differs from other studies, 
which have found a positive but not significant relationship (Blais and 
Gschwend 2011; Daoust 2015; Duch and Palmer 2002). Education, how-
ever, displays a positive sign, meaning that sophistication but not informa-
tion might be positively related to strategic voting.
Conclusion
Canada’s minority governments between 2004 and 2011 likely altered vot-
ers’ calculus. While I cannot analyze voters’ considerations before and after 
this period, I do find that a preference for minority government was inte-
grated as a strategic consideration in the Canadian federal 2015 election.
My study finds that one in five strategic voters would be driven by 
national considerations and that attitudes toward minority government 
had an independent impact of 3.1 percentage points on the proclivity to 
cast a strategic vote— a realistic and nonnegligible effect. However, local 
considerations appear to be much more prominent among strategic vot-
ers. Hence, it is not surprising that the variable capturing the effect of the 
viability of a voter’s preferred party displays a greater impact, reflecting the 
local impact on the strategic calculus.
The two methods I used offer different ways to analyze the impact of 
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national considerations on strategic voting, but both reveal that informa-
tion related to the local level has more impact than national consider-
ations. However, they also reveal that mobilizing national considerations 
accounted for about one in five strategic voters and that a favorable view of 
minority government increases the likelihood of strategic desertion from 
12.6% to 17.5%, a substantial amount. Thus, scholars of strategic voting 
should not disregard national considerations— they are relevant and make 
important contributions to the study of strategic voting.
A P P E N D I X

































Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001.
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Political Information Assessment
Below there are names of four parties and pictures of eight different peo-
ple. Four of the people are party leaders in the FEDERAL election, one 
from each party. Match leaders with Conservative Party of Canada; New 
Democratic of Canada; Liberal Party of Canada; Green Party of Canada.
Conservative Party of Canada: Picture of Stephen Harper
New Democratic Party of Canada: Picture of Thomas Mulcair
Liberal Party of Canada: Picture of Justin Trudeau
Green Party of Canada: Picture of Elizabeth May
[Quebec Only] Bloc Québécois: Picture of Gilles Duceppe
N O T E S
 1. A logit regression (see table A4.1) shows that supporters of the LPC, NDP, 
Bloc Québécois, and the Greens are more likely to prefer minority government 
than are supporters of the CPC. However, the magnitude of the impact is greater 
for nonmainstream parties. The Greens and the Bloc Québécois are most in favor 
of minority government. This makes sense using strategic considerations, as those 
small parties might hope to obtain the balance of power in the case of a minority 
government.
 2. These results do not change before or after the addition of controls.
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Information on Party Strength  
and Strategic Voting
Evidence of Non- Effects from a Randomized Experiment
André Blais, Peter John Loewen, Daniel Rubenson,  
Laura B. Stephenson, and Elisabeth Gidengil
Chapter 1 of this volume makes clear that strategic voting is born of the 
marriage of expectations and preferences. In first- past- the- post electoral 
systems, individuals are said to vote strategically when they abandon their 
preferred choice because it is perceived as having little or no chance of win-
ning (Blais et al. 2001). While strategic voting can and does occur in any 
voting system (Blais, Loewen, and Bodet 2004; Cox 1997), it is thought to 
be most prevalent in single- member district plurality elections. However, 
many studies suggest that strategic voting may not be as frequent as is often 
assumed. Supporters of one of the top two candidates in a constituency 
have no reason to abandon their first choice because their strategic and 
sincere incentives align (Aldrich, Blais, and Stephenson, this vol.; Alvarez, 
Boehmke, and Nagler 2006). The rate of strategic voting is much higher 
when we consider only those facing a strategic dilemma. Blais and Nadeau 
(1996) find that about 6% of all voters cast strategic ballots in the 1988 
Canadian federal election, but this number represents 28% of voters who 
actually faced a strategic dilemma. Even within that subgroup, however, a 
majority of voters stick with their preferred party (Abramson et al. 2010).
Prior work suggests that at least two reasons account for the relative 
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infrequency of strategic voting (Blais 2002). First, many voters have strong 
preferences for one party and are indifferent toward all the others. Sec-
ond, voters are not very good at determining the viability of parties in 
their constituency (Blais and Bodet 2006; Blais and Turgeon 2004). Many 
engage in wishful thinking, overestimating the chances of their preferred 
party. Polling information can affect perceptions of party chances (Blais, 
Gidengil, and Nevitte 2006). However, not all individuals use the objective, 
probabilistic information provided by a party’s level of support to inform 
their vote decision effectively (Loewen, Hinton, and Sheffer 2015). In this 
chapter, we gather further evidence about the effects of information. Are 
voters more likely to vote strategically when given objective information 
about the standings of candidates and parties? Given the framework put 
forth in chapter 1, increasing the accuracy and accessibility of information 
that informs voters’ expectations should induce strategic behavior.
To explore this question, we embedded an experiment in an online 
survey of voters in the 2015 Canadian federal election. This was a highly 
competitive election in which two center- left parties (the Liberal Party and 
the New Democratic Party) competed to be the principal challenger to the 
incumbent Conservative Party. Several groups organized to facilitate stra-
tegic behavior among supporters of non- Conservative parties.1 In the end, 
the Liberals went from sitting third in the polls to holding a majority of 
seats in the House of Commons. Accordingly, strategic voting was encour-
aged in this election and was central to the strategy of the two principal 
opposition parties.
Our experiment was limited to those voters who were in a clear posi-
tion to vote strategically— that is, those who expressed a vote intention 
for a party that was in third place or worse in their constituency and who 
expressed a second choice for a party that was among the top two in their 
constituency. These individuals should have the strongest motivation to 
be strategic— their own preference has little chance of winning, and they 
are not indifferent between the more likely options. Among this subset, 
we randomly assigned respondents to receive information on the relative 
standing and vote shares of candidates in the constituency, of the parties 
nationally, or neither.
Somewhat surprisingly, our results demonstrate that receiving simple 
information on projected vote shares and candidate/party standings did 
not change the overall rate of strategic voting. This non- effect holds across 
levels of voter interest, levels of voter optimism, and the campaign period 
as well as across alternative operationalizations of vote choice.
Our evidence of no effect is important for the practice of elections, 
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the operation of single- member  plurality systems, and our understanding 
of voting behavior. Studies of strategic voting and the theoretical frame-
work in chapter 1 suggest that expectations, informed by polls, are key fac-
tors in strategic behavior. Indeed, political actors regularly try to persuade 
voters to cast strategic ballots. Such attempts at behavioral change occur 
via simple flyers, Facebook posts, emails, and websites, and these attempts 
frequently involve presenting simple quantitative data about who is likely 
to win in an election. Our experiment speaks directly to the efficacy of 
such attempts to induce strategic voting. We describe our experiment and 
sample before presenting our principal results and further tests. We then 
propose an explanation of our null results and conclude with a discussion 
of the limitations and extensions of our study.
Sample
In the 2015 Canadian federal election, we embedded a simple experiment 
within an online survey of a large number of voters, the Local Parliament 
Project (localparliament.ca) (Loewen, Rubenson, and Koop 2018). The 
survey interviewed nearly 40,000 Canadians. A broadly representative sam-
ple was commissioned from Research Now, a large survey sample provider. 
The instrument was administered through Qualtrics. Respondents were 
asked a series of questions related to leader evaluations, voter participation, 
vote intention, a large battery of issue positions, and sociodemographics 
(see the appendix to this chapter). Our experiment includes 5,090 respon-
dents. We also have postelection vote choice data for 1,194 respondents.
Experiment and Expectations
The experiment was limited to those who indicated earlier in the survey 
that they intended to vote for a party that was in third place or worse in 
their constituency and whose indicated second choice was among the top 
two in the constituency— in other words, people who had an incentive to 
vote strategically and care about the outcome. ThreeHundredEight, a poll 
aggregator that partners with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
provided us with updated estimates of constituency- level and national vote 
totals every three days. Respondents were assigned to one of three condi-
tions: Control received no information; Local received estimates of the 
local standings of the candidates; National received estimates of the stand-
ings of the parties nationally (see appendix to this chapter).
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After being presented with the treatment, respondents were asked to 
provide an estimate of their confidence in these numbers and presented 
with between 9 and 13 additional questions. Finally, respondents were 
asked about their likelihood of voting for the four principal parties (Con-
servative, Liberal, New Democrat, and Green) plus the Bloc Québécois in 
Quebec: “All in all, what are the chances that you will vote for the following 
parties?” Responses were given on a scale that ranged from No Chance (1) 
to Absolutely Certain (10).2
Our experiment allows us to test for two possible mechanisms that may 
cause strategic voting. The first is that voters receive information about 
the viability of candidates locally— in this case, the nonviability of their 
preferred candidate in their constituency and the viability of the other two 
candidates— and choose to abandon their initial choice for their preferred 
choice between the top two candidates. This is in keeping with the idea 
that voters should feel most able to affect the outcome in their own district. 
Given the relative rarity of local polls, local candidate viability information 
should also be more novel. The second is that voters receive information 
about the national race and change their vote accordingly. This is an often 
faulty inference, yet it might regularly be made since attention to which 
party will form the government is more common than attention to local 
races. Information about the national race is likely to be more familiar to 
voters.
We also explore three possible sources of heterogeneous effects. The 
first is political interest. Those who are more interested and engaged in 
politics should be better able to understand the logic and necessity of 
strategic voting. We thus expect that any treatment effects will be greater 
among those with higher political interest. We measure this with a 0– 10 
measure of political attention. Second, we consider voter optimism. We 
asked voters about the chances that each party would win the election in 
their constituency. We expect that those who are more optimistic about 
their preferred party’s chances will be less responsive to treatments (Blais 
and Bodet 2006; Blais and Turgeon 2004).3 Third, we test for heteroge-
neous effects according to the day of the treatment. We expect that our 
treatments should have a greater effect as the campaign evolves, since vot-
ers will have a greater interest in making an effective choice.
Balance
Table A5.3.1 in the appendix to this chapter reports a test of sample bal-
ance. Assignment to treatment is unrelated to the joint distribution of age, 
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gender, income, province, vote intention, partisan identification, and atten-
tion to politics.
Estimation
Our estimation of effects relies on two dependent variables. First, we esti-
mate the relative probability that individuals will vote for the party they 
intend to support (Party A) versus the party indicated as their second 
choice on the condition that the second choice is in the top two parties in 
the constituency (Party B).4 These quantities are derived from the question 
on the likelihood of voting for each party. We convert these into a relative 
probability of the form 1−(A/(A+B)). This measure is increasing in B and 
decreasing in A. Intuitively, those with a higher quantity are more likely to 
vote strategically.
This measure has two desirable properties. First, it allows us to detect a 
change in the likelihood of voting strategically even when individuals have 
not yet decided to change their votes. It is, in other words, more sensitive 
than a simple dichotomous measure. Second, it does not require respon-
dents to correctly sum probabilities to one. Instead, it converts relative 
probabilities into a common measure.5
Our second measure leverages a postelection survey of a subset of 
those in the experiment. The measure captures whether individuals 
reported voting the way they indicated in the survey (0) or switched their 
votes to the preferred party between the top two parties in their constitu-
ency (1).
We estimate a model with dummy variables for both treatments. For 
our tests of heterogeneous effects, we interact these treatments with our 
moderators of interest. We include controls for age, gender, and strength 
of partisan identification, which we expect to decrease strategic voting.
Results
Table 5.1 presents descriptive information about our dependent variable. 
Overall, the probability of strategic voting is .33. Among the control group 
it is .33; for the local treatment condition, the mean is .33; the mean for the 
national treatment is .32. There is thus no apparent difference, a sharp con-
trast to our expectations as well as those in the strategic voting literature. 
Our second dependent variable indicates that the proportion of our sample 
that voted for their second choice rather than their nonviable initial choice 
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is .17. Again, this figure does not vary significantly across the treatment and 
control groups.
Table 5.2 presents results for estimations of the relative probabilities 
assigned to voting for the first- choice (that is, the initially indicated choice) 
and second- choice parties. Positive coefficients indicate a greater likeli-
hood of deserting for the more viable party. Beginning with Model 1, some 
variables behave as expected. Stronger partisans have lower probabilities of 
desertion. Desertion also decreases as voters are surveyed closer to voting 
day. However, we find no effect for our treatments.
Models 2– 4 consider the possibility of heterogeneous effects. It is pos-
sible that our overall null results are masking different effects among sub-
TABLE 5.1. Distribution of Dependent Variables
Control Local Treatment National Treatment
 N Mean SE N Mean SE N Mean SE
Likelihood of 
Desertion
1,043 0.328 0.006 2,065 0.330 0.004 1,982 0.324 0.004
Likelihood of 
Vote Switch
266 0.162 0.023 471 0.161 0.017 457 0.177 0.018 
TABLE 5.2. Change in Relative Probability of Voting for Second Preferred Party Rather 
Than Preferred Party
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 B p B p B p B p
Local treatment −0.001 0.829 0.028 0.154 0.003 0.848 −0.008 0.610
National treatment −0.006 0.397 −0.011 0.583 −0.001 0.922 −0.018 0.257





Survey Day*Local 0.000 0.746
Survey Day*National 0.000 0.751
Optimism*Local 0.000 0.644
Optimism*National 0.000 0.390
Age −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000
Gender −0.011 0.029 −0.005 0.283 −0.011 0.029 −0.011 0.029
Strength of Party ID −0.048 0.000 −0.053 0.000 −0.048 0.000 −0.047 0.000














Note: Dependent variable is relative likelihood of voting for second preferred party (B) rather than preferred 
party (A), calculated as 1 − (A/(A + B)). Model is OLS.
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sets of the sample. Beginning with Model 2, we see that although political 
interest increases the probability of desertion, it does not condition the 
effects of the treatment, and the coefficients on the treatments themselves 
remain statistically insignificant, as in Model 1. Model 3 conditions effects 
based on the campaign day of interview. Once again, the treatment coef-
ficients are not statistically significant, nor are there heterogeneous effects. 
Finally, Model 4 presents results when treatments are conditioned by opti-
mism about the chances of the preferred party winning the constituency 
seat. Once again, there are no apparent treatment effects.
Finally, table 5.3 presents the results of a model predicting a switched 
vote in the postelection survey. As with table 5.2, all models suggest no 
significant treatment effects. This finding lends credibility to the evidence 
of no effects because this model tests for strategic voting using a different 
outcome measured roughly a month after the election.
Limitations and Discussion
Our results indicate that when presented with simple and objective quan-
titative information about the relative local or national competitive posi-
TABLE 5.3. Likelihood of Switching Vote from Preferred Party to Second Preferred and 
More Viable Party
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 B p B p B p B p
Local treatment −0.035 0.869 0.492 0.454 0.180 0.668 −0.386 0.404
National treatment 0.076 0.718 0.390 0.568 0.384 0.350 −0.358 0.439





Survey day*Local −0.007 0.552
Survey day*National −0.010 0.377
Optimism*Local 0.007 0.393
Optimism*National 0.008 0.297
Age −0.015 0.006 −0.018 0.002 −0.015 0.006 −0.016 0.005
Gender −0.032 0.840 0.053 0.747 −0.036 0.824 −0.019 0.906
Strength of Party ID −0.422 0.000 −0.484 0.000 −0.425 0.000 −0.396 0.000














Note: Estimates are from logistic regressions.
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tions of parties, voters are unlikely to use this information to update their 
probabilities of voting for other parties or to switch their votes. We are 
thus faced with a puzzle: How can we reconcile this information with the 
consistent findings of strategic voting in single- member  plurality systems? 
More specifically, how can these results be squared with the empirical 
regularity that strategic voting is more likely to occur when a voter’s first 
choice is objectively farther from the top two parties? We can think of five 
possible (non- mutually- exclusive) explanations.
First, our experiment presented respondents with a very thin slice of 
information. Voters were given only the relative standings of parties and 
an estimate of vote shares. They did not receive any prompts about how 
to use this information— that is, to vote for their second- preference party. 
Accordingly, the lack of a treatment effect may result from a failure to pro-
vide enough relevant information to induce voters to take action.
Second, quantitative information as such might do little to facilitate 
strategic voting. Instead, voters embedded in social networks may assume 
that the vote intentions of their friends and acquaintances are representa-
tive of the wider population and decide whether to vote strategically based 
on this information (Tsang and Larson 2016). As a result, noncompeti-
tive parties may experience desertion without voters relying on quantita-
tive information. This type of effect is consistent with the evidence of poll 
effects provided by Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2006).
Third, voters might respond to qualitative information about whether 
their preferred party has a chance of winning. Our treatment simply pre-
sented the estimated vote shares for the various parties and did not high-
light the fact that the respondent’s preferred party was not viable. Voters 
may require more direct information to consider adjusting their vote.
Fourth, our nonresults may be a function of our sample. Our experi-
ment was limited to respondents who indicated a preference for a party in 
third place or worse. Some voters may already have decided to vote strate-
gically. Such voters would be excluded from this study. However, members 
of a substantial fraction of our sample were willing to reconsider their vote 
choices. Only 18% indicated that they were absolutely certain of their vote.
Fifth, our presentation of the treatment information may not have gen-
erated sufficient attention from respondents. However, when we condi-
tioned treatment effects on the average amount of time that a respondent 
spent considering survey questions as a proxy for survey effort, we found 
no conditional effects. Survey effort as such does not seem to drive the lack 
of treatment effects.
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The elephant in the room is the simplest explanation of all: the expec-
tations about strategic voting are faulty. In this chapter, we have demon-
strated that the presentation of simple quantitative information about 
the relative standings of parties during a real election campaign does not 
induce those who support third- place or worse parties to desert. This result 
is at odds with other research that argues for the importance of accurate 
expectations— although we provided accurate information, it made no dif-
ference for behavior. Given the novelty of these findings and the reality of 
strategic behavior demonstrated in other chapters in this volume, further 
work should explore the conditions under which voters— in the context of 
real elections— can be persuaded to abandon their preferred parties.
A P P E N D I X  5 . 1 :  VA R I A B L E S
Likelihood of deserting— The likelihood that an individual will vote for 
their second preferred party. Respondents are asked: “All in all, what are 
the chances that you will vote for the following parties?” Variable is calcu-
lated as 1−(A/[A+B]) where A is the likelihood of voting for the party they 
identify when asked for their vote intention and B is the likelihood of vot-
ing for the party they identified as their second choice.
Vote switch— Whether an individual switched a vote from the intended 
vote to one of the top two parties in their constituency. Coded 1 if vote was 
switched, 0 if it was not switched.
Vote choice— Used to determine the respondent’s vote intention: “Which 
party do you think you will vote for?” Response categories (order ran-
domized): the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the New Democratic 
Party, the Bloc Québécois, the Green Party, Undecided.
Second choice— Used to determine the respondent’s second choice. “And 
what would be your second choice?” Response categories do not include 
the party that was their vote choice (order randomized): the Conservative 
Party, the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc Québécois, 
the Green Party, don’t know.
Strength of Party ID— For those who indicate that they usually think of 
themselves as a partisan: “How strongly [party] do you feel?” Response 
categories: very strongly, fairly strongly, not very strongly, don’t know.
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Local Treatment— Dummy variable indicating whether the individual 
received the local information treatment.
National Treatment— Dummy variable indicating if the individual received 
the national information treatment.
Survey day— Variable reading 0 to 54, indicating when in the campaign 
the interview was conducted. Higher numbers occur closer to election day.
Interest— “Some people are very interested in politics. Others are not 
interested at all. On a scale of 0– 10 where 0 means you are not interested at 
all and 10 means you are very interested in politics, how interested would 
you say you are?”
Gender— Dummy indicating if the subject is male (0) or female (1).
Age— Continuous variable indicating age in years.
Optimism— Respondents’ estimation of the chances that the preferred 
party will win the election in their constituency, ranging from 0 to 100. 
“Thinking now about where you live, how likely is each party to win your 
constituency?
A P P E N D I X  5 . 2 :  T R E AT M E N T S
The experiment was limited to those who indicated earlier in the survey 
that they intended to vote for a party that was in third place or worse 
in their constituency and whose indicated second choice was among the 
top two in the constituency. ThreeHundredEight, a poll aggregator that 
partners with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, provided us with 
updated estimates of constituency- level and national vote totals every 
three days. Respondents were assigned to one of three conditions: Control 
received no information; Local received estimates of the local standings of 
the candidates; National received estimates of the standings of the parties 
nationally. The information took the following form:
Estimates of the share of the vote that each party would likely get 
in (LOCAL: each constituency/NATIONAL: Canada as a whole) 
if the election were to be held today, given the results of the previ-
ous elections and the most recent polls. These estimates have been 
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calculated by ThreeHundredEight (www.threehundredeight.com). 
According to these calculations, the share of the vote that the vari-
ous parties would get in (LOCAL: your constituency/NATIONAL: 
Canada as a whole) if the election were held today is the following.
Conservative Party: XX%
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A P P E N D I X  5 . 3 :  B A L A N C E
TABLE A5.3.1. Balance Test for Respondents
Local Treatment National Treatment
 Coef. Std. Error P > z Coef. Std. Error P > z
Age −0.003 0.003 0.205 0.001 0.003 0.819
Female 0.111 0.079 0.162 0.017 0.080 0.830
Income
$20k– $40k −0.115 0.175 0.509 −0.023 0.177 0.898
$40k– $60k 0.004 0.169 0.983 0.111 0.171 0.517
$60k– $80k −0.195 0.172 0.257 −0.111 0.174 0.524
$80k– $100k −0.098 0.177 0.580 −0.114 0.180 0.528
$100k– $120k −0.224 0.184 0.225 −0.162 0.187 0.384
$120k– $150k −0.192 0.193 0.320 −0.310 0.198 0.118
$150k– $200k 0.046 0.213 0.830 −0.195 0.222 0.378
$200k or more 0.326 0.248 0.189 0.492 0.248 0.047
Don’t Know −0.147 0.260 0.573 −0.030 0.260 0.908
Province
British Columbia 0.053 0.168 0.753 −0.031 0.170 0.858
Manitoba 0.175 0.242 0.470 0.242 0.242 0.317
New Brunswick 0.115 0.279 0.682 0.040 0.283 0.888
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.152 0.230 0.511 0.067 0.234 0.776
Northwest Territories −0.002 1.238 0.999 −14.132 837.795 0.987
Nova Scotia −0.299 0.281 0.288 0.121 0.267 0.649
Nunavut −0.155 0.880 0.860 −0.032 0.880 0.971
Ontario −0.028 0.149 0.853 0.050 0.150 0.737
Prince Edward Island 1.307 0.770 0.090 1.253 0.774 0.106
Quebec 0.018 0.167 0.916 −0.021 0.169 0.902
Saskatchewan 0.126 0.263 0.633 0.178 0.264 0.502
Vote Choice
Conservative Party −0.140 0.153 0.358 −0.042 0.153 0.784
New Democratic Party −0.019 0.132 0.886 0.090 0.133 0.497
Bloc Québécois 0.299 0.257 0.246 0.070 0.270 0.796
Green Party 0.121 0.145 0.406 0.078 0.147 0.594
Party Identity
Conservative 0.167 0.152 0.273 0.105 0.153 0.495
New Democrat −0.177 0.139 0.202 −0.213 0.139 0.126
Bloc Québécois −0.172 0.234 0.462 −0.312 0.244 0.201
Green Party −0.365 0.170 0.032 −0.279 0.171 0.103
None of these −0.029 0.157 0.855 −0.162 0.159 0.310
Don’t know 0.030 0.190 0.876 −0.052 0.193 0.788
Political Attention 0.040 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.017 0.172
Constant 0.632 0.261 0.016 0.524 0.264 0.047
N 5,090
Chi Squared Likelihood Ratio 75.49
Probability 0.199
Pseudo R2 0.007      
TABLE A5.3.2. Balance Test for Respondents included in Vote Switch
Local Treatment National Treatment
 Coef. Std. Error P > z Coef. Std. Error P > z
Age −0.003 0.003 0.205 0.001 0.003 0.819
Female 0.111 0.079 0.162 0.017 0.080 0.830
Income
$20k– $40k −0.115 0.175 0.509 −0.023 0.177 0.898
$40k– $60k 0.004 0.169 0.983 0.111 0.171 0.517
$60k– $80k −0.195 0.172 0.257 −0.111 0.174 0.524
$80k– $100k −0.098 0.177 0.580 −0.114 0.180 0.528
$100k– $120k −0.224 0.184 0.225 −0.162 0.187 0.384
$120k– $150k −0.192 0.193 0.320 −0.310 0.198 0.118
$150k– $200k 0.046 0.213 0.830 −0.195 0.222 0.378
$200k or more 0.326 0.248 0.189 0.492 0.248 0.047
Don’t Know −0.147 0.260 0.573 −0.030 0.260 0.908
Province
British Columbia 0.053 0.168 0.753 −0.031 0.170 0.858
Manitoba 0.175 0.242 0.470 0.242 0.242 0.317
New Brunswick 0.115 0.279 0.682 0.040 0.283 0.888
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.152 0.230 0.511 0.067 0.234 0.776
Northwest Territories −0.002 1.238 0.999 −14.132 837.795 0.987
Nova Scotia −0.299 0.281 0.288 0.121 0.267 0.649
Nunavut −0.155 0.880 0.860 −0.032 0.880 0.971
Ontario −0.028 0.149 0.853 0.050 0.150 0.737
Prince Edward Island 1.307 0.770 0.090 1.253 0.774 0.106
Quebec 0.018 0.167 0.916 −0.021 0.169 0.902
Saskatchewan 0.126 0.263 0.633 0.178 0.264 0.502
Vote Choice
Conservative Party −0.140 0.153 0.358 −0.042 0.153 0.784
New Democratic Party −0.019 0.132 0.886 0.090 0.133 0.497
Bloc Québécois 0.299 0.257 0.246 0.070 0.270 0.796
Green Party 0.121 0.145 0.406 0.078 0.147 0.594
Party Identity
Conservative 0.167 0.152 0.273 0.105 0.153 0.495
New Democrat −0.177 0.139 0.202 −0.213 0.139 0.126
Bloc Québécois −0.172 0.234 0.462 −0.312 0.244 0.201
Green Party −0.365 0.170 0.032 −0.279 0.171 0.103
None of these −0.029 0.157 0.855 −0.162 0.159 0.310
Don’t know 0.030 0.190 0.876 −0.052 0.193 0.788
Political attention 0.040 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.017 0.172
Constant 0.632 0.261 0.016 0.524 0.264 0.047
N 5,090
Chi Squared Likelihood Ratio 75.49
Probability 0.199
Pseudo R2 0.007      
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N O T E S
 1. Two principal examples are Leadnow’s Vote Together campaign and strate-
gicvoting.ca.
 2. These responses were recoded on a 0 to 9 scale so that a 0 corresponds to no 
chance at all.
 3. Note, however, that optimists could also be more likely to change, as the 
information that is provided differs more substantially from their prior beliefs than 
for non- optimists.
 4. We note again that those whose second choice is not among the top two 
placed parties in the constituency are not included in the experiment.
 5. We have also performed analyses with other operationalizations of the 
dependent variable: 1 − (A/T), where T equals the sum of the chances given to 
all other parties, and an ordinal three- category variable, with the highest category 
corresponding to another party receiving a higher score than A, the lowest category 
to A obtaining the highest score, and the middle category to a tie between A and 
another party. The results were similar.
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Expected Electoral Performance,  
Candidate Quality, and Voter  
Strategic Coordination
The Case of Japan
Carolina Plescia
Conventional rational choice theory sees voters as utility maximizers, 
deciding how best to use their vote to affect their preferred election out-
come. Voter strategic coordination can influence the electoral results by 
increasing the vote share of strong candidates (or parties) at the expense 
of weaker ones. Hence, understanding how and why voters come to think 
that some candidates (or parties) are more likely to win than others is key 
to understanding how a democracy chooses its elected officials and conse-
quently the policies those elected officials enact. In this chapter, I consider 
the case of single- member  plurality elections— that is, elections in which 
each district elects only one representative and that representative is cho-
sen by receiving a plurality of the vote.
To make good strategic decisions— that is, to avoid wasting their votes— 
voters must know the relative vote distribution of candidates in the elec-
toral district. With such information in hand, voters can vote strategically 
and ultimately coordinate on the two strongest candidates. Voter coordi-
nation thus depends on voter information, and the strategic voting model 
requires that voters clearly understand who is leading and who is trailing 
(e.g., Cox 1997; Myatt 2007; Blais et al., this vol.). While most scholars 
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implicitly assume that voters have ready access to such information, vot-
ers in mass elections are never certain of the electoral results and in some 
circumstances will not have access to objective information about who is 
trailing in the electoral race (e.g., Myatt and Fisher 2004; Clough 2007).
This chapter investigates the claim that all else being equal, the number 
and quality of district- level challenger candidates represents information 
helping or hindering voter strategic coordination. While it is well known 
that voters are largely uninformed about political matters either because 
they are inattentive or because of the enormous complexity of the politi-
cal system, potential candidates who run against each other in the district 
“differ in their valence (or quality), which is perfectly observable and is 
valued by all voters” (Galasso and Nannicini 2011, 79). In this regard, can-
didate quality has the potential to operate as a heuristic for voters in low- 
information situations and help them coordinate strategically. Quality is 
related not only to whether the candidate previously held elective office, as 
more commonly measured in the existing literature (e.g., Jacobson 1989; 
Burden 2009), but also— and more importantly— to the extent to which 
the candidate is related to the district and has a well- established base of 
supporters. This feature becomes relevant for voter strategic coordination. 
In fact, given that formidable challengers have more incentives and oppor-
tunities to develop effective candidacies and hence a better chance to chal-
lenge the top candidate in the district, voters can use the information they 
have gathered from knowing who contests the elections to make inferences 
about the distribution of support in their district.
Specifically, one quality challenger may give an impression that the seat 
is more contested than it really is, increasing competition between the two 
strongest candidates and fostering voter strategic coordination. In fact, as 
chapter 1 discusses, strategic voting is more likely in competitive, uncer-
tain settings where voter chances of influencing the result are the great-
est. Conversely, multiple quality challengers in a district can hinder voter 
strategic coordination, increasing uncertainty about the relative stand-
ing of the trailing candidates and ultimately undermining voter ability to 
coordinate on the two front- runners. Hence, strategic coordination will 
be higher in those districts where the incumbent faces a quality challenger 
than in districts where the incumbent faces multiple quality candidates or 
no quality candidates.
To test these propositions, this chapter uses extensive data from the 
single- member district (SMD) tier of the mixed- member electoral system 
in Japan’s lower house elections covering the period 1996– 2009. Japan is a 
particularly fitting case because the electoral system as well as the contex-
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tual features of Japanese politics create different types of district contend-
ers with varying political skills and local support bases. I show that changes 
in patterns of competition at the district level are correlated with changes 
in the number and quality of challenger candidates. However, simply com-
paring districts at any time can be problematic: in fact, quality challengers 
do not emerge randomly; rather, their occurrence depends on the prospects 
of victory (e.g., Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Ariga et al. 2016). Hence, to 
support the claim that challenger quality affects strategic coordination, I 
implement a treatment- effects model that corrects the endogeneity bias.
The results indicate that the presence of one quality challenger candi-
date significantly increases competition, thereby increasing voter strategic 
coordination. Conversely, more than one quality challenger hinders voter 
strategic coordination by creating informational noise in the electoral race. 
The findings are corroborated at the individual level using survey data 
covering Japanese national elections in 2003 and 2005, indicating that the 
observed patterns result from voter strategic coordination and not only 
from personal votes for specific candidates.
Challenger Quality and Voter Strategic Coordination
As chapter 1 discusses, scholars assert that voters care about election out-
comes and do not want to waste their votes— that is, vote for a candidate 
or party unlikely to win the election. The objective discrimination against 
candidates with no chance of winning the district race depends on voter 
perception of the closeness of the race between the two front- running can-
didates in that district and the relative distribution of support for trailing 
challengers (Cain 1978). On the former, the closer the district race is, the 
more uncertain the result between the two front- runners, the more likely 
supporters of weaker candidates are to feel that there is a reason for them to 
vote strategically. Another necessary condition for strategic coordination is 
that the identity of the leading challenger is known to voters (Cox 1997). 
The more competition and uncertainty among the trailing candidates, the 
less likely voters are to coordinate on the two front- runners. But how can 
voters reach certain expectations about who is winning and who is trailing?
The two sources of objective information available to voters most com-
monly considered by the existing literature are the outcome of the previous 
election and opinion polls.1 Past performance can provide an independent 
cue to voters who fear wasting their votes on candidates unlikely to suc-
ceed (Cox 1997; Lago 2008). Yet doubts remain about the extent to which 
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it is reasonable to expect that such information is relevant for a significant 
number of voters. In addition to the fact that time erodes voters’ memories, 
parties’ popularity may have changed substantially since the last election 
(Selb 2012), and new candidates may have entered the electoral competi-
tion (Crisp, Potter, and Lee 2012). Polls can serve as a coordination signal, 
providing voters with results and trends based on pre- election polls (For-
sythe et al. 1993; Gschwend 2007). However, district- level forecasts are 
rarely available, and national polls are not very relevant for predicting the 
outcome of elections in specific constituencies (Blais and Bodet 2006).
Given voters’ uncertainty about electoral outcomes, the relative quali-
fications of incumbents and challengers and the existence of a costly elec-
toral challenge can convey important information to the voters (Gordon, 
Huber, and Landa 2007). While the existing literature has usually focused 
on incumbent quality (e.g., Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Eggers et al. 
2015), challenger characteristics have the potential to determine elections 
by shaping the electoral campaign itself (Scheiner 2005; Burden 2009). 
Formidable challengers surely have more incentives and opportunities 
to develop effective candidacies and hence a better chance to challenge 
the top candidate in the district, thereby influencing the district race and 
increasing competition at the district level (Karp et al. 2002; Moser and 
Scheiner 2005).
The literature often makes a crude distinction between quality and 
non- quality candidates by defining them respectively as those who have 
previously held elective office and those who have not (e.g., Jacobson 1989; 
Burden 2009). According to the general argument underlying the incum-
bency bonus, the difference in the political relevance of certain candidates 
should create a support party bonus (Stokes 1992; Stone and Simas 2010). 
To be sure, incumbency status is a shorthand indicator for a number of 
factors, among them name recognition as a result of media exposure and a 
larger war chest. The potential to shape the electoral race, however, is also 
related to candidates’ ability to develop a substantial organized base of sup-
port at the district level, including access to organized teams of campaign 
workers and to local spending, door- to- door electoral canvassing, and so 
forth. In this regard, quality becomes a shorthand indicator for candidate 
visibility and for the electoral support that the candidate can mobilize at 
the district level, which impinges directly on voter expectations about the 
electoral outcome. Hence, candidate quality operates as a heuristic for 
voters who do not want to waste their votes: knowing who contests the 
elections helps voters to make inferences about the distribution of support 
for district- level candidates. One quality challenger may give the impres-
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sion that the seat is more vulnerable than it really is, thereby increasing 
competition and voter strategic coordination on the two front- running 
candidates. Conversely, having more than one quality challenger creates 
uncertainty about who the main challenger is, boosting the complexity of 
the voting decision environment and ultimately hindering voter strategic 
coordination. All else being equal, I expect that strategic coordination will 
be higher in those instances where the incumbent is challenged by one 
quality contender and will be lower where there are multiple quality chal-
lengers or no quality challenger.
Types of District Competition in Japan
Japanese elections provide an excellent case study because the electoral 
system as well as the contextual features of Japanese politics create dif-
ferent types of district contenders and a variety of district- level competi-
tions. The analysis examines electoral behavior from the introduction of 
the mixed- member electoral system in 1996 through the fifth election held 
under this system (2009). The mixed- member system has two tiers. In the 
first tier, 300 members (reduced to 295 in 2013) are elected in SMDs; in 
the second tier, 200 members (reduced to 180 in 2000) are elected from 
closed party lists in 11 region blocs according to proportional representa-
tion (PR) (Reed 2005). In particular, parties devote much attention to the 
district- level competition since the SMD vote for candidates has a large 
effect on the final composition of the parliament, thereby raising the stakes 
of the SMD elections (Estevez- Abe 2006; Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 
2006). The two tiers of the system work independently of each other and, 
as chapter 1 discusses, each vote may be sincere or strategic on its own 
terms (Plescia 2016; Harfst, Blais, and Bol, this vol.). In this chapter, I focus 
exclusively on the SMD tier.
By and large today, two types of parties exist: majority- seeking parties, 
such as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ), and non- majority- seeking parties, such as the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SDP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the religious 
party, Koumei.2 Each party can nominate only one candidate per electoral 
district; not all parties run candidates in every district. In Japan as in other 
countries, the number of candidates at the district level tends to diminish 
slowly over time yet rarely reaches the Duvergerian voting equilibrium m 
+ 1 (Reed 1990; Ariga et al. 2016). While in every SMD there is one seat to 
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be awarded, and technically only one incumbent who has won the district 
in the previous election, there can be many different challengers.3
First, challenger quality is related to previous parliamentary experience. 
In this regard, it is possible to distinguish several challengers of quality. A 
feature of mixed- member electoral systems is the dual candidacy provision, 
according to which a candidate endorsed by a party runs in an SMD con-
test and appears on the party’s PR list (McKean and Scheiner 2000). Zombie 
incumbents are those who lost in the SMD district but were resurrected 
and elected to the parliament through party lists (Pekkanen, Nyblade, and 
Krauss 2006). These resurrected winners usually behave as pure represen-
tatives of their respective districts because their efforts to be visible in their 
district increase their chance to win an SMD seat or a resurrected PR seat 
in the following election (Bawn and Thies 2003). Shadow incumbents are 
candidates previously elected to the parliament from that SMD in the past 
but not in the immediately preceding election. Other groups of challengers 
include those who have never represented that specific district before but 
still enjoy increased visibility at the district level either because they ran as 
part of a tag- team— Costa Rica arrangement— with a candidate who ran in 
the SMD in previous elections (quasi- incumbent)4 or because they had pre-
viously been part of the lower house of the parliament (fading incumbents).5
Second, quality is related to the ability to develop a substantial orga-
nized base of support at the district level and local- level experience, a cru-
cial feature in the Japanese case (Scheiner 2005, 137) as well as elsewhere 
(e.g., Karp et al. 2002). Specifically, the candidate support organization 
(koenkai) in Japan is designed to cultivate and deliver an organized vote 
for the candidate on Election Day (Scheiner 2005). This category of can-
didates, whom I call star challengers, includes all candidates who have never 
served in parliament before and thus are not part of any of the previously 
discussed categories of challengers, yet they are likely to receive a surplus 
of support at the district level because they are part of the district and have 
a well- established base of supporters.6 Such challengers include former 
prefectural governors and local assembly members, former city mayors or 
upper house members from that district, or candidates who inherited a 
district from a close relative.7
Using this classification, table 6.1 shows that of the 1,446 incumbent 
candidates who ran between 1996 and 2009, about 66% won re- election, 
almost 11% lost their SMDs but were resurrected in the PR tier of the 
electoral system, and a little more than 23% lost their seats. The rate of 
success is lower for quality challengers than for incumbent candidates but 
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much higher than for low- quality challengers. The rate of election in the 
SMDs is 50% for tag candidates, 34% for zombies, 35% for shadows, 25% 
for fading candidates, and 51% for star challengers but only 6% for non- 
quality candidates. Although I cannot control for how many of these can-
didates also run in the PR contest, table 6.1 shows that the rate of election 
under PR is 6% for tag candidates, 23% for zombie, 17% for shadow, 27% 
for fading, and 18% for star challengers, but only 5% for non- quality chal-
lenger candidates. Table 6.1 also displays average spending figures by type 
of candidate. The resources available to quality challengers do not differ 
substantially from those of incumbent candidates but are very different 
from the spending rates of non- quality challengers.8
Data and Methods
The first test of voter strategic coordination uses aggregate election data. 
The underlying idea behind this test is that if the proposed model of behav-
ior is correct, all else being equal, strategic coordination will be higher 
where the incumbent is challenged by one quality contender and lower 
where there is more than one quality challenger and where an incumbent 
faces no quality challenger. Because the expectations apply to cases in which 
an incumbent is running for reelection, the empirical analysis is restricted 
to district elections in which one incumbent participates.9 To measure voter 
strategic coordination, I employ a recently proposed modification of Cox’s 
(1997) commonly used second- to- first loser’s vote (SF) ratio. Cox’s SF ratio 
takes on a minimum of 0 if elites manage to coordinate on only two com-
petitors before the election or if voters desert all candidates other than 
the winner and the main challenger. In contrast, the SF ratio’s maximum, 
TABLE 6.1. Types of Candidates and Electoral Performance









Incumbent 65.9% 10.8% 23.3% 1,446 116.5 (42.8)
Quality challenger
 Tag 50.0% 6.3% 43.8% 48 121.8 (48.2)
 Zombie 33.9% 23.0% 43.0% 330 88.7 (41.5)
 Shadow 35.2% 16.9% 47.9% 284 91.3 (44.2)
 Fading 24.7% 27.3% 48.1% 77 100.3 (47.1)
 Star 51.6% 18.0% 30.5% 256 101.9 (43.1)
No quality challenger 5.0% 4.6% 90.3% 3,173 48.6 (41.1)
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one, will be obtained if the expected vote shares of first and second losers 
are too close for voters to decide which of the two to desert. A common 
criticism of the SF ratio pertains to its inability to correctly identify non- 
Duvergerian equilibria in lopsided elections (Gaines 1999). For example, 
Cox’s ratio will report a non- Duvergerian equilibrium in an SMD with 
three candidates receiving 90%, 5%, and 5% of the votes, respectively (SF 
ratio = 5/5 = 1). Selb (2012) proposes a slight modification of the SF ratio 
that corrects this shortcoming: the minimum of the first- loser’s- to- (last)- 
winner’s ratio and the second- to- first  loser’s ratio (mSF ratio). The mSF 
captures a sharp distance in the distribution of votes either between the 
first and second loser or, in lopsided elections, between the winner and the 
first loser, as indicated by an mSF value close to 0. In neck- and- neck races 
between the (last) winner and the first and second loser (a clear three- way 
tie) where instrumental voters have no incentive to desert their preferred 
choice— that is, a truly non- Duvergerian equilibrium— the mSF ratio still 
assumes values close to unity. Hence, the lower the ratio, the higher the 
degree of strategic coordination.10
An empirical analysis of the effect of the number of quality candidates 
on strategic coordination at the district level compares the mSF ratio of 
districts with one quality challenger to those with none or more than 
one. The quality challengers are all those candidates classified as zom-
bie, shadow, fading, and star challengers. Table 6.2 displays the values of 
the mSF ratio in those different scenarios, comparing them with a simple 
count of the number of candidates. The upper part of the table shows that 
the SF and the mSF ratios increase as the number of candidates in the 
district gets larger, indicating declining levels of strategic coordination. 
The lower part of the table shows that the values of the two ratios remain 
TABLE 6.2. Competition and the Number of Quality Candidates
 SF Ratio mSF ratio Margin (%) Districts (N)
N (Candidates)
 3 0.24 (0.17) 0.22 (0.14) 10.88 (8.56) 627
 4 0.40 (0.24) 0.37 (0.20) 9.02 (7.46) 441
 5 0.51 (0.26) 0.47 (0.23) 7.27 (6.91) 175
 6 0.57 (0.24) 0.53 (0.20) 5.44 (4.67) 46
 > 6 0.61 (0.27) 0.55 (0.23) 5.20 (3.79) 18
Type of competition
No quality challenger 0.34 (0.21) 0.31 (0.21) 12.15 (9.15) 534
1 quality challenger 0.32 (0.24) 0.29 (0.16) 7.70 (6.18) 663
> 1 quality challenger 0.60 (0.25) 0.55 (0.21) 5.49 (4.61) 109
Note: Calculations exclude open seats and districts with only two candidates.
112 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages
stable in districts where there is no or just one quality challenger, although 
the ratios are lower in the latter case. However, the values of the ratios 
increase sharply when the number of quality challengers is larger than one. 
The actual number of candidates per district is only marginally related to 
the number of quality challengers. The two variables are clearly positively 
related, but the correlation coefficient is very low (r = 0.3). The table also 
displays the mean values of vote share margin between the SMD winner 
and the runner- up in that election: competition increases (i.e., margin val-
ues decrease) as the number of candidates or quality challengers increases.
Simply comparing the districts this way, however, is problematic. The 
number of quality candidates is clearly an endogenous product of the com-
petition; in fact, parties tend to nominate quality candidates in those dis-
tricts where the chance of victory is greater. One solution to the problem of 
nonrandom selection would be to add control variables that at least in part 
can account for the observed heterogeneity across districts. This, however, 
would not properly correct for the endogeneity issue, and the addition of 
control variables may produce biased estimates (Barnow, Cain, and Gold-
berger 1980). Because of the problem of nonrandom selection involved in 
quality challengers entering the race where they have better chances of suc-
cess, for the first test using aggregate data, I use a treatment- effects model.
The treatment- effects model is becoming increasingly popular in politi-
cal science (e.g., Schneider et al. 2003; Maeda 2008). This model consciously 
examines the two processes simultaneously— that is, whether or not the 
subjects receive the treatment and what factors affect the occurrence of the 
treatment. The first stage of the estimation process uses pertinent factors to 
predict the occurrence of quality challengers. The second stage estimates the 
“treatment effect”— the impact of the number of quality challengers— on 
voter strategic coordination. Controlling for the selection of quality chal-
lengers enables the isolation of the marginal impact of the number and qual-
ity of candidates on voter strategic coordination from the factors that lead to 
placement of these candidates in specific districts in the first place. I present 
the results of the treatment-effects model next to those obtained using a 
naive Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model.
The second test of strategic voting relies on individual- level data 
leveraging on pre- and postelectoral survey data covering the 2003 and 
2005 elections. Examining these survey data enables us to test vote choice 
while directly controlling for voters’ preferences regarding candidates and 
expectations about the electoral outcome. The individual- level data also 
allow for a more direct measurement of the respective weights that voters 
give to strategic considerations and sincere preferences.
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Empirical Findings at the Aggregate Level
The aggregate- level analysis proceeds in two steps employing a multino-
mial treatment- effects model (Deb and Trivedi 2006).11
First Stage: Model Setup
The dependent variable in the first stage is the treatment effect: whether 
the district has no challenger of quality or more than one compared to the 
control group, where there is only one challenger of quality. Which factors 
affect the quality and the number of quality candidates in a district? The 
first factor is the vote share margin between the SMD winner and the run-
ner- up in the previous election (PrevMargin): the larger the values of the 
PrevMargin variable, the less competitive the district is and the less likely 
it is that challenger parties will enter the race and waste strong candidates. 
Since the competitiveness in the previous election is needed to calculate 
this variable, the first postreform election (1996) cannot be included in the 
empirical models.12 The second factor takes into account Japanese parties’ 
capacity to nominate slates of qualified candidates for SMDs. Because of 
its historic dominance and many incumbents, the LDP is best situated to 
locate high- quality candidates with strong local support. For this reason, I 
include a dummy variable in the model for the presence or absence of an 
LDP incumbent (LDPincumbent), which should scare away strong oppo-
nents. Third, voters’ incentives to coordinate strategically are known to 
be affected by elites’ coordination. Hence, the third factor included in the 
model is a dummy variable that measures, at the district level, whether 
the opposition (to the LDP) has coordinated around a strong Democratic 
Party of Japan candidate.13 Coordination by the opposition increases the 
chances of a quality challenger but reduces the chances of more than one. 
Finally, the fourth factor is the number of candidates who contested the 
district in the previous election (PrevNcands), which is likely to affect 
the dependent variable: the larger the number of previous candidates, the 
more likely that more than one quality challenger will arise and the less 
likely that only a single quality candidate will arise.
First Stage: Results
Table 6.3 shows the results of the first- stage regression. As expected, the 
PrevMargin variable has a significant positive impact on the likelihood 
that a district will have no quality challenger and a negative effect on the 
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likelihood that a district will have more than one: the less competitive the 
district is, the larger the advantage of the incumbent candidate and the 
less likely an opposition party is to run a quality challenger. The variable 
measuring the number of candidates who have contested the district in 
the previous election has no significant impact on the likelihood of the 
absence of a quality challenger. However, the larger the previous number 
of candidates contesting the elections, the higher the chances of finding 
more than one quality challenger. The presence of an LDP incumbent has 
a positive effect on the likelihood that there will be no quality challengers 
and a negative effect on the likelihood of multiple quality challengers, but 
these findings are statistically significant only in the second case. Coordi-
nation by the opposition parties has the expected negative sign, but it is not 
statistically significant. Overall, and as hypothesized, the findings indicate 
that the number and quality of challenger candidates clearly depend on 
past electoral results.
Second Stage: Model Setup
In the second stage, the dependent variable is the mSF ratio. The right 
side of the equation includes the key independent variable (the trichoto-
mous treatment variable, whether there is no quality challenger, more than 
one, or just one), the current number of candidates, and the previous vote 
margin. All else being equal, a larger number of candidates decreases voter 
TABLE 6.3. Multinomial Treatment-Effects Model: First- Stage
Dependent Variable: Treatment
Ref: 1 Quality Challenger No Quality Challenger > 1 Quality Challenger
PrevMargin 0.141*** −0.059+
(0.013) (0.031)











LL −281.92  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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coordination and thus increases the mSF. Contrarily, the more competi-
tive the district in the previous election, the more voters will fear wasting 
their votes, resulting in lower mSF values. Again, coordination by elites is 
likely to influence strategic voter coordination by reducing the number 
of quality alternatives available to voters. I include two variables to cap-
ture elite coordination: one that measures coordination by the center- right 
government party, the LDP, and one for the coordination of the opposition 
parties around the main center- left party, the Democratic Party of Japan. 
I also control for the characteristics of the SMDs in terms of the level of 
urbanization, which is known to be strongly related to parties’ popularity 
in Japan. I added a variable measuring the proportion of the district’s popu-
lation that lives in census- defined urbanized areas (Urban).14
Second Stage: Results
Table 6.4 reports the results of the second stage of the multinomial treat-
ment-effects model. It also reports the results from a naive OLS model. 
Focusing first on the key independent variable, table 6.4 shows a statisti-
cally significant and positive effect of the two treatment variables in both 
the second stage of the multinomial treatment-effects model and the OLS 
model. To illustrate this result, I calculated the marginal effect of the treat-
ment variable on the predicted value of the mSF ratio (figure 6.1). Start-
ing with the non- quality challenger treatment, the marginal effect is about 
0.035— that is, the value of the mSF ratio is on average 0.035 points higher 
(meaning less strategic coordination) in those districts where there is no 
quality challenger than in districts where incumbents are challenged by 
quality candidates. This difference is significant at p < 0.05. A naive OLS 
model predicts the same positive effect, albeit a more modest one— 0.024. 
The marginal effect of more than one quality challenger is 0.135— that is, 
the mSF ratio is about 0.135 points higher when there are multiple quality 
challengers compared to districts with just one quality challenger. This dif-
ference is significant at p < 0.001. Again the naive OLS model predicts the 
same positive effect but this time at slightly higher rate— 0.185.
Table 6.4 also shows a positive coefficient for the variable measuring 
the number of candidates: this means that the larger the number of can-
didates, the lower the level of voter coordination. The table also indicates 
that the larger the previous margin of votes between the winner and the 
loser (that is, the less competitive the district was), the lower the strategic 
coordination today; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The coordination by the opposition or the LDP also increases strategic 
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coordination, but the effect is significant only for the opposition. Finally, 
urbanization has a positive impact on strategic coordination. In sum, it is 
clear that when the district is contested by one quality challenger, levels of 
voter strategic coordination are higher than in cases when the incumbent 
faces no or multiple quality challengers.
Empirical Findings at the Individual Level
Finally, I use survey information about voter preferences and expectations 
to predict the type of vote choice— that is, sincere versus strategic— and 
evaluate the findings of the aggregate- level analysis. Voter coordination 
around a main challenger by deserting lower- ranked candidates might 
result from personal support for the quality challenger, which qualifies as 
sincere voting rather than as an attempt to influence the electoral results. 
TABLE 6.4. Multinomial Treatment Effects Model: Second- Stage
Dependent Variable: mSF Ratio
 Second Stage Naive OLS Model
Ref: 1 Quality Challenger
Treatment: No Quality Challenger 0.120* 0.024*
(0.059) (0.012)





















Note: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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To test whether the patterns observed result from strategic coordination 
rather than personal voting, I employ survey data from the JES III project.15 
While the JES survey was conducted in ten waves, I am interested only in 
those waves covering the pre- and postelectoral periods of the lower house 
elections, so I use Waves D, E, J, and K for the 2003 and the 2005 national 
elections.16 Japanese surveys contain district identifiers, enabling research-
ers to link survey responses to aggregate- level district information. Also, 
for each election, each respondent was interviewed both before and after 
the election. The pre- electoral wave allows us to measure preferences and 
expectations, while the postelectoral wave is used to measure vote choice, 
thus minimizing the potential problem that answers given after the elec-
tions may be affected by the electoral outcome.
At the start of the pre- electoral interview, respondents are shown a card 
with the pictures of the candidates running in the district and are asked 
which candidates they know. Table 6.5 reports the mentions by type of can-
didates. Incumbents are among the most well- known types of candidates: 
nearly 69% of them are mentioned in 2003 and 66% in 2005. However, the 
rates of mention are not much lower for the different types of challengers 
except for the challengers of no quality, who are least known. Respondents 
Fig. 6.1. Average Marginal Effect of Quality Challengers on mSF Ratio 
(95% CI)
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are also asked to score known candidates using a feeling thermometer 
from 0 (very much dislike) to 100 (like the candidate very much). The table 
shows that average feeling scores are very similar across mentioned candi-
dates, and none of the specific types of candidates enjoys a surplus in terms 
of feelings, although non- quality challengers again average lower values.
Model Setup
As chapter 1 discusses, a sincere vote describes a situation in which the 
voter chooses the most preferred candidate from a menu of alternatives. 
Nonsincere voting instead describes a situation in which voting goes 
against sincere preferences. I define a vote in the SMD as sincere when the 
voter supports the most preferred candidate and 0 otherwise.17 In our data, 
about 74% of the respondents voted sincerely in the SMD, choosing the 
most preferred candidate with the SMD vote, and about 26% voted for a 
less preferred candidate.
The empirical models include a variable that takes into account the 
number of quality challengers running in each district. To confirm the 
results at the aggregate level, we should find that voters are less likely to 
TABLE 6.5. Candidates, Quality, and Respondents’ Knowledge










Yes No Yes No
Incumbent 68.9% 31.1% 55.6 (20.0) 65.7% 34.3% 55.9 (19.8)
 Obs 1,560 705 1,525 1,015 530 992
Tag 67.5% 32.5% 53.9 (20.5) 70.3% 29.7 50.2 (20.8)
 Obs 110 53 108 45 19 45
Zombie 49.9% 50.1% 48.6 (20.5) 52.3% 47.7% 49.4 (20.3)
 Obs 252 253 236 287 262 275
Shadow 63.3% 36.7% 53.0 (19.2) 52.9% 47.1% 49.7 (22.3)
 Obs 295 171 291 126 112 124
Fading 48.4% 51.6% 51.2 (24.1) 43.5% 56.5% 52.8 (26.0)
 Obs 106 113 104 20 26 20
Star 55.2% 44.8% 50.4 (20.5) 52.2% 47.8% 51.1 (17.8)
 Obs 262 213 256 129 118 127
No Quality 
Challenger
25.8% 74.1% 44.5 (10.5) 27.5% 72.5% 42.0 (22.1)
 Obs 1,215 3,481 1,151 751 1,983 697
Note: Since some respondents refuse to score candidates, the number of rated candidates is always lower 
than the number of mentioned candidates.
aFeeling scored of mentioned candidate.
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vote sincerely where the incumbent faces a quality challenger than in dis-
tricts where the incumbent faces multiple or no quality candidates. The 
models also include a series of important individual- and aggregate- level 
variables. At the aggregate level, I include a commonly employed measure 
of district competitiveness: the more competitive the district, the more 
likely voters are to vote strategically.
At the individual level, I control for feelings for the top party and the 
top candidate as well as the differences in score between the first and the 
second scored candidates. These variables are measured using a feeling 
thermometer from 0 (very much dislike) to 100 (like the candidate or the 
party very much). I expect that the higher the feelings for the most pre-
ferred party or candidate, the more utility the voter gets in voting sincerely. 
The models also include voter expectations about the electoral outcome. 
One way of measuring expectations is by using an indirect measure that 
captures the most preferred candidate’s margin of contention. The mar-
gin of contention is measured by taking the difference between the votes 
gained by the most preferred candidate and the candidate who finished 
second. By definition, this variable is positive when the preferred candi-
date is in third position or lower, 0 when the preferred candidate finishes 
second, and negative if the preferred candidate wins (e.g., Fisher 2004). 
The larger the value, the less likely the voter should be to vote sincerely, 
since the most preferred candidate is unlikely to win. Japanese surveys also 
allow us to directly measure expectations. The survey asked respondents 
a closed- ended question about their perceptions of their preferred candi-
dates’ chances of winning the SMD: “How close of a race do you think the 
SMD where you live will be?” I categorize the most preferred candidate as 
noncompetitive when the respondent chose “Even if I vote, the candidate I 
support will have a hard time winning” and 0 otherwise.18 Since it is quite 
likely that voting strategically is related to voters’ interest, I also control 
for interest in politics.
Results
Table 6.6 shows the results of two parsimonious models of sincere vote, 
one in which expectations are measured indirectly (Model 1) and one when 
a direct measure is used (Model 2). Focusing first on the key independent 
variable, the type of district competition has a significant effect on sincere 
voting. All else being equal, Model 1 shows that the odds of casting a sin-
cere vote are 33% higher (exp(0.288) = 1.33) where there are no quality 
challengers contesting the election than in situations where the incum-
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bent faces a quality challenger, holding preferences and expectations con-
stant. The odds of casting a sincere vote are 52% higher (exp(0.417) = 1.52) 
where there is more than one quality challenger than in situations where 
there is only one quality challenger, although the results are significant 
only at p > 0.1. Model 2, where I control for direct expectations, shows that 
the odds of casting a sincere vote are 38% higher (exp(0.325) = 1.38) where 
there are no quality challengers contesting the elections and 45% higher 
(exp(0.376)= 1.45) where there is more than one quality challenger than in 
situations where there is only one quality challenger. These findings con-
firm the results gathered using aggregate- level data.
Both models find that personal feelings for the top- ranked candidate 
have a positive effect on voting sincerely, as do the other two feeling ther-
TABLE 6.6. Sincere and Strategic Voting in the 2003 and 2005 Lower House 
Elections: Multilevel Logit Models
Dependent Variable: Sincere Vote
 Model 1 Model 2
Ref. 1 Quality Challenger
No Quality Challenger 0.288* 0.325**
(0.120) (0.120)
> 1 Quality Challenger 0.417+ 0.376+
(0.221) (0.221)
Feeling for Top Party 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
Feeling for Top Candidate 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.004) (0.004)
Score Second- Best Candidate 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001)
Interest in Politics −0.046 −0.022
(0.072) (0.072)













Note: Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Logit random effect models by district. The models include fixed effect by year (not shown).
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mometer variables. For every one unit increase in the 0– 100 scale of feeling 
for candidates, the odds of casting a sincere vote grow by 5% (exp(0.049) 
= 1.05). The effect of feeling for parties and the difference score is lower 
but is still positive and significant. Interest, however, has no effect on vote 
choice. Concerning expectations, the less competitive the preferred can-
didate, the less likely the respondent is to vote sincerely, as expected. The 
results hold for both indirect (Model 1) and direct (Model 2) measure-
ments of expectations. The previous vote margin has the expected positive 
effect on sincere voting, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The evidence points to the conclusion that the rate of strategic coordi-
nation is higher in those districts where one quality challenger faces an 
incumbent compared to those districts where zero or multiple quality chal-
lengers run for elections, a result that provides support for the findings at 
the aggregate level.
Conclusion
Without common knowledge about who is trailing in the electoral race, 
voter coordination on the strongest two alternatives is unlikely to succeed 
(Cox 1997; Myatt 2007). Studying where and how voters get the infor-
mation they need to make informed decisions is key to understanding 
strategic voting and ultimately election outcomes (Blais et al., this vol.). 
This chapter showed that the resources and talents of challenger candi-
dates have a significant impact on vote choice. The presence of one qual-
ity challenger significantly increases competition, thereby increasing voter 
strategic coordination. However, the presence of multiple quality challeng-
ers hinders voter strategic coordination by creating noise in the electoral 
race. The findings are corroborated at the individual level, indicating that 
the observed patterns result from strategic coordination, not merely from 
personal votes for specific candidates. Candidate quality operates as one 
important heuristic voters use to understand the competition at the district 
level and avoid wasting their votes. Knowing who contests the elections 
helps voters to make inferences about the distribution of support for the 
district- level candidates. This has important implications for democratic 
elections and party strategy.
First, the common view that citizens barely engage with the com-
plexity of the political world should not discourage scholars from exam-
ining where and how voters gather the information they need to make 
informed decisions. The local environment in general and the presence 
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of a quality challenger in particular can convey important information to 
voters and can greatly help them to form reasonable expectations about 
the electoral outcome. In addition, a party’s capacity to win elections is 
related not only to its ability to run the right number of candidates but 
also to its ability to find the right candidate for each district, which may 
increase voter coordination across the board. In this regard, politicians 
also have good incentives to behave strategically via enhanced alloca-
tion of resources to the district or the selection of more appealing candi-
dates. This issue merits future investigation, since even sincere support-
ers of minority parties may vote for one of the two main contenders not 
because they are strategic but because the strategic behavior of parties 
has accommodated their preferences.
There are good reasons to believe that inferences can be made from 
plurality to PR systems with regard to the effect of candidate quality and 
voter strategic coordination. In fact, voters can use the quality of national 
candidates to make inferences about the distribution of support for the dif-
ferent parties at the national level, especially in those instances where new 
leaders or new parties contest the elections for the first time (Lago, this 
vol.). Focusing on voter information may provide explanations for previ-
ously unexplored cases and in general may explain all those cases where 
objective predictions cannot be made but where coordination on two par-
ties or candidates is found.
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 1. The literature has often stressed that people also form expectations about a 
candidate’s chances of winning a district on the basis of personal preferences. In this 
case, perceptions about who is trailing in the race are distorted by existing political 
preferences (e.g., Price 2000).
 2. Japan has had many party mergers and splits, but they are beyond the scope 
of this chapter. See Reed 2005; Reed, Scheiner, and Thies 2012.
 3. In this chapter I look at competition in about 1,500 districts covering the 
elections of 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009. Of these, about 0.2% were contested 
by only two candidates, about 3% were open- seat elections with no incumbent 
running, and about 7% had more than two incumbents. The two- incumbent cases 
exist only for the 1996 elections, the first election following the end of the single- 
nontransferable- vote system, which used multimember districts.
 4. Tag- team members run for the same SMD. One candidate runs in the SMD, 
while the other runs only in the PR contest, and they switch positions for the next elec-
tion (Dabney 2009). The LDP and Koumei, for example, make such arrangements.
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 5. Data come from different sources. Aggregate voting records for the 1996– 
2009 elections, spending data, and candidate status derive from Masahiko and 
Yanai 2013. By- elections and Costa Rica arrangements come from Steven Reed’s 
dataset, available at http://www.fps.chuo-u.ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.html. Additional 
information on candidate curriculum derives from different sources, including the 
House of Representatives website (http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/
html/index_e.htm); and Reed 2004; Scheiner 2005; Dabney 2009.
 6. Hence, a candidate who was a star challenger at t − 1 at time t will be consid-
ered an incumbent if she won the SMD, a zombie if she won in the PR, and still a 
star challenger if she lost.
 7. In Japan, the practice of inheriting districts is common within families of very 
successful politicians. Inheriting a seat effectively provides a candidate with the 
entire existing organization of the deceased candidate (Scheiner 2005).
 8. Disclosure of campaign spending usually is not very accurate (Dabney 2009). 
Yet, the ceiling on spending typically is set high enough that candidates do not usu-
ally reach or exceed the limits (Carlson 2007).
 9. Since the number of districts without an incumbent and with more than one 
is very low, including all districts produces very similar results.
 10. In 83% of the district election observations, the mSF equates the SF ratio. 
Hence, using the SF ratio would not change substantive conclusions.
 11. The analysis uses the mtreatreg command in Stata 14, which estimates the two 
steps simultaneously (Deb 2006). The model is estimated using maximum simu-
lated likelihood.
 12. I do not need to control for whether the district is an open seat or for the 
presence of more than one incumbent candidate because such cases exist only for 
the 1996 elections.
 13. Coordination takes into account whether the Democratic Party of Japan can-
didate has been “recommended” by another party in the same camp. Data from 
Steven Reed’s dataset available at: http://www.fps.chuo-u.ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.
html
 14. Data from Steven Reed’s dataset available at: http://www.fps.chuo-u.
ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.html
 15. The JES III Project is run by Kenichi Ikeda, University of Tokyo; Yoshiaki 
Kobayashi, Keio University; and Hiroshi Hirano, Gakushuin University; data are 
available at http://www.coeccc.keio.ac.jp/data_archive_en/data_archive_jesIII.
html
 16. Waves A, B, G, and H cover the pre- and postelection periods for the House 
of Councillors elections in 2001 and 2004. Wave C covers the 2003 prefectural 
assembly election.
 17. For the 10% of respondents who gave equal rankings to multiple candidates, 
a sincere vote is a vote for one of these candidates.
 18. The category of 0 includes the following answers: (a) “Even if I don’t vote, 
the candidate I support will be elected”; (b) “Even if I don’t vote, the candidate I 
support will gather just enough votes to be elected”; (c) “If I vote, the candidate 
I support will be elected”; and (d) “If I don’t vote, the candidate I support may 
have a hard time winning.” “Don’t know” and unclear answers (e.g., “I have not 
decided which candidate to support” and “There are no candidates I support”) are 
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dropped from the analysis. However, since they constitute a small percentage of 
respondents, including “Don’t Know” and unclear answers as 0 does not change the 
substantive conclusions.
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Strategic Coalition Voting in Belgium
The 2014 Federal and Regional Elections
Tom Verthé and Stefanie Beyens
Voters harboring strategic voting motives veer from their preferred party 
or candidate expecting to influence the outcome of an election. As chapter 
1 points out, for some voters, an election’s outcome is the composition 
of parliament; others wish to have an impact on who governs. Majoritar-
ian systems and their single- party executives obviously make this easier 
for their electorates, as the party that wins a majority of parliamentary 
seats usually heads the government. But when election results tend to be 
translated into coalition governments, being strategic in the voting booth 
requires an extra expectation— that is, who will (successfully) negotiate 
with whom? Still, we assume that for voters who grew up in these systems, 
this extra step in their potential reasoning will not take an extraordinary 
amount of effort. To test whether this assumption holds, we study Bel-
gium, a federal country with a history of (oversized) coalitions, complex 
government formations, and two separate party systems. If Belgian voters 
were able to vote strategically in the 2014 elections, then this provides an 
affirmative answer to the research question, “Does strategic voting happen 
even in the least likely cases?” If strategic voting can happen in Belgium, it 
can happen anywhere.
In 2014, Belgium organized simultaneous elections for the European, 
federal (i.e., national) and regional parliaments, an excellent opportunity 
to study strategic voting in a complex system. Belgium’s state structure has 
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been federal since 1993. It contains three territorial regions (Flanders is 
Dutch- speaking, Wallonia is French- speaking, and Brussels is bilingual) 
and three language communities (Flemish, French, and German, which is 
the smallest and was added after the First World War). Belgium’s peculiar 
federalism, based on both territorial and linguistic divisions, is the result of 
decades of state reform, and the outcome of each round of reform is con-
sidered only a temporary compromise. While these particulars make the 
country unique (and difficult to understand), they also provide an interest-
ing case for the study of strategic voting. Especially when several elections 
occur simultaneously, Belgium presents its electorate with many opportu-
nities to act strategically in the voting booth. Given our interest in strategic 
voting with governing coalitions, we focus only on the federal and regional 
levels, as the European Union’s governing body (the Commission) is not 
directly elected through its parliament. This chapter thus focuses on elec-
tions at the Belgian federal and the Flemish and Walloon regional levels.
The elections for the federal Chamber of Representatives and the 
regional parliaments use a semi- closed list system, and seats are allocated 
according to the proportional D’Hondt system, with a 5% vote share 
threshold at the district level. The medium- sized, multimember electoral 
districts for both elections follow the provincial boundaries (except for the 
Walloon regional elections). The rapid succession of state reforms since 
the 1970s— from a unitary to a federal structure— has also affected the 
configuration of Belgian parties. Most important, Belgium does not have 
one statewide party system; rather, it has two major party systems that are 
based on Dutch and French language groups.1 These party systems are 
geographically distinct and overlap only in the Brussels electoral district.2 
As a consequence, an overwhelming majority of the population cannot vote 
for parties belonging to another language group. This has resulted in a 
hyperfragmented party landscape, where most parties have an ideological 
sister party on the other side of the language border. Having two party sys-
tems in one country stands in the way of a clearly structured competition 
because government formation is also affected. The federal government 
coalition is constitutionally required to include both language groups, 
although there is no formal requirement for a double majority. As a result, 
the previous federal government consisted of 6 parties, the current federal 
parliament hosts 13 parties (6 Dutch- and 7 French- speaking), and over 
the past 20 years, every party (except for the most extreme ones) has been 
part of a government coalition at one level or another. In sum, therefore, 
Belgium has two party systems that, in 2014, simultaneously had to form 
governments at the regional (one party system per region) and federal (two 
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party systems together) levels. The complexity of this setting might con-
found and discourage even the most rational voters from trying to maxi-
mize their utility.
Chapter 1 clearly shows that opportunities to vote strategically occur 
more often than we think, however. There is also no reason to assume that 
Belgian voters would be intrinsically less inclined to want to influence the 
composition of their government(s). Moreover, the obvious complexities 
of the case should not be exaggerated: Belgium remains a typical case of 
a proportional representation (PR) system with a coalition government. 
When we analyze strategic voting within each party system separately, 
the thresholds that apply to parties in other PR systems with coalition 
governments are the same: getting into parliament (district viability) and 
being part of the coalition (government viability) (see Lago, this vol.). This 
means, in practice, that we expect voters to abandon their most preferred 
party when it either has little chance of getting a single seat in the electoral 
district or has little or no chance of getting into government (or a com-
bination of the two). Instead, they will choose an ideologically proximate 
party that has a higher district or government viability. When we analyze 
strategic coalition voting for the federal level, however, the dual party sys-
tem complicates matters. Voters wishing to influence the composition of 
the Belgian government have to make predictions about two elections: one 
in the Dutch- speaking party system and one in the French- speaking party 
system. A Belgian government does not need a majority in the separate 
language groups, but it does need an equal number of ministers from each 
language group. Inevitably, a Belgian coalition will require parties from 
both linguistic communities to negotiate an agreement. This has become 
more complicated by the recent success of a Flemish nationalist party 
(Nieuw- Vlaamse Alliantie [N- VA]) that has no sister party on the other 
side of the language border and that is ideologically disinclined to cooper-
ate with French- speaking parties not in favor of more independence for 
the regions.
Does that leave the strategic coalition voter powerless at the Belgian 
level? Arguably no, as until 2014, the composition of regional governments 
tended to mirror the composition of the Belgian government, and vice 
versa. Moreover, Belgium’s traditional party families— Christian demo-
crats, social democrats, and liberals— still have parties representing the 
ideology on each side of the language divide, albeit at different strengths. 
Coalition cues were also given leading up to the 2014 simultaneous elec-
tions: the continuous hostility played out in the press between what turned 
out to be the largest French- speaking party (Parti Socialiste [PS], the social 
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democrats) and the largest Dutch- speaking party (N- VA) made it unlikely 
that they would be coalition partners. Still, the reasons are nothing more 
than speculation, and individual voters might have widely varying percep-
tions about party viability at various levels.
Until recently, few studies have examined strategic voting behavior in 
Belgium. Verthé et al. (2017) have used the 2014 Making Electoral Democ-
racy Work (MEDW) and PartiRep data to compare the relative effect of 
government and district viability on vote choice. Their results show that 
both viabilities have a substantial, distinct, and positive effect on vote choice 
and support the notions set out in the framework in chapter 1 about which 
outcomes may shape strategic voting behavior in PR systems. We must not 
neglect the classic notion of the wasted- vote logic— whether parties have 
a chance to win a seat in the voter’s district— in PR systems as well. Both 
government and district viabilities should be included in analyses to fully 
understand the complexity of vote choice in such systems. However, Ver-
thé et al. focus only on the probabilistic estimation of the impact of both 
viabilities on vote choice, while this chapter explores actual strategic voting 
behavior and adds a deterministic angle by proposing a set of criteria that 
allow us to identify strategic coalition voters and their characteristics.
This chapter focuses only on government viability and its role in stra-
tegic voting in Belgium. One could argue that this viability is also the 
most important one from both a substantive and a quantitative point of 
view. Substantively, the scientific literature on power in contemporary par-
liamentary democracies agrees that the executive branch of the govern-
ment has taken up a dominant position (Norton 1990; Mair 2013). Media 
coverage also overwhelmingly favors party leaders, ministers, and heads 
of government over MPs or parliament (Bittner 2011; Karvonen 2012). 
From a purely quantitative point of view, the composition of government 
is an aspect that (potentially) concerns far more voters than the number of 
small- party supporters who worry about the threshold of parliamentary 
representation.
The 2014 Elections
Before delving into the perceptions of voters, we need to take a closer 
look at the 2014 Belgian elections. Belgium uses a PR system for all of its 
elections and it combines two party systems at the federal level, resulting 
in one of the most fragmented parliaments among modern democracies 
(Lijphart 1999). In none of the parliaments included in this study did any 
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party obtain more than 40% of votes or seats, and in all cases, at least three 
parties obtained more than 15%. This is not a new feature of the Belgian 
party system; all federal and regional governments since the 1960s have 
been coalitions. The tradition of mirroring the partisan composition of the 
federal executive across linguistic groups (e.g., including both the French- 
and Dutch- speaking liberal parties, social democrats, and so forth) has led 
to government coalitions that contained up to six parties. Coalitions at the 
regional level are usually smaller (two or three parties), but no region has 
ever been governed by a single majority party.
Over the past few decades, coalition formation in Belgium has also been 
quite uncertain because parties no longer follow the ideological proxim-
ity criterion. On multiple occasions, parties from the left and the right 
have governed together (De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont 2006), at 
times skipping the center parties altogether. Furthermore, the bulk of the 
Belgian parties, including green and regionalist parties, have been part of 
government coalitions at either the federal or regional level or both. Only 
the extreme left (Partij van de Arbeid /Parti du Travail [PVDA/PTB]) and 
the extreme right (Vlaams Belang [VB], Parti Populaire [PP], and Front 
National [FN]) have never been part of a coalition government (plus the 
small libertarian party, Lijst Dedecker [LDD]). This means the coalition 
formation game is very open.
While the general picture of coalition formation in Belgium shows an 
open competition between a large number of ideologically diverse parties, 
this is not necessarily the case for each election year. Parties could stra-
tegically coordinate before the election and form pre- electoral alliances 
or send out coalition signals to influence voting behavior. In 2014, how-
ever, they did not do so. Coalition signals in Belgium are usually rather 
weak, and 2014 was no exception. Only the green parties (ECOLO and 
Groen) had announced before the elections that they would enter a gov-
ernment coalition together. Even though positive coalition signals were 
largely absent, all other parties informally yet publicly agreed to shun the 
radical right parties (Vlaams Belang, PP, and FN) as a consequence of their 
extreme positions on immigration issues and other matters— under no cir-
cumstances would those parties be involved in coalition negotiations. Only 
one other negative coalition signal occurred. The Walloon social demo-
crats (PS) and the Flemish regionalists (N- VA), each of which is the largest 
party in its region, are on opposite sides of two of the main cleavages in 
Belgian politics, linguistics and socioeconomics, and both parties made it 
very clear they would not govern together at the federal level under any 
circumstance (Dandoy, Reuchamps, and Baudewyns 2015).
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The federal coalition ultimately was composed of the Flemish regional-
ists (N- VA) and Christian democrats (Christen- Democratisch en Vlaams 
[CD&V]) and the two liberal parties (Mouvement Réformateur [MR] in 
Wallonia, Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten [Open VLD] in Flan-
ders). At the regional level, however, the frequent practice of more or less 
symmetric governments was abandoned, and the Walloon government 
was formed by the social democrats (PS) and Christian democrats (Cen-
tre Démocrate Humaniste [CDH]), while the Flemish government mim-
icked the ideological composition of the federal level: regionalists (N- VA), 
Christian democrats (CD&V) and liberals (Open VLD).
Data and Variables
Our analyses use data from two separate surveys conducted in the weeks 
preceding Election Day (May 25, 2014). Each survey sampled between 500 
and 1000 respondents per region. Data for the regional elections comes 
from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project (MEDW),3 which 
conducted an online survey using quota sampling to ensure sample diver-
sity. The federal data originates from the PartiRep project,4 which orga-
nized a face- to- face survey with a randomly selected representative sample 
of adult citizens in the national population registry.
This chapter explores strategic coalition voting and does not study dis-
trict viability.5 Neither of the surveys included a question on perceived 
district viability. Even though this means that we present only a partial 
picture of overall strategic voting, government coalition formation is at the 
core of the political struggle, and only very small parties (and therefore an 
equally small number of supporters) confront issues of district viability.6 
This means that our estimate of strategic coalition voting will inevitably 
underestimate the full extent of strategic voting among the Belgian popu-
lation in 2014.
We follow a two- pronged approach as suggested by Blais et al. (2006)— 
an indirect and a direct method. The indirect (probabilistic) approach 
examines the effect of party preference, ideological distance, and govern-
ment viability (independent variables) on vote choice (dependent variable) 
by estimating a conditional fixed- effects logit model. Vote choice is the party 
for which respondents intend to vote in the federal or regional election. 
All of the independent variables are measured on an 11- point scale. Party 
preference is measured by asking the respondents to indicate the extent to 
which they like each of the parties included in the analysis on a scale from 
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0 (not liking at all) to 10 (liking a lot). Ideological congruence is constructed 
on the basis of two variables: the first variable is measured by asking the 
respondents how they rate each of the parties’ ideological positions on 
a scale from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right); the second variable 
measures the respondents’ ideological position by asking them to place 
themselves on the same scale. We created an index based on the absolute 
difference between the positions of the respondent and the party on the 
left- right scale. A low value would indicate ideological closeness, while a 
high value would indicate ideological remoteness. To facilitate the inter-
pretation of the direction of the effects in our analysis, we inverted this 
index by taking the maximum ideological distance between a respondent 
and the party (10) and subtracting the original measurement of ideological 
distance. This leaves us with an index of ideological congruence that goes 
from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates a very low ideological congruence and 10 a 
very high ideological congruence. Government viability is measured by ask-
ing respondents to rate the chances that each of the parties will be part of 
the next federal or regional government coalition on a scale from 0 (very 
unlikely) to 10 (very likely).7
We next use the direct, deterministic method, which requires voters 
to meet certain predetermined criteria to be considered strategic coali-
tion voters. We first determine the extent of sincere versus insincere vot-
ing and then subsequently identify those respondents whose insincere 
vote intention can be explained by considerations concerning government 
viability. We then estimate a binomial logistic regression model to exam-
ine the provenance of strategic coalition voters. This model includes some 
other variables. Political interest is measured on an 11- point scale in both 
surveys, with 0 indicating that respondents had no interest at all, and 10 
indicating that they were very interested. However, the PartiRep election 
study measured only a general interest in politics, while MEDW inquired 
about both general political interest and interest in this particular elec-
tion. For analyses regarding the regional elections, we therefore created a 
composite scale by adding both types of interest and dividing the result by 
two. Political knowledge is measured differently in the two surveys. MEDW 
showed the respondents pictures of 10 politicians, 5 of whom were party 
presidents, and 5 party names (N- VA, CD&V, Socialistische Partij Anders 
[SP.A], PS, and MR). Respondents were asked to correctly match the party 
presidents to their parties, thereby creating a 6- point scale that we used as 
a proxy for general political knowledge. The PartiRep survey also provides 
us with political knowledge questions that result in a 6- point scale but uses 
a different approach. Five multiple- choice political knowledge questions— 
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with four options per question— were asked, with each question targeting 
a different dimension or government level.8
Based on respondents’ answers on the party preference questions, we 
constructed two new variables that summarize distributional characteris-
tics we consider relevant for strategic coalition voting. The first one is the 
intensity of the party preference, which is calculated by subtracting the lowest 
value attributed to any party from the highest value attributed to any party. 
This variable thus shows us the range between the most and least preferred 
parties, which we believe might influence the odds that a respondent is a 
strategic coalition voter. The lower this value, the weaker the respondent’s 
preferences and the more likely that other party attributes (such as gov-
ernment viability) might influence the vote intention. It is of course also 
possible that the overall range of party preference values does not truly 
matter in swaying voters away from their pure preference. Why would it 
matter that a respondent attributed a 0 to their least preferred party and 
a 10 to the most preferred one if all of the other parties receive a 5? A 
much more precise indicator for the influence of individual voters’ prefer-
ence structures on strategic coalition voting is the distance between the two 
most preferred parties. We therefore subtracted the preference score of the 
second- most- preferred party from that of the most preferred party. The 
lower this value, the higher the likelihood that a voter might be tempted to 
cast a strategic coalition vote.
Results
Indirect Method
We start our analysis with the probabilistic approach to examine whether 
parties’ perceived government viability has an effect on intended vote 
choice. To do so, we estimated a conditional logit model that includes 
the respondent’s evaluation of party preference, government viability, and 
ideological congruence on a left- right scale. Table 7.1 presents the results 
of this analysis. The unit of analysis is respondent/party, which means the 
parties are treated as choice options with attributes (the independent vari-
ables) that vary by party and are nested in the respondent. In Models 1– 3, 
we introduce the independent variables step by step. We can observe that 
the strongest determinant of vote choice is the expressed preference inten-
sity for a party. The more that respondents like a party, the more likely they 
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the ideological congruence between the respondent and a party increases, 
the likelihood of voting for that party increases as well. When we add the 
independent variable that we are actually interested in, we see that govern-
ment viability has a positive significant effect on vote choice and that this 
effect is distinct from ideological proximity or party preference.
We do not, however, claim that party preference, ideological congru-
ence, and government viability do not interact. On the contrary, since stra-
tegic coalition voting takes place when voters make a choice between two 
parties that they at least somewhat like, we should expect an interaction 
between these two variables. The same goes for the preference value attrib-
uted to a party and its (perceived) ideological congruence with the respon-
dent. We can expect that parties that are ideologically more proximate to 
a respondent’s position will score better on the preference scale and that 
this in turn will lead to a higher likelihood of voting for that particular 
party. These variables are, however, only moderately correlated (Pearson’s 
r varies between 0.42 and 0.56). Therefore, we introduced two interaction 
terms in Model 4. To interpret the effect of this interaction, we plotted the 
marginal effects in figures 7.1 and 7.2.
Figure 7.1 shows that ideological congruence has a significant (and 
increasingly strong) positive marginal effect on vote choice for those par-
ties that are at least somewhat liked (thus scoring five or more on the pref-
erence scale). At first glance, the effect seems to be negative for parties that 
are disliked, even though the 95% confidence intervals show us that it is 
impossible to determine whether the marginal effect is positive or negative 
below a preference value of five for the regional and three for the federal 
elections. We assume that voters have many reasons not to vote for parties 
they dislike and that this has no impact on strategic voting considerations, 
which come into play when voters weigh secondary attributes of parties 
they at least somewhat like.
Figure 7.2 reveals a similar pattern: the marginal effect of government 
viability on vote choice is positive for parties that are at least somewhat 
liked, while the direction of the effect for parties that are disliked can-
not be determined in the case of the regional elections. The effect size 
of government viability varies. For the regional elections, the marginal 
effect increases as the party preference value increases, whereas the angle 
of the slope for the federal elections is not clear. At a first glance the effect 
appears to decrease slightly as party preference values rise, but when we 
take into account the 95% confidence interval, it becomes clear that the 
effect might just as well be stable or increase, just as it does for the regional 
level. Since the effect is positive across all preference values for the federal 
Fig. 7.1. Marginal Effect of Ideological Congruence
Fig. 7.2. Marginal Effect of Government Viability
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elections and at high preference values at the regional level, this does not 
affect the substance of our findings: voters make strategic choices between 
parties they at least somewhat like. The indirect approach thus shows us 
that Belgian voters take into account their perceptions of parties’ govern-
ment viability when deciding for whom to vote. The observation that the 
effect of government viability on vote choice is much stronger overall at 
the federal level also seems to indicate that second- order election effects 
(Reif and Schmitt 1980) are at play here and that voters consider the fed-
eral level more important than the regional one when it comes to coali-
tion formation. However, this interpretation is based on tentative evidence 
from a single election year, and we did not ask respondents to provide sepa-
rate scores for their party preference levels for each level of government. 
A more elaborate and longitudinal research design is needed to explore 
the role of government viability as an indicator of second- order election 
effects with greater certainty.
Direct Method
All types of pure strategic voting require voters to abandon their preferred 
party for a less preferred party while taking into consideration their expec-
tations about election outcomes. This means we need a stepwise approach 
to identify respondents with only one preferred party, then pure sincere 
voters, and finally the proportion of insincere voters whose vote intention 
has higher government viability than their preferred party.
Table 7.2 shows that voters in the two elections have more or less equally 
distributed party preferences. Two- thirds of the respondents in both sur-
veys show a clearly distinct party preference, while one- third have two or 
more tied party preferences. Since we are looking only into the comparison 
of pure strategic voting and pure sincere voting (see chapter 1), we move 
forward with the group of respondents with a single preferred party. Table 
7.3 indicates that three- quarters of that group intends to vote sincerely, 
which leaves us with one- quarter of insincere voters who could potentially 
have strategic motives to abandon their preferred party. The overall num-
ber of insincere voters of course hides the fact that not all parties suffer 
equally from insincere voting (i.e., abandonment in favor of another, less 
favored party).
Table 7.4 shows some interesting variation between the parties and 
between the two election levels. The levels of sincere voting for the federal 
elections show a pattern that follows expectations from the strategic vot-
ing literature. Supporters of smaller and ideologically more extreme par-
TABLE 7.2. Distribution of the Number of Preferred Parties among Respondents
 
Regional Federal
N % N %
Single Preferred Party 1,310 67.3 1,320 66.6
Two Tied Preferred Parties 376 19.3 341 17.2
More than Two Tied Preferred Parties 261 13.4 322 16.2
 Total 1,947 100 1,983 100
Source: Data from MEDW (regional elections), PartiRep (federal elections).
TABLE 7.3. Proportion of Sincere and Insincere Voters
 
Regional Federal
N % N %
Sincere voters 966 73.7 1,005 76.1
Insincere voters 344 26.3 315 23.9
 Total 1,310 100 1,320 100
Source: Data from MEDW (regional elections), PartiRep (federal elections).
TABLE 7.4. Proportion of Sincere Voters per Preferred Party (Loyal Voters)
Flanders % Population Wallonia % Population
Regional
N- VA 92.0 200 PS 91.3 126
CD&V 86.1 86 MR 92.1 164
Open VLD 90.0 70 CDH 84.1 63
SP.A 84.7 98 ECOLO 91.2 57
VB 89.3 28 PTB 78.7 47
Groen 92.5 53 FDF 68.2 22
PVDA 81.5 27    
Federal
N- VA 92.6 190 PS 93.6 220
CD&V 87.6 121 MR 96.4 110
Open VLD 82.2 73 CDH 94.9 78
SP.A 88.5 78 ECOLO 72.2 115
VB 76.9 26 PTB 76.3 38
Groen 63.3 79 FDF 14.3 7
PVDA 61.1 18    
Source: Data from MEDW (regional elections), PartiRep (federal elections).
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ties abandon their parties more often than do supporters of larger center 
parties. While the center parties have a share of loyal supporters that tops 
80% in Flanders and 90% in Wallonia, the smaller parties have between 
60 and 77% of loyal voters in Flanders and 75% in Wallonia (with the 
Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones [FDF] as an outlier, potentially as 
a consequence of the low overall number of FDF supporters). Even though 
these observations agree with the theory, the comparison with the regional 
elections is striking and shows remarkable differences for some parties. 
For the regional elections, the levels of sincere voting are lower for the 
center Walloon parties (PS, MR, and CDH) and are higher for the smaller, 
ideologically more extreme parties (ECOLO, PTB, FDF).9 The same goes 
for their Flemish counterparts: supporters of Vlaams Belang, Groen, and 
PVDA remain more loyal at the regional level. For Groen and ECOLO, 
the numbers are truly striking: only 63% and 72% of their respective sup-
porters intended to vote sincerely at the federal level, while this proportion 
rises to 92% at the regional level. The Flemish liberals experienced a simi-
lar increase (from 82% to 90%). Since table 7.3 shows relatively similar 
proportions of insincere voting across both levels, we should be careful 
in drawing firm conclusions. The deterministic approach seems to show 
tentative support for the interpretation that the federal election was con-
sidered a first- order election, eliciting strategic behavior by supporters of 
small or ideologically more extreme parties to promote a left- or right- 
wing coalition.
The final step in our direct approach is determining the proportion of 
strategic coalition voters. Table 7.5 shows that on average, half of all insin-
cere voters (across both elections) indicated that their vote intention had 
a higher perceived government viability than their preferred party.10 We 
consider this group the strategic coalition voters. For the federal elections, 
the proportion of strategic coalition voters is higher (58%) than for the 
regional elections (42%). If we look at the absolute numbers provided in 
table 7.4, the proportion of strategic coalition voters in the entire popula-
tion is a mere 2.4% for the regional elections and a more reasonable 7.5% 
for the federal elections. The very low number of respondents— especially 
for the regional elections— who can firmly be placed either within or 
outside of the group of strategic coalition voters results from to a sub-
stantial number of missing values. To reach the end of our deterministic 
funnel, respondents had to provide us with answers to a myriad of ques-
tions, and for all of those questions they had to provide information for 
multiple parties. These requirements drastically reduce our sample, and 
the online survey method used for the regional election data might be one 
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of the reasons why the number of strategic voters is higher for the federal 
elections, where interviews were carried out face- to- face. This suspicion 
is also fueled by the fact that when comparing proportions, the difference 
between the two elections is still substantial but far less steep. If we take a 
less conservative approach to estimate the proportion of strategic coalition 
voters among the total population, we could use the proportion of strategic 
coalition voters among those who provided us with the necessary informa-
tion to make that determination and extrapolate that to the number of 
insincere voters. If we use this estimate and compare it to the total survey 
population, the proportion of strategic coalition voters rises to 7.4% in the 
regional elections and slightly increases to 9.2% in the federal elections. 
Again, the proportion of strategic coalition voters provides only a partial 
picture of overall strategic voting because we concern ourselves solely with 
pure strategic voting (see chapter 1) and because this chapter deals solely 
with the role of government viability in strategic voting, while district via-
bility might also be a factor for small- party supporters. These percentages 
are quite close to findings in other studies that deal with insincere, tactical, 
or strategic voting (see, e.g., Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Abramson et al. 
2009; Bargsted and Kedar 2009).
Table 7.6 shows that as far as strategic coalition voting is concerned, 
the smaller, ideologically more extreme parties still pay the price for their 
lower government viability even though the population at the regional 
level is so small that conclusions for individual parties should be taken with 
a grain of salt. For the federal elections, the population is larger and the 
pattern is more definite with regard to individual parties. For the federal 
election, it is clear that the green parties (who represent roughly 45% of 
the strategic coalition voters, on average) and the extreme left PVDA/PTB 
(14%) severely suffer from strategic coalition voting in both parts of the 
country. In Flanders, 9% of the strategic coalition voters listed the extreme 
right Vlaams Belang as their preferred party. If supporters considered these 
parties more viable for entering postelection coalitions, their vote shares 
would increase considerably (for simulations, see Verthé et al., 2017).
TABLE 7.5. Proportion of Strategic Coalition Voters
 
Regional Federal
N % N %
Higher government viability 31 41.9 99 57.9
Equal or lower government viability 43 58.1 72 42.1
 Total 74 100 171 100
Source: Data from MEDW (regional elections), PartiRep (federal elections).
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Now that we have identified the Belgian strategic coalition voters, can 
some individual- level characteristics help explain the likelihood of mem-
bership in this group? To answer this question, we estimate a binomial 
logit model with membership in the group of strategic coalition voters as a 
dependent variable.11 Our first model includes only age and gender as inde-
pendent variables. The second group of elements comes from the classic 
voting literature and is just as important for understanding or explaining 
strategic voting in first- past- the- post systems as under PR rules. In this 
model we add political interest and knowledge under the assumption that 
to engage in strategic considerations, a voter needs to be knowledgeable 
enough to understand the stakes of the election and its potential outcomes 
and interested enough to be willing to act on these perceptions. (For more 
on the role of political sophistication in strategic voting, see Blais et al., this 
vol.; Plescia, this vol.). This assumption can be easily challenged, however. 
Voters need not actually be well informed; they must simply be convinced 
that they are well informed and willing to act on that conviction. One could 
even argue that a certain degree of irrational hubris is an essential person-
ality trait for voters who assume that their individual votes can influence 
election outcomes (Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan 
and Lomasky 1993). Our third model includes two variables calculated on 
the basis of respondents’ party preference ratings. A first assumption would 
be that voters with outspoken preferences are less likely to switch among 
parties because of coalition considerations (Blais et al. 2006; for a similar 
argument on partisanship, see Daoust, this vol.). People who put their pref-
erences aside because of coalition considerations probably have less strong 
party preferences. In addition, the intensity of preferences across the entire 
range of parties may matter less than the difference in preference inten-
TABLE 7.6. Distribution of Strategic Coalition Voters across Preferred Parties
Flanders % N Wallonia % N
Regional
N- VA, CD&V, Open VLD, SP.A 17.6 3 PS, MR, CDH 42.9 6
VB, Groen, PVDA 82.4 14 ECOLO, PTB, FDF 57.1 8
 Total 100 17  Total 100 14
Federal
N- VA, CD&V, Open VLD, SP.A 35.8 19 PS, MR, CDH 10.9 5
VB, Groen, PVDA 64.2 34 ECOLO, PTB, FDF 89.1 41
 Total 100 53  Total 100 46
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sity between the two highest- rated parties. Voters who like their preferred 
party a lot and their second preference only a bit less can be assumed to be 
more likely to give in to strategic coalition considerations than voters who 
likes their second preference a lot less than the first.
Table 7.7 shows the results of our three logit models. According to these 
results age, gender, and political interest have no significant effect on the 
probability of being a strategic coalition voter. Political knowledge does 
seem to have an effect on this probability for the federal election, yet the 
direction is the opposite what we would expect from most strategic voting 
literature. This would mean that less knowledgeable voters are more likely 
to cast a strategic coalition vote. The effect size is similar for the regional 
elections but is not statistically significant. This finding might result from 
the much lower proportion of strategic coalition voters in the regional 
election sample. We could not explain this phenomenon. More sophisti-
cated voters may have more outspoken party preferences, since there is a 
weak correlation (Pearson’s r = 0.20) between overall preference intensity 
and political knowledge. However, there is no correlation between political 
knowledge and the preference structure variable that actually has a signifi-
cant effect on strategic coalition voting tendencies (the distance between 
the two most preferred parties). Our full model, which includes variables 
based on individual voters’ party preference rankings and their distribu-
tion, indeed shows preference ratings across the entire range of parties on 
the ballot do not determine whether a voter will cast a strategic coalition 
vote; rather, casting a strategic coalition vote depends on the closeness of 
the preference intensities of the two most preferred parties. This provides 
support for the basic assumption that strategic voting in PR systems hap-
pens when voters make a choice between two or more parties that they like 
and decide to let their vote depend on secondary attributes (in this case, 
perceived government viability).
Conclusions
Although the institutional complexity of the Belgian political context cre-
ates some peculiar obstacles for voters who wish to vote strategically, these 
obstacles by and large disappear when we treat the two main regions as the 
separate party systems they are: they then become quite typical examples of 
PR systems with coalition governments. We focus on government viability 
to study strategic voting in Belgium because government viability is argu-
ably more important than district viability in a country that has not known 
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a single- party government in the last six decades. However, both types of 
viability should be taken into account for a full picture of strategic voting 
in Belgium.
Our indirect approach— a conditional fixed- effects logit model— shows 
that government viability indeed has a significant positive effect on vote 
choice and that this effect is distinct from ideological congruence and party 
preference. The marginal effect does vary according to voters’ preference 
ratings. For the regional elections, the effect starts out weak but increases 
as preference ratings are higher, while the effect for the federal elections is 
stronger overall, but the direction cannot be determined. Our direct, deter-
ministic method shows that roughly one- quarter of voters with a single 
preferred party intend to vote insincerely. At the federal level, the smaller, 
ideologically more extreme parties are clearly more likely to be abandoned 
by their potential electorate than are their larger, centrist adversaries, 
which points in the direction of strategic voting, even though all parties 
suffer from disloyal supporters to some extent. The results from both the 
direct and indirect methods do seem to indicate that second- order effects 
are at play here and that voters consider the federal level more important 
than the regional one with regard to coalition formation. To determine 
how many voters actually voted strategically on the basis of considerations 
concerning government viability, we split the group of insincere voters into 
those who attributed a higher government viability to their vote intention 
than to their preferred party and those who did not. When we extrapolate 
this proportion to the entire electorate, we see that between 7 and 9% of 
the population cast a strategic coalition vote. This number is consistent 
with previous studies that examined strategic voting in PR systems. Finally 
we estimated a binomial logit model to explore which individual- level 
characteristics increase the likelihood that a voter will be a strategic coali-
tion voter. This analysis shows that for both election levels, the closeness 
of preference intensity between the two most preferred parties influences 
the probability of strategic coalition voting. The smaller the difference in 
the preference ratings of the two highest- rated parties, the more likely that 
voters will abandon their preferred party and cast a strategic coalition vote.
Our results thus confirm our expectation that strategic voting is present 
in a context as seemingly complex as the Belgian one and that the frame-
work proposed in chapter 1 can be applied to this case. The underlying 
dynamics for strategic (coalition) voting in Belgium seem to be quite simi-
lar to those found in other party and electoral systems, even though the 
simultaneous elections might have provoked some second- order election 
effects. A sizable portion of the population does not want to waste its vote 
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on a party that is in one way or another considered not viable, and as vot-
ers’ party preferences move closer to each other, they become more likely 
to allow their vote choice to depend on their perceptions regarding the 
potential election outcome rather than party preference.
N O T E S
 1. The very small German- speaking community elects its own community par-
liament. The members of this linguistic community vote as Walloon citizens for 
the Walloon regional parliament. For more information on the distinctions among 
Belgian communities and regions, see Deschouwer 2009.
 2. Because of this particular feature, we do not consider the election of the Brus-
sels regional parliament or the Brussels electoral district for the federal election. 
Voters are not preregistered as belonging to any particular language group, so they 
can choose which party system in which to cast their votes. This further complicates 
the study of strategic voting behavior in Brussels and, more important, renders it 
incomparable to the other regions. Since this option was also available for voters in 
the faciliteitengemeenten/communes à facilités, respondents from these municipalities 
were also removed from the federal election sample. For good general descriptions 
of the specificity of the Belgian party system, see De Winter, Swyngedouw, and 
Dumont 2006; Deschouwer 2009.
 3. www.chairelectoral.com/medw.html
 4. www.partirep.eu
 5. For a comparison between the effect of district and government viability on 
vote choice, see Verthé et al. 2017.
 6. There is a formal electoral threshold of 5% at the district level.
 7. The MEDW survey did not ask this question for the extreme right Vlaams 
Belang because of the “cordon sanitaire”— the informal agreement between the 
other parties not to engage in coalition formation with Vlaams Belang at any level. 
For the regional data, all values of government viability for Vlaams Belang are 
automatically coded 0 for all respondents.
 8. Respondents were asked to identify the president of the federal Chamber of 
Representatives (André Flahaut), which party was not a member of their respective 
regional government (Open VLD/MR), which party was not a member of the fed-
eral government (N- VA), how many member states are in the EU (28); and which 
institutions form the federal parliament (Chamber and Senate).
 9. We have compared the distribution of the preference structure variables 
(preference intensity and the distance between the two most preferred parties) 
between supporters of the smaller, more extreme parties and those of the larger, 
center parties to examine whether systematic differences in preference structures 
between these two groups could be (at least in part) responsible for the differences 
in terms of sincere voting levels. However, our analyses show that these distribu-
tions are extremely similar, which means that other party attributes should under-
pin this dynamic.
 10. The population we examine keeps getting smaller, not only because we inten-
tionally drop parts of the original population because of imposed deterministic 
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restrictions but also because the required information to apply these restrictions 
keeps increasing and we suffer from attrition as a result of missing values. A com-
parison of table 7.3 and table 7.4 shows this phenomenon.
 11. Because of the small proportion of strategic coalition voters we should opt for 
a rare- events logit model. We did perform a penalized maximum likelihood estima-
tion method (Firth logit model), which reduces biases in samples with rare events 
as a dependent variable. This method does, however, not allow probability weights 
that correct for sampling biases. Because the effect directions, sizes and significance 
levels deviate minimally between this method and the normal logistical regression 
corrected by probability weights, we opted to report these results in order to stay 
consistent with the other logistical regression models in this chapter.
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Voting Strategically in Two- Vote Elections
Philipp Harfst, André Blais, and Damien Bol
Voters do not always cast a vote for their most preferred candidate or 
party. They sometimes vote for their second, third, or even fourth option 
to increase the probability of affecting the final electoral result. We thus 
assume that voters are instrumental in the sense that they care about 
the outcome of the election. Most of the literature on strategic voting is 
focused on single- member district (SMD) elections (plurality or major-
ity rule) (e.g., Abramson et al. 2010, this vol.; Alvarez and Nagler 2000; 
Blais and Nadeau 1996; Blais et al. 2001, 2011, this vol.; Daoust, this vol.; 
Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten 1994). Under this electoral system, voters 
have strong incentives to desert their first preference if it has little chance 
of winning the election in their district— that is, if it is not viable. This in 
turn reduces the number of parties running in the election.
Recently, some studies have pointed out the existence of similar and 
alternative forms of strategic voting under proportional representation 
(PR) (e.g., Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Duch, May, and Armstrong 2010; 
Lago, this vol.; Lebon et al., this vol.; Meffert and Gschwend 2010; Ver-
thé and Beyens, this vol.). However, relatively little is known about strate-
gic voting under two- vote electoral systems such as the German mixed- 
member system (an exception is Plescia, this vol.). While chapter 1 develops 
an encompassing theoretical approach to potential strategies in mixed- 
member elections, we are not aware of any study giving a comprehensive 
and simultaneous empirical account of the different strategies voters could 
adopt. To fill this gap, we use unique data from surveys that were specifi-
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cally designed to study these strategic votes and were conducted during the 
2013 German federal election and the 2013 Bavarian and Lower Saxon 
regional elections.
Previous Work on Strategic Voting in Two- Vote Elections
We define as strategic voters’ decisions to vote for a party (or the candidate 
of a party) that is not their most preferred party to affect the outcome of 
the election (Blais et al. 2001). Typically, this situation occurs when the 
party is not viable, meaning that it has little chance of winning a seat. A 
sincere vote (a vote for the preferred party) is not necessarily devoid of 
strategic considerations, since voters may vote for their preferred parties 
partly because they perceive that party as viable (Abramson et al. 2010; 
Aldrich, Blais, and Stephenson, this vol.). Nonsincere votes are not neces-
sarily strategic. Voters can decide to support the second or third option for 
reasons that have nothing to do with their willingness to affect the electoral 
outcome (for example, by mistake; Lau et al. 2014). However, this chapter 
is confined to situations where strategic considerations lead voters to sup-
port a party that is not their preferred option.
Consequently, we adopt a definition of strategic voting that differs 
slightly from the one used in chapter 1. That chapter considers as stra-
tegic any vote that is based on a combination of preferences and expecta-
tions about the possible outcome of the election. From that perspective, a 
vote for a preferred party based at least partly on the perception that the 
party is viable is deemed strategic. In contrast, we focus on “pure” strategic 
voting— that is, where strategic considerations are decisive and lead voters 
to desert their preferred option.
Mixed- member electoral systems are an interesting testing ground for 
the analysis of strategic voting since they entail two electoral tiers with two 
different electoral rules. They thus create two sets of incentives for voters. 
This chapter analyzes German federal and regional elections (in Bavaria 
and Lower Saxony) for which this electoral system is used. Voters cast a 
vote for a candidate in a local constituency under an SMD plurality system. 
They cast another vote for one of the closed party- lists in a multimember 
constituency under a closed- list PR system (except in Bavaria’s regional 
election, where the party list is open). In this PR tier, the total number of 
seats that a party gets depends on the number of list votes received, with 
the proviso that a party needs to get at least 5% of the party- list vote (or 
at least three constituency seats in the case of the federal election) to be 
152 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages
eligible for PR seats (for federal electoral rules, see Mader 2014; Saalfeld 
2005; for Lower Saxony, see Meyer and Müller- Rommel 2013; for Bavaria, 
see Schultze 2014).
Most of the literature on strategic voting in the context of a mixed- 
member electoral system in Germany (and in other countries using the 
same system) has primarily focused on ticket- splitting (i.e., not voting for 
the same party in the two electoral tiers) based on either aggregate (Bawn 
1999; Cox 1997; Roberts 1988) or survey data (Gschwend 2007; Karp 
et al. 2002; Pappi and Thurner 2002; Plescia 2016). These studies show 
that the closer the race in a district between the candidates engaged in 
the SMD system, the bigger the difference of votes parties receive in the 
two electoral tiers. These studies explain this pattern by strategic voting: 
voters in close SMD contests do not vote for the same party as in the PR 
tier to oppose their least favorite candidate among those that have some 
chance of winning (Bawn 1999; Moser and Scheiner 2005, 2009). Fur-
ther, Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie (2003) reveal that, in Germany, the 
two biggest parties— the Christian Democrats (Christlich Demokratische 
Union/Christlich- Soziale Union [CDU/CSU]) and the Social Democrats 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [SPD])— are the main benefi-
ciaries of ticket- splitting in the SMD tier because supporters of smaller 
parties of the same bloc (right and left, respectively) act strategically. In 
the same vein, Gschwend and Pappi (2004) demonstrate that the clarity of 
coalition alternatives or ideological blocs significantly increases the share 
of ticket- splitting in the country.
With survey data, Herrmann and Pappi (2008), Gschwend (2007), Karp 
et al. (2002), and Pappi and Thurner (2002) show that at least some ticket- 
splitters can be labeled strategic voters as they desert the candidate of their 
most preferred party in the SMD tier if this candidate has little chance of 
winning. Gschwend (2007) and Shikano, Herrmann, and Thurner (2009) 
also find that some voters engage in coalition insurance voting. In particu-
lar, supporters of the CDU/CSU sometimes vote for the junior coalition 
partner (Freie Demokratische Partei [FDP]) as they fear this small party 
might not receive enough votes to pass the 5% threshold. Finally, Karp 
(2006) finds evidence supporting the idea that ticket- splitting and strategic 
voting are more frequent among highly knowledgeable voters.
However, Jesse (1988) and Schoen (1999) show that a substantial 
amount of split tickets in Germany do not fulfill basic criteria of rational-
ity and cannot be characterized as strategic. In fact, these authors find that 
between 13% and 21% of split tickets are “strategically wrong”— that is, 
voters chose a candidate of a small party in the SMD tier and voted for a 
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large party in the PR tier. This proportion may even be larger in New Zea-
land, where ticket- splitting is more frequent (Karp et al. 2002).
The literature thus usually studies strategic voting in two- vote elections 
through the lens of ticket- splitting. But a substantial proportion of split- 
ticket voting is not driven by strategic considerations. Many split- ticket 
voters actually have strong preferences for a candidate who is not from 
their preferred party in their local constituency. Then, they sometimes cast 
a sincere split- ticket vote as they vote for their preferred candidate in the 
SMD tier and for their preferred party in the PR tier (Plescia 2016, this 
vol.; Riera and Bol 2017). Furthermore, in theory, a straight ticket vote can 
be strategic. Imagine the case of supporters of a small party that has no 
chance of winning either in the SMD or in the PR tier. These voters might 
desert their most preferred party in both instances and cast two votes for 
the same viable party. If this were the case, focusing exclusively on ticket- 
splitting would underestimate strategic voting. In this chapter, we exam-
ine strategic voting independently from ticket- splitting. However, we also 
evaluate the extent to which the two are related.
The literature on strategic voting in two- vote elections typically focuses 
on one single type of strategic voting— either the desertion of a nonviable 
candidate in the SMD tier or the desertion of a senior coalition partner to 
save a junior coalition partner in the PR tier. Building on the theoretical 
framework sketched out in chapter 1, which relates strategic voting to vot-
ers’ preferences and perceptions of election outcomes, we provide a com-
prehensive and simultaneous empirical account of the different strategies 
voters can adopt in two- vote elections. In addition, we examine the possi-
bility that voters strategically defect from their favorite party in the PR tier 
if this party is not viable, thereby introducing a third variety of PR strategic 
voting that very much resembles strategic voting in SMD elections. We 
then evaluate how these three strategies relate to each other and whether 
they differ in terms of determinants.
Three Types of Strategic Voting in Two- Vote Elections
In two- vote elections, a variety of types of strategic voting can be theoreti-
cally identified. In this chapter, we focus on the three that we assume to be 
the most frequent. The first concerns the vote in the SMD tier and directly 
relates to the idea developed by Duverger (1951) and Cox (1997): under 
plurality rule, supporters of a small party have incentives to desert the can-
didate of this party to maximize the chances of influencing the electoral 
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outcome. (This type of strategic voting is very common in first- past- the- 
post systems; see Aldrich, Blais, and Stephenson, this vol.; Blais et al., this 
vol.) The rationale is that voters anticipate that some candidates have no 
chance of being elected and instead vote in favor of the candidate of their 
most preferred party among those perceived as viable.
In line with most of the literature on strategic voting in plurality systems 
(Abramson et al., this vol.; Blais et al., this vol.; Daoust, this vol.; Lago, this 
vol.), we account only for considerations located at the district level when 
we analyze the SMD vote. For example, we ignore potential considerations 
regarding which party will form the government. This choice is particu-
larly appropriate for a study focused on Germany, as the vote in the SMD 
tier does not have any impact on the partisan composition of the parlia-
ment and the government. The PR tier fully compensates for potential 
distortions between votes and seats brought about by the SMD tier.
Under plurality rule, each constituency has at most two viable candi-
dates (Cox 1997). The intuition is that voting for a candidate who comes 
third or lower in terms of (perceived) chances is a wasted vote. This can-
didate never stands a chance of being elected. Yet a single vote could make 
a difference between the top two contenders. All voters should thus vote 
for their most preferred candidate between these two to maximize the 
chances of affecting the electoral outcome. We call this strategy strategic 
local desertion.
The other two types of strategic voting in two- vote elections apply to 
the vote in the PR tier (see also the description of strategic voting in PR 
systems in Aldrich, Blais, and Stephenson, this vol.). The first is similar to 
local strategic desertion: voters may be reluctant to waste their votes on a 
party that is very unlikely to obtain enough votes to gain at least one seat 
in this electoral tier. The rationale is that a wasted vote has no impact on 
the electoral outcome. In other words, even in the PR tier, voters have 
incentives to desert their most preferred party if it is not viable. We call 
this strategic list desertion.
The potential number of viable parties in the PR tier is rather large, 
especially in Germany, where numerous seats are allocated through these 
districts. However, some small parties still do not receive enough votes to 
gain even one seat. In Germany, the minimum number of votes a party 
must receive to be included in the allocation of seats in the PR tier is easy 
to identify: a party must obtain at least 5% of the votes nationwide to enter 
parliament.1 So strategic list desertion entails voters thinking that their 
most preferred party will receive less than this threshold. In many PR 
countries, a small district magnitude creates “natural thresholds” (Lijphart 
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1994). However, this is not the case in Germany, as seats are allocated based 
on national vote shares in a single nationwide district (598 seats).
The second type of strategic voting in the PR tier is more complex. 
It starts with several assumptions, partly confirmed by the analysis of the 
Israeli case by Blais et al. (2006): (1) voters anticipate that the government 
that is going to be formed after the election is likely to be a coalition gov-
ernment, (2) voters care about which parties will be part of this coalition, 
and (3) they know which parties are potential coalition partners of the 
most preferred party. If these assumptions are true, and if uncertainty exists 
about whether the partners of the most preferred party will obtain enough 
votes to gain at least one seat in parliament (in Germany, this concerns the 
5% threshold), voters have incentives to cast a vote for these partners. The 
rationale is that the votes for these partners will be wasted if they do not 
obtain enough votes to gain at least one seat in parliament. By voting for 
a partner party, voters increase the likelihood that the coalition will win 
a majority of seats and form the government. We call this strategic coali-
tion insurance voting. Although this possibility may seem very unlikely at 
first glance given the number of conditions required for it to occur, several 
studies show that coalition insurance voting is rather common in democ-
racies with stable coalitions and a threshold (Gschwend 2007; Pappi and 
Thurner 2002; Shikano, Herrmann, and Thurner 2009). In Germany, this 
type of strategic voting is well known, even in the mass media, where it is 
usually referred to as Leihstimme (borrowed or leased vote).
This chapter shows that all three forms of strategic voting occur in 
mixed- member systems. This implies that different strategies can be used 
with regard to each of the two votes in varying combinations. In conse-
quence, strategic voting can take different forms, of which split- ticket vot-
ing is only one. In addition, mixed- member systems, with their two votes, 
open up the option to vote strategically at a comparatively low cost at the 
local SMD level since there is a second PR vote. We should therefore 
observe a higher proportion of strategic local candidate votes than strate-
gic list votes.
Furthermore, several individual determinants have been shown to be 
associated with the probability of casting a strategic vote in the litera-
ture. Most important, Blais (2002) and Gschwend (2007) find that as the 
strength of voters’ preference for a party increases, the likelihood that they 
will vote strategically decreases. Consistent with the discussion in Aldrich, 
Blais, and Stephenson (this vol.), when the intensity of voters’ preference 
for a party is high, they are more reluctant to desert this party for another 
one, even for strategic reasons.
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Indeed, we show that the strength of party preference is negatively 
associated with the probability to engage in strategic local and list deser-
tion (following our definition). However, we also see that this effect of 
the intensity of preference is smaller regarding coalition insurance voting. 
When voters desert the senior coalition partner for the junior coalition 
partner to save it from falling below the representation threshold, they do 
not have to accept that their preferred party (i.e., the senior coalition part-
ner) will lose. To the contrary, if the overall coalition wins, the voter’s most 
preferred party will dominate the government.
Strategic Voting in Two- Vote Elections: Empirical Perspectives
Data and Operationalization
To study strategic voting, we use four original pre- and postelection panel 
surveys conducted in 2013 in two German regions via the Making Elec-
toral Democracy Work project (Blais et al. 2017). The elections covered 
are the regional election in Lower Saxony (January), the regional election 
in Bavaria (September), and the German federal election in both regions 
(September, one week after the Bavarian regional election). The surveys 
are online quota- based surveys that guarantee a balanced and diverse sam-
ple regarding age, gender, education, and geographical area. As far as we 
can tell, these are the first surveys conducted in Germany that include all 
the questions needed to identify strategic voters (party preferences, vote 
choice, and perceptions of the likely outcome of the election at both the 
district and the national or regional level).
In Lower Saxony, we use different samples for the regional and fed-
eral elections. In each case, we contacted about 1,000 persons. In Bavaria, 
we use a single sample of around 4,000 persons for the two elections. In 
both regions, the pre- election survey lasted around 20 minutes and was 
conducted within the two weeks preceding the elections. The postelection 
surveys lasted around 10 minutes and were conducted during the week 
following the election. We use the postelection questionnaire to measure 
vote choice and the pre- election questionnaire to measure party prefer-
ences and the likely (perceived) outcome (at both the local and national or 
regional level).
Strategic voting can be measured directly or indirectly (Blais, Young, 
and Turcotte 2005). We adopt a direct approach— that is, we lay out the 
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conditions that must be met for a vote to be construed as strategic. We 
operationalize these conditions with the questions included in the Making 
Electoral Democracy Work surveys.
The first step is to establish the most preferred party of each of the 
respondents.2 Party preferences are measured in the pre- election survey 
through a simple and direct question asking respondents to rate each of 
the parties on a 0– 10 scale, where 0 means that the person does not like the 
party at all and 10 means that the person likes it a lot. The preferred party 
is simply the party that has the highest rating.
The main problem with this approach is the presence of ties. In our 
case, about 24% of respondents give the highest rating to two or more par-
ties.3 We adopt the approach followed by Blais and Gschwend (2010) and 
use the party identification question to break ties. This decreases the share 
of respondents with tied party list preferences to a bit more than 16%. 
Remaining ties in preferences for individual candidates were broken when-
ever respondents indicated that they liked a candidate in the SMD tier.4 
About 29% of respondents reported having a preference for a local con-
stituency candidate, and among those, the share of voters with a congruent 
list and candidate preference was particularly high among supporters of 
the two large parties (CDU/CSU and SPD)— around 90%. In the case 
of small- party supporters (Greens, Left, FDP, Pirates, AfD, Free Voters), 
the share of congruent supporters ranges from 49% (Left) to 67% (Free 
Voters). This leaves us with 8% of ties in preferences for local candidates. 
Whenever one of these tied respondents votes for one of the tied most 
liked parties or candidates, we assume that the party or candidate is her 
sincere and therefore nonstrategic choice.
Appendixes A and B to this chapter reveal the distribution of party pref-
erences in our four surveys crossed with the two reported votes.5 Unsur-
prisingly, the great majority of people vote for their preferred party in both 
the SMD and PR tiers. Quite a substantial minority do, however, vote for a 
different party, especially in the SMD tier and especially among supporters 
of small parties.
The fact that quite a few people do not vote for their preferred party 
suggests the presence of strategic voting. A total of about 17% of respon-
dents cast nonsincere votes in the PR tier, while about 15% did so in the 
SMD tier. However, a nonsincere vote is a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition to classify a vote as strategic. We also need to consider voters’ per-
ceptions of the likely outcome of the election before we can assess whether 
this behavior is strategic.
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Strategic Local Desertion
A strategic local desertion is a vote in the SMD tier cast for the candi-
date of the party voters prefer among those that are perceived as viable by 
supporters of parties with little chance of winning in their constituency. 
Because each SMD has at most two viable candidates, two conditions must 
thus be fulfilled for a local desertion to be construed as strategic: (1) the 
preferred candidate must be perceived as not among the top two contend-
ers in the constituency and (2) respondents must vote for the candidate of 
the party they prefer among those top two contenders. We establish the 
respondents’ perceived viable top contenders based on responses to ques-
tions about the chances (on a 0– 10 scale) of the candidate of each party 
winning in the constituency. The two candidates with the highest ratings 
are considered viable; others are considered nonviable.6
Table 8.1 shows the proportion of voters who find themselves in a stra-
tegic local desertion situation— that is, they believe that the candidate of 
their preferred party is not among the top two candidates. On average, 
12% of all respondents satisfy this condition, although the proportion var-
ies slightly from one election to the other. Table A8.3 shows that at least 
40% of the small parties’ supporters perceive their party as nonviable in 
the SMD tier, while no more than 7% of large parties’ supporters feel the 
same way.
Table 8.1 shows that on average, 4% of the respondents can be consid-
ered strategic local deserters because they are in a strategic local desertion 
situation and cast a vote for the candidate of their most preferred party 
between the top two contenders in their constituency. This share varies 
across elections, reaching its lowest score in the Bavarian regional election 
(3%) and its highest score in the Lower Saxon national election (6%).
TABLE 8.1. Strategic Local Desertion
Bavaria Lower Saxony
 Regional National Regional National Mean 
Voters in a Strategic Local 
Desertion Situation
9.9% 12.4% 10.1% 15.4% 12.0%
Strategic Local Deserters 2.7% 4.3% 3.5% 6.1% 4.2%
Strategic Local Deserters 
(among Voters in a 
Strategic Local Desertion 
Situation)
27.0% 34.9% 34.7% 39.8% 34.1%
N 3,462 3,122 595 588  
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At first glance, these rates seem relatively low. However, they are calcu-
lated on the basis of all respondents, many of whom have no reason to cast 
strategic local desertion votes since they perceive the candidate of their 
preferred party as viable. The percentages are considerably higher if we 
consider only those voters who faced the decision to vote sincerely or stra-
tegically in the SMD tier (that is, voters for whom the candidate of their 
preferred party is not one of the top two contenders). As the bottom row 
of table 8.1 shows, on average 34% of the voters facing a strategic dilemma 
cast a strategic local desertion vote.
Table A8.4 shows the rate of strategic local desertion votes by party. 
While virtually none of the supporters of the two large parties cast strate-
gic local desertion votes, between 8% and 51% of the small- party support-
ers do so. Furthermore, (the few) large- party supporters who (in most cases 
erroneously) believe that the candidate of their most preferred party is not 
viable seldom desert their party. By contrast, those voters in a strategic 
situation who prefer a small party cast a strategic vote in large proportions.
Strategic List Desertion and Coalition Insurance Voting
A strategic vote in the PR tier can take the form of either a strategic deser-
tion from a small party that is considered to have little chance of crossing 
the 5% threshold or a coalition insurance vote if large- party supporters are 
uncertain about whether a small prospective coalition partner will gain 5% 
of the votes.
In each of the two regional elections, two parties were at risk of falling 
below the 5% threshold and are therefore potential victims of strategic list 
desertion. In Lower Saxony, it was uncertain whether FDP and the Left— 
both present in the outgoing parliament— would pass the hurdle, while 
the Free Voters had virtually no chance. In Bavaria, only the FDP was in a 
critical position with regard to the 5% threshold. The Left never stood a 
chance in the region, and the Free Voters were almost certain to pass the 
5% threshold.
The federal election also applies a 5% threshold, but at the national 
level. Therefore, small parties had very different prospects. Although the 
Left was not viable at the regional level in Bavaria and possibly in Lower 
Saxony, its supporters could be nearly certain that the party would enter 
the federal parliament as a consequence of its strong standing in eastern 
Germany. By contrast, the Free Voters, however strong in Bavaria, stood 
no chance of entering the federal parliament. Finally, the FDP occupied an 
uncertain position.
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The first necessary condition for a strategic list desertion is that respon-
dents believe that their preferred party is unlikely to cross the 5% hurdle 
in the PR tier. We use respondents’ evaluations of their preferred party’s 
chances to gain representation in parliament. The relevant question uses a 
scale ranging from 0 (no chance at all) to 10 (certain to win). This question 
was not asked for parties that were certain to pass the threshold (CDU, 
CSU, SPD, and the Greens), since we assume that the supporters of these 
four parties cannot be strategic list deserters. Altogether, an average of 
83% of our respondents prefer one of these four parties, and we are thus 
interested in the other 17%. We interpret those who say that the chances 
that their preferred party obtaining at least 5% of the votes are between 0 
and 5 on the 11- point scale as “pessimists” and thus as willing to consider 
strategic list desertion. To classify a vote as strategic list desertion, pes-
simist respondents have to cast their vote in the PR tier for the party they 
prefer most among the large parties that are certain to gain parliamentary 
representation (CDU, CSU, SPD, the Greens) or any other party that they 
consider likely to gain a seat in parliament.
Among all respondents, on average 5% believe that their party has little 
chance of reaching the 5% threshold (see table 8.2). When we only look at 
the supporters of the small parties that were not certain to win represen-
tation, the share of pessimists goes up to 44%, on average. It is lowest in 
the Bavarian regional election (22%) and tops 50% in both the Bavarian 
national and the Lower Saxon regional elections.
The strategic list desertion rate (an average of 2%) is much lower than 
strategic local desertion. The share of voters who desert their preferred 
party in the PR tier because the party is not viable rises to 33% when we 
TABLE 8.2. Strategic List Desertion
Bavaria Lower Saxony
  Regional National Regional National Mean 
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation
2.7% 7.0% 4.0% 6.4% 5.0%
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
22.2% 52.0% 57.0% 44.1% 43.8%
Strategic List Deserters 0.7% 1.7% 1.4% 3.0% 1.7%
Strategic List Deserters 
(among Voters in a 
Strategic List Desertion 
Situation)
25.9% 24.6% 34.0% 47.0% 32.9%
N 3,462 3,122 595 588  
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consider only voters who are pessimistic about the chances of their party 
gaining representation in parliament (that is, those who are in a strategic 
list desertion situation). It is lowest in Bavaria (about 25%) and reaches 
47% in Lower Saxony’s federal election.
When we look at strategic list deserters by party (see appendix, table 
A8.5), we observe that on average 14% of small- party supporters strate-
gically abandon their most preferred party in the PR tier. This share is 
considerably higher among pessimistic small- party supporters. Close to 
one- third of those voters who believe that their most preferred small party 
has little chance of crossing the 5% hurdle strategically desert this party.
We now turn to coalition insurance voting. A coalition insurance vote 
is cast when a supporter of a large party deserts it in the PR tier to sup-
port a junior coalition partner that is perceived at risk of not crossing the 
5% threshold. This time, we thus concentrate on voters who prefer a large 
party (CDU/CSU, SPD) and check whether they believe that the junior 
coalition partner is at risk of falling below the 5% threshold. To do so, we 
use the question measuring the chances of a party entering parliament. 
We operationalize uncertainty as an evaluation of the coalition partner’s 
chances ranging from 2 to 8 points on the 11- point scale. Since there is 
no rating for the chances of the Greens entering parliament, we look only 
at CDU/CSU supporters and their propensity to support the FDP (in all 
elections). Since the coalition signals of the Free Voters to the SPD before 
the Bavarian regional election were at best unclear, we assume that SPD 
supporters had no incentive for a coalition insurance vote in this instance.
At first glance, coalition insurance voting seems rare. On average, it 
concerns only about 3% of all our respondents (see table 8.3). However, 
remarkable differences occur between elections that provided voters with 
quite contrasting incentives with regard to strategic coalition voting. 
While the polls saw the FDP at risk during the whole year under consid-
eration, the signal sent by parties concerning coalition insurance voting 
differed drastically in these three elections. First, during the Lower Saxon 
regional election campaign, the governing CDU emphasized its close 
connection to its junior coalition partner. Furthermore, leaders did not 
actively oppose the possibility that their supporters would cast a coalition 
insurance vote, and some individual candidates even encouraged support-
ers to do so. Second, the Bavarian Christian Democrats campaigned for 
an absolute majority (which they ultimately received) and did not even 
signal that they might form a coalition with the FDP. During the federal 
campaign, although the FDP leaders called on CDU supporters to vote for 
the FDP in the PR tier, all the candidates and leaders of the senior coalition 
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partner clearly opposed this call. The appeal for coalition insurance voting 
therefore was much stronger in the Lower Saxon regional election than 
in other elections. The FDP’s borrowed votes campaign proved successful 
for the party, which attracted a considerable number of strategic coalition 
insurance votes (7%), a proportion much higher than in the other surveys 
(between 1% and 3%). And the difference is even more impressive when 
we look only at CDU supporters in Lower Saxony: the rate of coalition 
insurance voters drops from 13% in the regional election to only 5% in 
the national survey. These results confirm Gschwend and Pappi’s (2004) 
as well as Merolla’s (2009) finding that the decision to vote strategically is 
strongly affected by the messages conveyed by the parties and their elites 
during the campaign.
Combining Different Types of Strategic Votes
On average, 9% of all voters engage in strategic voting in at least one of the 
three ways (see table 8.4). The least frequent type is strategic list desertion 
(1% on average), while the most frequent is strategic local desertion (4% 
on average) when we consider respondents who cast only one strategic 
vote. On average, 1% of all voters cast two strategic votes, a possibility that 
is not often mentioned in the literature. About 43% of those who desert 
their most preferred list because they perceive it as nonviable in the PR 
tier also desert their favorite candidate in the SMD tier. Conversely, only 
16% of those who cast strategic local desertion votes also cast a strategic 
list desertion votes.7
TABLE 8.3. Coalition Insurance Voting
Bavaria Lower Saxony
 Regional National Regional National Mean 
Voters in a Coalition 
Insurance Voting Situation
49.4% 50.1% 37.8% 36.9% 43.6%
Coalition Insurance Voters 1.5% 3.1% 6.5% 2.0% 3.3%
Coalition Insurance Voters 
(among CDU/CSU 
supporters)
2.5% 5.1% 13.1% 4.5% 6.3%
Coalition Insurance Voters 
(among Voters in a 
Coalition Insurance Voting 
Situation)
3.1% 6.1% 17.2% 5.5% 8.0%
N 3,462 3,122 595 588  
Revised Pages
 Voting Strategically in Two-Vote Elections 163
Strategic Voting and Ticket- Splitting
Another question that we can address with our data is the relationship 
between strategic voting and ticket- splitting (i.e., voting for two different 
parties in the SMD and PR tiers). On average, more than one- fifth (23%) 
of all our respondents are split- ticket voters. But how much of this split- 
ticket voting can be traced back to strategic considerations? It cannot be a 
majority, since only 7% of votes are strategic. In fact, in our sample, only 
26% of split- ticket votes can be considered strategic (see table 8.5). Not 
surprisingly, the share of strategic voting is much lower among straight- 
ticket voters (3%). Another way to look at these data is to say that only two- 
thirds of strategic voters are split- ticket voters. The bottom line, however, 
is that many split- ticket votes are not strategic, while a substantial propor-
tion of straight tickets are. It is thus possible to cast a straight ticket for 
strategic reasons. This is the case, for example, if respondents hold a pref-
erence for a small party and its candidate that they perceive to be chance-
less in both the SMD and PR tiers. These numbers underline the need to 
clearly distinguish ticket- splitting and strategic voting.
Determinants of Strategic Voting in Two- Vote Elections
We now turn to the analysis of the individual determinants of strategic vot-
ing. We run logit models predicting the probability of casting at least one 
of the three types of strategic votes and then each of them separately on the 
entire four- election sample that we weight to correct for the oversampling 
of Bavarian voters. In each case, we include only respondents who were 
potential strategic voters. For example, while predicting strategic local 
desertion, we include only respondents whose preferred party is not viable 
TABLE 8.4. Combinations of Strategic Voting
Bavaria Lower Saxony
 Regional National Regional National Mean 
All Strategic Voters 4.7% 8.3% 10.9% 10.1% 8.5%
Strategic Local Deserters 
Only
2.4% 3.5% 3.0% 5.0% 3.5%
Strategic List Deserters Only 0.4% 0.9% 0.8% 1.9% 1.0%
Coalition Insurance Voters 
Only
1.5% 3.1% 6.5% 2.0% 3.3%
Strategic Local and List 
Deserters
0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 1.1% 0.7%
N 3,462 3,122 595 588  
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in their district. If their preferred party is viable, it is impossible for them 
to cast a strategic vote (according to our definition).
Our key independent variable is the strength of the respondent’s pref-
erence for a party. Our expectation is that the greater this preference, the 
less likely the respondent is to cast a strategic vote. Respondents who really 
like a party might feel reluctant to vote for another party, even for strate-
gic reasons. This variable is constructed by taking the difference between 
the rating voters give their most preferred party and the rating given to 
the second- most- preferred party, rescaled from 0 to 1. We use this rela-
tive indicator instead of the absolute rating of the most preferred party 
to account for the possibility that some voters give very high or very low 
ratings to all parties.
We also include the respondent’s knowledge of politics as a covariate. 
TABLE 8.5. Split- Ticket and Strategic Voting
 
Straight- Ticket 
Voting Split- Ticket Voting Total
Bavarian Regional Election
No Strategic Voting 77.4% 18.0% 95.4%
Strategic Voting 2.3% 2.3% 4.7%
Total 79.7% 20.3% 100.0%
N 2,665 797 3,462
Bavarian National Election
No Strategic Voting 77.4% 14.4% 91.7%
Strategic Voting 2.8% 5.5% 8.3%
Total 80.1% 19.9% 100.0%
N 2,415 707 3,122
Lower Saxon Regional Election
No Strategic Voting 71.2% 18.0% 89.1%
Strategic Voting 1.8% 9.1% 10.9%
Total 72.9% 27.1% 100.0%
N 405 190 595
Lower Saxon National Election
No Strategic Voting 73.5% 16.4% 89.9%
Strategic Voting 3.0% 7.1% 10.1%
Total 76.5% 23.5% 100.0%
N 430 158 588
Mean
No Strategic Voting 74.9% 16.7% 91.5%
Strategic Voting 2.5% 6.0% 8.5%
Total 77.3% 22.7% 100.0%
N 5,915 1,852 7,767
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Our intuition is that political knowledge increases the probability that 
the respondent will cast a strategic vote. Some level of political knowl-
edge is required to evaluate and reflect on the parties’ chances of win-
ning (Blais and Turgeon 2004). Black (1978) and Alvarez, Boehmke, and 
Nagler (2006) find that political knowledge is positively associated with 
the probability of casting a strategic vote. This variable is measured with 
the use of eight questions for which respondents had to match leaders 
and slogans to parties. Five of these questions were asked in the pre- 
election questionnaire, while three were asked in the postelection survey. 
We add up the number of correct answers to create an indicator of politi-
cal knowledge that we rescale from 0 to 1. As an alternative measure of 
political knowledge, we also include a dummy that indicates whether or 
not the respondent holds a university degree. In addition, we include 
a series of control variables. First, we control for whether respondents 
voted strategically with their other votes (PR vote in the case of SMD 
vote, and vice versa). Second, we control for age and gender and include 
election dummies.
Table 8.6 shows the results of these analyses. Model 1 estimates the 
individual determinants of all possible strategies for all our respondents 
concerned with at least one possible form of strategic voting. As expected, 
the greater the strength of party preference, the lower the probability that 
the voter will cast a strategic vote. Also as expected, the higher the level 
of formal education, the higher the probability of casting a strategic vote. 
Both effects are statistically significant at a level of p < 0.01.
Models 2– 4 look at each of the three possible strategies individually. 
These models reveal that the impact of party preference is similar for all 
types of strategic voting. Turning to the impact of political knowledge, we 
find that it does not always have the expected effect on the probability of 
casting a strategic vote. While the effect is positive and statistically signifi-
cant at a level of p < 0.1 for strategic local desertion and the strategic list 
desertion, it is null for the coalition insurance vote. The empirical evidence 
therefore only mildly confirms our expectations, a finding that is in line 
with other studies that find no relationship between political knowledge 
and the propensity of casting a strategic vote (Blais and Gschwend 2010; 
Duch and Palmer 2002). A university degree, which is also an indicator of 
a respondent’s cognitive abilities, has a positive and statistically significant 
effect (at a level of p < 0.01) on the probability of casting a strategic local 
desertion vote or a coalition insurance vote.
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Conclusion
This chapter focuses on strategic voting in two- vote elections. Relying on 
survey data from three German elections held in 2013, we find that on 
average about 9% of voters cast at least one strategic vote. Only a minority 
of voters confront a strategic situation, since most voters prefer parties that 
have good chances of winning in both tiers and are not in coalition with 
junior partners that might fall below the 5% threshold. Although we are 
looking only at pure strategic voting, many more voters are at least partly 
strategic, even though they end up supporting their preferred option.
The most prevalent type of strategic vote is strategic local desertion 








 b/se b/se b/se b/se
Strength Party  
Preference
−2.203*** −1.088* −2.042* −1.702***
(0.37) (0.60) (1.12) (0.56)
Political Knowledge 0.340 0.680* 1.112** −0.211
(0.22) (0.35) (0.56) (0.35)
University Degree (0/1) 0.502*** 0.646*** −0.509 0.569***
(0.10) (0.17) (0.35) (0.16)
Age 0.009** 0.003 0.012 0.019***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender (0 = male / 1 = 
female)
−0.126 −0.249 0.383 −0.085
(0.10) (0.16) (0.28) (0.16)
Bavarian Regional 
Election (0/1)
−0.948*** −0.420 −0.823* −0.595*
(0.17) (0.27) (0.46) (0.34)
Bavarian National 
Election (0/1)
−0.528*** −0.208 −1.139*** 0.073
(0.16) (0.26) (0.41) (0.32)
Lower Saxon Regional 
Election (0/1)
0.427* 0.230 −0.063 1.245***
(0.22) (0.39) (0.64) (0.38)












Constant −1.625*** −0.915* −1.770** −3.284***
(0.32) (0.51) (0.80) (0.55)
N 4,582 1,041 479 3,357
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0488 0.0771 0.157 0.0628
a omitted due to collinearity.
Note: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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(4%, compared to 2– 3% for strategic list desertion and coalition insurance 
voting). We also find that strategic voting is only weakly related to ticket- 
splitting. Only two- thirds of all strategic voters are split- ticket voters, 
while the remainder are straight- ticket voters— that is, they desert their 
preferred party in both the SMD and PR tiers.
Although small, these proportions should be interpreted in the light 
of our measurement. The conditions we use to establish each of the three 
sorts of strategic voting are rather restrictive. Using a very similar mea-
surement, Blais et al. (2009) find around 3% and 5% of strategic voting 
in national elections in Canada and the United Kingdom, although these 
two countries use an SMD plurality system that is supposed to give strong 
incentives for this behavior.
In a second step, we analyze the determinants of strategic voting in two- 
vote elections. We find that partisan strength has a negative effect on the 
probability of casting a strategic vote, regardless of its type. Partisans are 
reluctant to vote for another party, even if doing so is in their best strategic 
interest. Finally, our analysis also demonstrates that political knowledge 
has a positive effect on the probability of casting a strategic vote with the 
exception of the coalition insurance vote. In Germany at least, even voters 
with low levels of political knowledge seem to understand the logic behind 
this particular type of strategic vote.
A P P E N D I X  A
TABLE A8.1. Party Preference and Vote in the SMD Tier, by Party
 
CDU/




CDU/CSU 91.7% 2.8% 0.6% 0.1% 1.2% 0.2% ./. 3.4%
SPD 5.0% 87.5% 2.8% 1.2% 0.2% 0.0% ./. 3.4%
Greens 4.0% 29.9% 60.6% 0.5% 0.0% 1.1% ./. 3.8%
Left 5.2% 26.4% 3.4% 60.2% 0.0% 0.9% ./. 4.0%
FDP 32.9% 6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 49.6% 3.9% ./. 5.6%
Pirates 16.9% 12.8% 3.8% 3.3% 2.0% 56.4% ./. 4.8%
Free Voters 11.5% 14.7% 2.0% 1.8% 1.2% 1.3% ./. 67.5%
Total 58.7% 20.9% 7.0% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% ./. 7.6%
N 1,480 638 219 84 76 64 ./. 238
Bavarian National Election
CDU/CSU 92.0% 3.1% 0.7% 0.4% 1.6% 0.4% 0.5% 1.8%
SPD 4.6% 89.0% 3.8% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.3%
Greens 3.9% 37.0% 56.8% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6%
Left 2.2% 24.4% 2.8% 64.7% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 3.2%
FDP 36.1% 6.1% 0.0% 0.0% 53.0% 4.7% 0.0% 2.5%
Pirates 11.1% 10.2% 3.2% 3.4% 1.7% 61.5% 4.3% 6.0%
AfD 26.6% 7.6% 0.8% 2.2% 1.7% 1.0% 54.8% 5.7%
Free Voters 23.9% 23.4% 4.1% 1.2% 3.5% 0.5% 6.0% 33.9%
Total 55.3% 24.4% 7.0% 3.1% 2.3% 1.7% 2.9% 3.3%
N 1,587 791 223 117 83 69 132 120
Lower Saxon Regional Election
CDU/CSU 90.2% 6.6% 1.0% 0.1% 1.5% 0.6% ./. ./.
SPD 4.9% 87.4% 5.0% 1.0% 0.7% 1.1% ./. ./.
Greens 8.3% 38.7% 47.8% 2.8% 0.9% 1.4% ./. ./.
Left 0.0% 33.7% 3.5% 59.5% 0.0% 3.4% ./. ./.
FDP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% ./. ./.
Pirates 17.6% 28.3% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 48.8% ./. ./.
Total 42.0% 40.5% 8.9% 3.0% 2.7% 2.9% ./. ./.
N 172 261 80 29 13 40 ./. ./.
Lower Saxon National Election
CDU/CSU 93.1% 4.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0%
SPD 6.5% 83.5% 5.0% 2.1% 0.8% 0.4% 1.4% 0.3%
Greens 2.8% 52.7% 40.8% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0%
Left 4.2% 35.8% 8.9% 48.5% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0%
FDP 77.7% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 12.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pirates 29.0% 7.5% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 48.3% 6.9% 0.0%
AfD 22.5% 19.5% 0.0% 3.0% 3.0% 7.4% 44.7% 0.0%
Free Voters 31.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 68.9%
Total 44.2% 38.1% 6.5% 4.5% 1.4% 1.7% 3.1% 0.4%
N 193 245 42 47 8 15 34 4
Note: The percentages add up to 100% horizontally. In the first column, the first line indicates that 91.7% of 
voters who prefer the CSU in the Bavarian regional election vote for that party.
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TABLE A8.2. Party Preference and Vote in the PR Tier, by Party
 
CDU/




CDU/CSU 86.8% 3.8% 1.2% 0.2% 2.4% 0.2% ./. 5.4%
SPD 3.4% 85.5% 4.9% 1.2% 0.5% 1.2% ./. 3.2%
Greens 5.6% 22.4% 63.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.4% ./. 5.4%
Left 7.3% 24.3% 2.2% 59.3% 1.5% 0.9% ./. 4.3%
FDP 18.3% 6.4% 1.5% 0.0% 69.4% 1.3% ./. 3.0%
Pirates 14.0% 11.1% 2.7% 2.1% 2.7% 54.5% ./. 12.9%
Free Voters 12.0% 15.2% 2.0% 1.6% 2.7% 2.5% ./. 63.9%
Total 51.2% 22.1% 9.2% 2.3% 3.5% 2.1% ./. 9.6%
N 1,498 818 355 111 203 96 ./. 381
Bavarian National Election
CDU/CSU 88.4% 2.3% 1.0% 0.7% 4.7% 0.4% 1.5% 1.1%
SPD 3.9% 87.6% 4.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.5% 1.4% 0.2%
Greens 4.6% 13.0% 78.2% 1.6% 1.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.3%
Left 3.9% 14.4% 2.3% 75.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0%
FDP 14.5% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 80.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
Pirates 4.8% 4.1% 0.0% 11.8% 1.7% 69.4% 6.5% 1.7%
AfD 6.3% 4.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 2.1% 83.2% 2.3%
Free Voters 18.5% 19.9% 3.4% 2.1% 4.1% 0.6% 9.0% 42.3%
Total 51.2% 20.9% 8.9% 4.0% 5.3% 2.0% 4.5% 3.1%
N 1,391 671 277 155 202 83 225 118
Lower Saxon Regional Election
CDU/CSU 76.6% 4.4% 2.2% 0.0% 16.4% 0.4% ./. ./.
SPD 4.9% 82.4% 7.8% 1.0% 3.6% 0.4% ./. ./.
Greens 7.8% 15.0% 71.5% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% ./. ./.
Left 0.0% 18.6% 17.5% 63.8% 0.0% 0.0% ./. ./.
FDP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% ./. ./.
Pirates 9.7% 37.1% 3.5% 3.3% 0.0% 46.4% ./. ./.
Total 36.9% 33.4% 14.0% 3.2% 10.2% 2.2% ./. ./.
N 135 191 142 34 50 43 ./. ./.
Lower Saxon National Election
CDU/CSU 91.5% 2.3% 0.0% 0.3% 5.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%
SPD 5.5% 85.5% 3.7% 1.3% 1.7% 0.4% 1.9% 0.0%
Greens 2.8% 16.3% 74.0% 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 1.1%
Left 8.4% 16.2% 8.7% 61.7% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0%
FDP 13.9% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 76.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pirates 11.7% 29.9% 8.0% 12.5% 0.0% 31.1% 6.9% 0.0%
AfD 20.1% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 62.5% 0.0%
Free Voters 0.0% 62.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.8%
Total 91.5% 2.3% 0.0% 0.3% 5.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%
N 168 216 53 58 20 15 53 5
Note: The percentages add up horizontally. In the first column, the first line indicates that 86.8% of voters who 
prefer the CSU in the Bavarian regional election vote for that party.
TABLE A8.3. Voters in a Strategic Local Desertion Situation, by Party
 
CDU/




0.6% 6.9% 40.9% 58.5% 55.6% 48.7% ./. 25.1% 9.9%
N 9 35 124 60 45 41 ./. 51 365
Bavarian National Election
0.3% 5.1% 47.7% 67.3% 56.3% 58.1% 45.3% 45.8% 12.4%
N 4 26 120 70 36 36 48 61 401
Lower Saxon Regional Election
3.8% 3.2% 34.4% 70.8% 100.0% 36.2% ./. ./. 10.1%
N 6 6 32 20 4 12 ./. ./. 80
Lower Saxon National Election
1.9% 2.9% 51.1% 62.7% 51.1% 72.3% 56.7% 100.0% 15.4%
N 3 5 29 39 4 12 15 4 111
Mean
 1.7% 4.5% 43.5% 64.8% 65.8% 53.8% 51.0% 57.0% 12.0%
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TABLE A8.4. Strategic Local Desertion by Party
 
CDU/






0.1% 0.3% 12.6% 12.1% 23.8% 10.6% ./. 7.6% 2.9%
Strategic Local 
Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic 
Local Desertion 
Situation)
11.4% 4.8% 30.9% 20.6% 42.8% 21.8% ./. 30.3% 26.2%




0.1% 0.5% 21.8% 18.5% 29.1% 9.3% 14.1% 19.2% 4.7%
Strategic Local 
Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic 
Local Desertion 
Situation)
25.0% 10.5% 45.7% 27.5% 51.6% 16.0% 31.2% 41.9% 36.2%
N 1,440 493 250 105 65 62 111 134 2,660
Lower Saxon Regional Election
Strategic Local 
Deserters
0.0% 1.6% 13.7% 26.7% 0.0% 20.3% ./. ./. 4.0%
Strategic Local 
Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic 
Local Desertion 
Situation)
0.0% 50.0% 39.7% 37.7% 0.0% 56.2% ./. ./. 33.1
N 150 169 95 27 4 35 ./. ./. 595
Lower Saxon National Election
Strategic Local 
Deserters
0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.9% 51.1% 19.7% 19.0% 0.0% 6.7%
Strategic Local 
Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic 
Local Desertion 
Situation)
0.0% 0.0% 49.0% 41.3% 100.0% 27.2% 33.5% 0.0% 39.5%




0.1% 0.6% 18.3% 20.8% 26.0% 15.0% 16.6% 8.9 4.5%
Strategic Local 
Deserters (among 









































TABLE A8.5. Strategic List Desertion, by Party




Strategic List Deserters (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
14.8% 6.9% 9.3% ./. 0.0% 5.8%
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation)
27.9% 39.8% 17.9% ./. 0.0% 25.3%
N 102 84 82 ./. 199 467
Bavarian national election
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
3.6% 12.1% 8.8% 7.3% 25.0% 12.8%
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation)
13.5% 24.7% 11.3% 16.2% 39.6% 25.0%
N 105 65 62 111 134 477
Lower Saxony regional election
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
13.2% 0.0% 22.1% ./. ./. 15.4%
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation)
24.7% 0.0% 37.9% ./. ./. 28.0%
N 27 4 35 ./. ./. 66
Lower Saxony national election
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
11.2% 9.5% 42.1% 22.9% 62.2% 20.4%
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Voters in a Strategic List 
Desertion Situation)
43.9% 100% 42.1% 50.7% 76.7% 48.9%
N 56 8 17 26 4 111
Mean
Strategic List Deserters (among 
Small- Party Supporters)
10.7% 7.1% 20.6% 15.0% 20.3% 14.2%
Strategic List Deserters (among 
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A P P E N D I X  B :  W O R D I N G  O F  S U R V E Y  Q U E S T I O N S
Party Rating
Q17: Please rate each of the following political parties on a scale from 0 
[really dislike party] to 10 [really like the party]: [Party]
Party Leader Rating
Q19: Please rate each of the following candidates on a scale from 0 
[really dislike party leader] to 10 [really like party leader]: [Party 
Leader]
Rating of Party’s Chance to Cross 5% Threshold
Q23: How likely is each of the following parties to gain enough votes 
to get into parliament on a scale from 0 [very unlikely] to 10 [very 
likely]: [Party]
Rating of Party’s Chance to Win Local Constituency Race
Q27: Please rate the chances of each party winning the seat in your local 
district on a scale from 0 [very unlikely] to 10 [very likely]: [Party]
Vote Choice
PQ6: Which party’s candidate did you vote for?
PQ7: Which party list did you vote for?
Political Knowledge
All elections:
Q10: Below there are pictures of various political candidates. Please 
match the candidates that you know with their party: [Party]
Federal Election, Lower Saxony and Bavaria
PQ14A: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: Together successful?
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PQ14B: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: The WE matters?
PQ14C: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: Only with us?
Regional Election, Bavaria
PQ14A: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: And you?
PQ14B: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: . . . keep(s) promises.
PQ14C: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: BAVARIA.
Regional Election, Lower Saxony
PQ14A: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: Tackle things. Do it better?
PQ14B: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: This is how we do it?
PQ14C: Can you indicate which party is associated with the following 
slogan: This is a good idea?
N O T E S
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 1. Germany has another representation threshold— a requirement that a party 
obtain at least three SMD seats. Since 1994, no party that has fallen below the 5% 
threshold has obtained three SMD seats or more. This chapter thus does not con-
sider this second representation threshold.
 2. In this chapter, we focus mostly on party preferences. Voters sometimes have 
candidate preferences that are so strong that they are willing to desert the most 
preferred party to support their favorite candidate (Plescia, this vol.).
 3. Throughout the chapter, we confine ourselves to respondents who reported 
having voted for one of the parties included in our surveys: CDU/CSU, SPD, 
Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen [GRÜNE]), Left (Die Linke [DIE LINKE]), 
Free Democrats (FDP), Pirates (Piratenpartei Deutschland [PIRATEN]), Alter-
native for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland [AfD]), and Free Voters (Freie 
Wähler [FREIE WÄHLER]). These parties combined to receive more than 97% 
of the vote in each of the four elections. We also exclude abstainers.
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 4. For the exact wording of this and all other questions, see appendix B to this 
chapter.
 5. All analyses reported in this chapter are weighted according to the vote in the 
PR tier and are standardized across samples to 1,000 standard units. This helps us 
to calculate more precise estimates of the number of strategic voters. In the tables, 
we also report the initial N of every sample.
 6. There can be more than two candidates if there are ties for first or second 
place. In the case of ties, we consider all candidates, regardless of whether they are 
tied for first or second place.
 7. None of our respondents combined a strategic local desertion vote with a 
coalition insurance vote, a finding that results from our definition of the coalition 
insurance strategy. Those who are susceptible to engage in a coalition insurance 
vote have a first preference for either the CDU or CSU and are likely to consider 
these parties one of the top two contenders in the constituency (at least in the two 
regions from which we draw our sample).
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Strategic Voting in Multiwinner Elections 
with Approval Balloting
An Application to the 2011 Regional Government  
Election in Zurich
Karine Van der Straeten, Romain Lachat,  
and Jean- François Laslier
In most cantons in Switzerland, the regional government is elected under 
an original voting rule, according to which voters can vote for several can-
didates in a multimember, majority election (Lutz and Strohmann 1998; 
Vatter 2002). In multimember districts, elections usually follow some pro-
portional, list- based rule. Majority or plurality elections in multimember 
districts are quite rare, although they have been used more frequently in 
the past— for example, in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
(Cox 1984). There are only few examples of current national elections held 
under such a system, and they are mainly limited to two- member districts 
(Blais and Massicotte 2002). This is, for example, the system used at the 
federal level in Switzerland for the election of the upper chamber (e.g., 
Lachat 2006). However, the case on which this chapter focuses is remark-
able because of the large magnitude of the district. Indeed, in the canton 
of Zurich, the seven members of the government are elected in a single 
district, and voters are allowed to cast up to seven votes.
How should strategic voters vote in such multiwinner elections with 
approval balloting? Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016) have recently pro-
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posed a theory of strategic voting in such elections. In this chapter, we 
summarize that theory’s main assumptions and predictions and, using sur-
vey data collected during the 2011 election of the Zurich canton’s govern-
ment, study whether individual behavior is consistent with the theory. We 
compare the observed voting behavior with the predictions of our model 
regarding both aggregate- level results (number of votes used, distribution 
of candidate votes) and percentage of correct predictions at the voter- 
candidate level. The model fares quite well in predicting individual- level 
observations. Roughly 70% of the individual decisions on candidates are 
consistent with a model of rational voting.
The chapter begins by describing the exact electoral formula as well 
as the context of the 2011 Zurich regional election. We then turn to the 
assumptions and predictions of a strategic voting model in such elections 
and check whether these predictions are consistent with both aggregate 
results and individual behavior. Next, we discuss strategic versus sincere 
voting before offering some concluding thoughts.
The Electoral Context
This study focuses on the April 2011 election for the regional government 
in the Swiss canton (the regional unit of the Swiss federal state) of Zurich. 
In this canton, the government, composed of seven members, is elected in 
a single electoral district. The election is based on a two- round system in 
which candidates need to receive a majority of the votes to be elected in 
the first round.
In the first round, citizens can cast as many votes as there are seats 
to be filled (i.e., up to seven votes). However they can also cast fewer 
votes. “Cumulative voting”— that is, giving several votes to the same can-
didate— is not allowed. Votes can be given to any citizen with the right 
to vote in that election. In other words, votes are not limited to an offi-
cial list of candidates determined before the election. Nonetheless, most 
votes are concentrated on the well- defined set of registered candidates 
who have been nominated by the parties or who have made their can-
didacy public in some other way. The possibility of giving a vote to any 
eligible citizen, however, means that a significant proportion of the votes 
go to additional persons. In the April 2011 election, this was the case for 
8% of the votes cast.
Candidates are elected in the first round if they reach some minimal 
majority threshold (and get one of the seven highest vote totals). This 
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threshold is equal to the total number of candidate votes cast (that is, 
individual votes for candidates), divided by twice the number of seats and 
rounded up to the next integer. As most citizens partially abstain by using 
only some of their seven votes, this threshold is substantially lower than 
one based on the absolute majority of voters. This implies that a candi-
date can be elected in the first round while being supported by fewer than 
half of the citizens.1 In practice, it means that all candidates in Zurich are 
usually elected in the first round. No second round has been necessary in 
recent history.2 In fact, the number of candidates who pass this majority 
threshold is often larger than the number of seats, in which case those with 
the highest vote totals are elected.3
In the (largely hypothetical) second round, citizens can cast as many 
votes as seats remain to be filled (that is, the total number of seats in the 
government minus the number of candidates elected in the first round). As 
in the first round, votes can be given to any eligible citizen. This implies 
that parties can put forward new candidates in the second round. The can-
didates with the highest vote totals are elected.
The election in Zurich took place on April 3, 2011, with nine registered 
candidates from six political parties seeking the seven seats:
• two left- wing parties: the Social- Democrats (SP), with two candi-
dates, and the Greens (GPS) with one candidate;
• two parties in the center: the Evangelical People’s Party (EVP) 
and the Christian- Democrats (CVP), each with one candidate;
• two right- wing parties: the Liberals (FDP), with two candidates, 
and further on the right the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), also with 
two candidates.
Table 9.1 presents the candidates’ names and party affiliations as well 
as the official electoral results (ranking the candidates by decreasing 
number of votes obtained). The seven members of the regional executive 
were elected in the first round. Eight of the nine registered candidates, 
received more votes than the minimal majority threshold (84,034 votes). 
Our analysis focuses on explaining the votes for the registered candidates 
for several reasons. We have very little information about nonregistered 
citizens who receive votes. We do not have voters’ evaluations of these 
persons, and their nominal vote counts are not even recorded in the offi-
cial election results.
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A Simple Model of Strategic Voting
Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016) have proposed a “trembling hand” the-
ory of strategic voting in multiwinner elections with approval balloting, in 
the manner of Myerson and Weber (1993) or Laslier (2009). In such elec-
tions, a fixed- sized committee of M members is to be elected from a fixed 
set of K candidates. Voters cast ballots for (“approve”) candidates, giving at 
most one vote to a candidate (no cumulative voting); they can approve at 
most V candidates (in the case of Zurich, V = M). The M candidates with 
the highest vote totals are elected. Ties, if any, are randomly broken.4
This theory relies on three main assumptions:
Assumption 1: Voters’ preferences regarding committees are addi-
tively separable across candidates in the following sense: each 
voter has a utility function for candidates, and the utility for any 
given committee is simply the sum of the utilities for the M can-
didates composing this committee.
Assumption 2: When voting, voters are purely instrumental (no 
expressive motives).
Assumption 3 (“trembling ballot” assumption): There exists a tiny 
probability that any vote might be misrecorded: any YES vote 
for a candidate can wrongly be recorded as a NO vote, and sym-
TABLE 9.1. Official Results of the Zurich Governmental Election, April 3, 2011
Candidate Votes Result
Mario Fehr (SP) 137,035 Elected 1st round
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134,061 Elected 1st round
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129,943 Elected 1st round
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129,349 Elected 1st round
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123,159 Elected 1st round
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121,144 Elected 1st round
Martin Graf (GPS) 120,815 Elected 1st round
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118,487
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68,996
Others 93,485
Number of Candidate Votes Cast 1,176,474
Number of Voters 273,256
Majority Threshold 84,034  
Source: Statistical Office of the Canton of Zurich.
Note: The total number of voters includes only individuals who cast valid ballots.
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metrically, any NO vote for a candidate can wrongly be recorded 
as a YES vote. Mistakes are independent across candidates and 
across voters.
Assumption 2 clearly places this theory in the group of models study-
ing the calculus of voting as investment,” as chapter 1 proposes. This is an 
example of a “pure” theory of instrumental voting, because the assumption 
about valuing outcomes in terms of who wins and who loses is the single 
attribute of elections that matters to voters.
Assumption 1 states that a voter’s utility for any given committee is 
simply the sum of the utilities for the candidates composing this commit-
tee. This assumption makes sense in situations where each member of the 
committee (here, government) is quite autonomous in making decisions, 
so that his or her contribution can be ascertained by itself, independently 
of the other members. This seems a reasonable assumption in the case at 
hand, but it rules out situations where the only important thing for voters 
is, say, to get a majority in the committee or situations where voters care 
about diversity (when the value of getting one additional candidate elected 
on the committee would depend on how many candidates from the same 
party, gender, or group are likely to be elected).5
Assumption 3 guarantees that whatever the profile of ballots cast by the 
voters, all electoral outcomes (realized scores of candidates) have a positive 
probability.
How should a rational voter vote under such assumptions? In ratio-
nal models of strategic voting, voters cast their votes by anticipating their 
influence on the outcome. The first step in voters’ reasoning is therefore 
to consider all the events (that is, the distribution of other voters’ votes) 
such that the individual voter is in a position to cast a decisive vote. Indeed, 
whenever that voter is not pivotal, all actions yield the same payoff— the 
same set of candidates is elected. Voters then need to assess the likelihood 
of these pivot events to compute the expected utility associated with each 
possible ballot. Under these assumptions, a rational voter should act as fol-
lows (Proposition 11 in Laslier and Van der Straeten 2016):
Step 1: Given her anticipations about the behavior of other voters, the voter 
identifies the set of candidates she expects to be elected (denoted by c₁ to 
cM ) or not (denoted by cM+1 to cK ), according to the scores she expects for 
them:
ŝ(c1) > ŝ(c2) > . . . > ŝ(cM) > ŝ(cM + 1) > . . . > ŝ(cK),
where ŝ(ck) denotes the expected scores of candidate ck.
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Step 2: For 1 ≤ k ≤ M, define candidate ck’s “main contender” as cM+1, and 
for M + 1 ≤ k ≤ K, define candidate ck’s “main contender” as cM.
Step 3: The voter ranks the candidates according to (the inverse of) their 
distance, in terms of expected votes, from the main contender.
Step 4: The voter considers all the candidates in turn, according to the 
priority order defined in Step 3. As long as the voter does not hit the 
vote budget constraint (V votes), she votes for a candidate if and only 
if her utility for this candidate is larger than her utility for the main 
contender.
Two candidates are critical: the weakest expected winner (cM) and the strongest 
expected loser (cM+1). The intuitive content of this rule is that the elected com-
mittee will probably be {c₁..... cM}. But if something different happens as a 
consequence of the voter’s vote, what can it be? If one of the expected win-
ners were to be replaced by a candidate who was expected to lose, it would 
most likely be cM+1— the one with the highest score. Therefore, to decide 
whether to approve an expected winner or not, the voter should compare 
that candidate to its main contender, cM+1. If an expected loser were elected 
because of the voter’s vote, which expected winner would be replaced? The 
answer is most likely the weakest expected winner, cM, and the same reasoning 
leads the voter to compare the expected losers to their main contender, the 
expected weakest winner. The two types of reasoning concur with respect to 
cM and cM+1: the voter approves the preferred one and not the other.
Given the limited number of votes, the voter considers the candidates 
lexicographically, in the order defined in Step 3. In this order, candidates 
are ranked according to their distance from their most likely contender 
(in number of expected votes). This is equivalent to ranking them by their 
decreasing probability of being caught in a tie for election. Indeed, our 
trembling ballot assumption (Assumption 3) implies that the most likely 
pivot event is a tie between the two candidates who are expected to rank in 
the M and M + 1 positions (here candidates cM and cM+1). What is the next 
most likely pivot event? All the other pivot events imply some reversals 
of the expected order among candidates. What is the next pair of candi-
dates between which the voter is most likely to be pivotal? Our assump-
tions imply that it will be either cM and cM+2 or cM−1 and cM+1, depending on 
whether the difference in expected scores between cM and cM+2 is larger or 
smaller than the difference in expected scores between cM−1 and cM+1. Indeed, 
they are the two pairs that require the least order reversals compared to the 
expected outcome. Similarly, other pivot events can be ranked by decreas-
ing probability of occurrence.
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An Empirical Evaluation of the Strategic Model
Data
Our analysis is based on data collected as part of the Making Electoral 
Democracy Work project (Blais 2010). A two- wave panel survey was con-
ducted, with respondents interviewed during the two weeks before the 
April 3, 2011, parliamentary and governmental elections in the canton of 
Zurich and again during the week following the election. The first wave 
included 1,192 respondents, 842 of whom also completed the second ques-
tionnaire.6 These surveys were conducted online by Harris/Decima, rely-
ing on a panel of respondents from Link, a Swiss polling firm. The sam-
pling was based on a stratified, quota- based approach. Quotas were set by 
controlling for age, gender, and education status. The participation rate 
was 36% in the pre- electoral wave and 71% in the postelectoral wave.
To test our strategic voting model, we need information about:
 1. the citizens’ preferences for the candidates,
 2. their anticipations about the scores of the candidates,
 3. their actual vote choice.
Citizens’ preferences for the candidates: To construct individual prefer-
ences for the candidates, the pre- electoral wave used a series of questions:
Please rate each of the following candidates on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means you strongly dislike that candidate and 10 means that 
you strongly like that candidate.
Citizens’ anticipations about the scores of the candidates: The survey did not 
ask about respondents’ anticipations about the electoral outcomes. To test 
our theory, we therefore had to make some assumptions about their antici-
pations. We assume that citizens’ correctly anticipate how other voters are 
going to vote. (For an analysis assuming that citizens base their expecta-
tions on pre- electoral polls, see appendix A.)
Citizens’ actual vote choice: Vote choice was measured either in the pre- 
electoral wave or in the postelectoral wave, depending on when respon-
dents cast their vote. Advance postal voting is widespread, and about half 
of the respondents in the pre- electoral wave had already voted. In the post-
electoral wave, we assessed respondents’ voting choice by asking,7
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 For the cantonal government election you had up to 7 votes. Which candidates did 
you vote for? (up to 7 answers possible)
 – Regine Aeppli (SP)
 – Ursula Gut (FDP)
 – Thomas Heiniger (FDP)
 – Ernst Stocker (SVP)
 – Markus Kägi (SVP)
 – Hans Hollenstein (CVP)
 – Mario Fehr (SP)
 – Maja Ingold (EVP)
 – Martin Graf (Greens)
 – Other candidate
 – Don’t know
Given that some respondents had already voted when ansering the pre- 
electoral wave, our sample is not limited to respondents who participated 
in both panel waves. Of the 1,192 respondents, 502 can be included in the 
analysis: 451 respondents were excluded because they did not vote, while 
another 239 were excluded because they did not evaluate one or more can-
didates. Table 9.2 compares the official electoral results of the candidates 
with those observed in our sample.
TABLE 9.2. Distribution of Votes for the Registered Candidates in the Election and 
in the Sample




Candidates Votes % of voters Votes % of voters in %b
Mario Fehr (SP) 137,035 50.1 298 59.4 +18.4
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134,061 49.1 268 53.4 +8.8
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129,943 47.6 221 44.0 −7.4
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129,349 47.3 257 51.2 +8.2
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123,159 45.1 202 40.2 −10.7
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121,144 44.3 272 54.2 +22.2
Martin Graf (GPS) 120,815 44.2 269 53.6 +21.2
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118,487 43.4 263 52.4 +20.8
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68,996 25.2 154 30.7 +21.5
Average Number of Votes 
per Ballota
4.0 4.4
Number of voters 273,256 502  
a For the nine registered candidates only.
b The sample relative bias is the difference between the percentages of votes for the candidate in the 
sample and in the election divided by the percentage of votes in the election.
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All candidates except the ones from the SVP (the most right- wing 
party) received higher scores in our sample than in the official election 
results. The bias is moderate for the two FDP (moderate right) candidates 
(about 8 or 9%), and is larger for the remaining center and left- wing can-
didates (around 20%). The existence of a left- wing bias in our sample does 
not pose a problem for testing our model because all our analyses are con-
ducted at the individual level: the objective is to check whether each indi-
vidual in our sample casts votes that are consistent with the recommenda-
tion of the strategic model.
In our sample, the average number of votes for candidates per ballot 
is 4.4, which is larger than what is observed in the official election (4.0).8 
Therefore our sample slightly overestimates the number of votes per ballot 
(+11%). The most plausible explanation for this difference is that our study 
excluded voters who could not evaluate all nine candidates, thus restricting 
our sample to well- informed voters. Some evidence suggests that lack of 
information about the candidates is correlated with casting fewer votes (see 
Lachat and Kriesi 2015). Figure 9.1 provides more information about the 
number of votes cast by respondents in our sample, showing the distribu-
tion of the number of votes for the nine candidates per ballot. The modal 
number of votes per ballot is 7 (23% of the ballots). Ballots with a single 
name are the least frequent (7%).
Table 9.3 provides the means and the standard deviations of the evalu-
ations received by the candidates (on a 0– 10 scale). We observe a strong 
correlation (coefficient of 0.92) between the electoral score and the mean 
evaluation of the candidates.
Empirical Method
For each voter, we compute the strategic recommendation as defined by 
the model, and compare it to the actual vote. To vote strategically, voters 
must start by anticipating the scores of the different candidates to evalu-
ate the likelihood that they might get involved in a tie (or a near tie). We 
assume here that they form anticipations that are, on average, perfect. That 
is, their anticipations are such that the average expected scores of the can-
didates coincide with the official scores. (Appendix A presents the results of 
a series of replications in which expectations about candidate chances are 
based on poll results instead.)
Table 9.4 presents all the information about the context of the election 
that is needed to establish the strategic recommendation for each voter:
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• Step 1: It establishes the set of expected winners (shaded in light 
gray) and the set of expected losers (no shade), based on the num-
ber of votes they are expected to receive (column 2), where by 
assumption, their expected number of votes coincides with their 
score in the official election.9 In particular, the names of the two 
critical candidates— the weakest expected winner (Martin Graf) 
and the strongest expected loser (Hans Hollenstein)— are written 
in bold characters.
• Step 2: For each candidate, column 3 identifies the main con-
tender. For all candidates expected to be winners, the main con-
tender is the strongest expected loser (Hans Hollenstein), whereas 
for all candidates expected to be losers, the main contender is the 
weakest expected winner (Martin Graf).
Fig. 9.1. Distribution of the Number of Votes per Ballot (% of Ballots)




Candidates Mean Standard Deviation % of Voters
Mario Fehr (SP) 5.54 3.27 59.4
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 5.39 2.64 53.4
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 4.48 3.40 44.0
Ursula Gut (FDP) 5.12 2.74 51.2
Markus Kägi (SVP) 4.33 3.35 40.2
Regine Aeppli (SP) 5.11 3.09 54.2
Martin Graf (GPS) 5.31 3.17 53.6
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 5.16 2.66 52.4
Maja Ingold (EVP) 4.38 2.86 30.7
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• Step 3: The distance (in expected votes) between each candidate 
and the main contender (column 4) yields the priority order in 
which voters should consider the candidates (column 5).
• Step 4: The voter considers all the candidates in the priority order 
that appears in column 5. Until voters hit the vote budget con-
straint (seven votes), they vote for each candidate if and only if 
the utility for this candidate is larger than the utility for the candi-
date’s main contender.10
So far, we have neglected nonregistered citizens who received votes. 
Although nonregistered names receive a substantial number of votes 
(93,485), they are dispersed among many different people. It is not pos-
sible to know how many votes the strongest nonregistered candidate 
received, as these votes are not broken down by individual candidates in 
the vote counting process. Nonetheless, we can be confident that the dis-
tance between any of these persons and their main contender (the weakest 
expected winner, Martin Graf) is much larger than all the distances com-
puted for registered candidates. Therefore, their probability of being part 
of a pivot event is negligible compared to the probabilities of the registered 
candidates. Introducing these candidates into our analysis would not alter 
the strategic recommendation regarding the vote for (or against) the reg-
istered candidates.
Our analysis also neglects the minimal majority threshold needed 
for election in the first round. What happens to our strategic reason-













Mario Fehr (SP) 137,035 H. Hollenstein 18,548 7
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134,061 H. Hollenstein 15,574 6
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129,943 H. Hollenstein 11,456 5
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129,349 H. Hollenstein 10,862 4
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123,159 H. Hollenstein 4,672 3
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121,144 H. Hollenstein 2,657 2
Martin Graf (GPS) 120,815 H. Hollenstein 2,328 1
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118,487 M. Graf 2,328 1
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68,996 M. Graf 51,819 8
Others 93,485    
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ing described so far if this majority requirement is explicitly taken into 
account? There are now two types of pivot event featuring candidate c:
 (1) There exists another candidate c′ such that candidates c and c′ 
are caught in a tie (or a near tie) for the M = 7th rank, and both 
of them are above the majority threshold. In this case, the voter 
is pivotal in changing the chances of candidates c and c′ to be 
elected during the first round.
 (2) Candidate c is ranked M = 7th or above, and that candidate gets 
a number of votes (from other voters) equal to the majority 
threshold minus one vote. In that case, the voter can make the 
candidate a first- round winner rather than a first- round loser 
(who might win election during the second round).
Our analysis omits the second scenario because in the Zurich election, the 
top eight candidates are all well above this threshold (84,034 votes), and 
their distance from the threshold is much larger than the distance from 
their main contender.11
Results
Our model predicts which ballot every voter should cast, depending on 
that voter’s preferences (all voters sharing the same anticipations about 
outcomes). We look at the model predictions from two different angles. 
First, we compare aggregate- level predicted results to observed aggregate- 
level outcomes. Second, we compute the number of correct predictions at 
the voter- candidate level.
Figure 9.2 indicates our sample’s observed and predicted scores for each 
candidate. The observed score of a candidate is the fraction of voters in our 
sample who vote for this candidate. The predicted score of a candidate is 
the score that this candidate would receive if all the voters voted according 
to our strategic voting model. Indeed, our strategic voting model predicts 
whether each voter should vote for each candidate. We then aggregate 
these individual predictions to compute the predicted scores at the candi-
date level.
The strategic model performs quite well in explaining the electoral 
scores in the sample (correlation coefficient 0.97). The largest relative 
error is found for the last candidate, Maja Ingold, whose score is overesti-
mated by the strategic model.
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The M + 1 rule, according to which voters should concentrate on a 
group of top candidates the size of which is equal to the district magnitude 
(M) plus 1 (Cox 1997), does not apply here.12 All candidates, including the 
ninth candidate, can get a significant number of votes.
Figure 9.3 shows the observed and predicted distributions of the num-
ber of votes per ballot in our sample. Again, the correlation coefficient is 
quite high: 0.71. Our strategic voting model predicts an average of 4.2 
votes per ballot, while the sample yields 4.4 votes per ballot. Nevertheless, 
as figure 9.3 shows, the model fails to predict the mode of the observed 
distribution at 7 votes per ballot: compared to the strategic voting recom-
mendation, the sample has too many full ballots.
As a complementary way to assess the performance of the strategic 
model, we now compute its percentage of correct predictions, at the voter- 
candidate level. We have 502 respondents voting for 9 registered candi-
dates for a total of 4,518 voter- by- candidate observations. Table 9.5 shows 
the percentages of correct predictions for each candidate and on average.
An average of 69% of predictions were correct. This number can be 
decomposed by candidate and by the sign of the strategic recommendation 
(positive = a vote for the candidate; negative = don’t vote for the candidate). 
Fig. 9.2. Candidate Scores, Observed and Predicted (% of Voters)
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Table 9.5 also provides such decompositions. The table shows that the 
average percentage of correct predictions is the same whether the strategic 
recommendation was negative or positive. Consistent with the observation 
made in figure 9.2 that the rational model overestimates Maja Ingold score, 
table 9.5 shows that only 36% of voters who were predicted to vote for her 
actually did so. This is the only instance where the percentage of correct 
predictions falls below 50%.
Finally, we construct a general indicator of individual rationality by 
Fig. 9.3. Number of Votes per Ballot (%)
TABLE 9.5. Percentage of Correct Predictions, per Candidate
 
% of Positive 
Predictions





% of Negative 
Predictions








Mario Fehr (SP) 55 84 45 70 78
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 52 64 48 59 62
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 42 73 58 77 75
Ursula Gut (FDP) 49 63 51 60 61
Markus Kägi (SVP) 39 70 61 79 75
Regine Aeppli (SP) 50 78 50 70 74
Martin Graf (GPS) 52 78 48 73 76
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 48 63 52 58 60
Maja Ingold (EVP) 36 36 64 72 59
Average 47 69 53 69 69
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counting the number of candidate votes correctly predicted on each indi-
vidual ballot. If a voter’s behavior was fully consistent with our theory, we 
should be able to correctly predict the votes for each of the nine registered 
candidates. Figure 9.4 below depicts the distribution of this indicator.
Although only 6.5% of the ballots are fully consistent with the nine 
strategic candidate- level recommendations, the model made at least seven 
correct predictions for almost half of the ballots (47.7%). Consequently, we 
conclude that the strategic voting model performs fairly well in explaining 
individual voting decisions.
Strategic versus Sincere Voting?
There is no straightforward operationalization of sincere voting under 
approval balloting. As chapter 1 discusses, sincere voting is the calculus 
of voting as consumption whereby a voter decides whether to vote for a 
candidate depending on the “expressive benefits” derived from voting for 
this candidate. When a voter has a single vote to cast, this model has a 
straightforward recommendation: voters should vote for the candidate 
they like most. The same holds if voters cast a fixed number of votes larger 
than one: voters should vote for their preferred candidates. The recom-
mendation is much less straightforward when voters can choose to cast any 
number of votes (possibly up to some cap). Where should voters draw the 
line between the candidates associated with positive and negative expres-
Fig. 9.4. Number of Correct Predictions by Ballot (% of Ballots)
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sive benefits? How does that threshold relate to voters’ evaluations of the 
candidates?
For the purposes of this discussion, we label a ballot as sincere in accor-
dance with Brams’s (1982) definition: if voters approve a candidate, they 
also approve all the candidates to whom those voters give a strictly higher 
evaluation. With this definition of sincere voting, the sincere voting model 
(contrary to the strategic model) does not make a single precise prediction 
about the ballot a voter should cast. With a maximal number of V votes 
to cast, any ballot such that the voter votes for her v preferred candidates, 
with v no larger than V, is a sincere ballot. For this reason, there is no obvi-
ous benchmark of a sincere voting model that could be tested on the data. 
Nevertheless, to better understand the qualitative properties of strategic 
voting in this context, it is interesting to explore whether the recommenda-
tions derived from the strategic voting model are generally consistent with 
this notion of sincerity. As Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016) point out, 
strategic voting may in theory entail casting nonsincere ballots (Proposi-
tion 4). Our findings show that in this election, the strategic recommenda-
tion satisfies this notion of sincerity in most cases.
All of the eight candidates with the highest expected scores (the seven 
expected winners plus the strongest expected loser) have a priority order 
of at most 7, which means that the constraint on the number of votes (the 
voter is allowed to cast at most M = 7 votes) is not binding when the voter 
decides whether to vote for these candidates. It is straightforward to check 
that if the strategic recommendation implies voting for one of these eight 
candidates, it also implies voting for all the candidates with higher evalu-
ation. Indeed, if voters prefer Hans Hollenstein (the strongest expected 
loser) to Martin Graf (the weakest expected winner), they should vote for 
all candidates they prefer to Hollenstein plus Hollenstein, whereas if voters 
prefer Graf to Hollenstein, they should vote for all candidates they prefer 
to Hollenstein but not for Hollenstein. Both cases imply sincere voting 
among the top eight candidates.
For the last candidate, Maja Ingold, sincerity can be violated in only 
two types of situations:
 (1) Voters have used their seven votes when considering the first 
eight candidates and have no votes left to vote for Maja Ingold 
even if she is preferred to Martin Graf (her main contender) and 
some of the expected winners for whom the voters have already 
voted.
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 (2) Voters still have (at least) one vote left, and there exists an 
expected winner c other than Martin Graf such that the voters 
have the following ranking in their utility for the candidates: 
u(Hollenstein) > u(c) > u(Ingold) > u(Graf). Such voters should 
vote for Ingold (who is preferable to her main contender, Graf) 
but not vote for the expected winner c (since she likes c less than 
the main contender, Hollenstein).
The Ingold example is useful in that it illustrates the two potential reasons 
why the strategic recommendation might not be sincere in general:
 (1) The constraint on the number of votes is binding.
 (2) The expected winners are compared to the strongest expected 
loser, whereas the expected losers are compared to the weakest 
expected winner. (If all candidates were compared to the same 
benchmark, sincere voting would result, neglecting the con-
straint on the number of votes.)
In our data, the strategic recommendation quite often leads to a sincere 
ballot. For more than 90% of the voters in our sample, the strategic model 
predicts that the voter should cast a sincere ballot. To get a more precise 
quantification of this small minority of nonsincere cases, we compute the 
number of pairs of candidates for whom sincerity is violated. We consider 
that sincerity is violated on a set {c,c′} of any two candidates if and only if 
the voter votes for one candidate and does not vote for the other although 
the voter prefers the latter to the former. Table 9.6 reports the distribution 
of the number of pairs that violate sincerity. Only 0.57% of pairs (not bal-
lots) violate sincerity.
Contrary to what happens in a single- member  district elections (M = 
1), where strategic voting contradicts sincerity whenever a voter’s preferred 
candidate is not one of the two front- runners, the strategic recommenda-
tion in the Zurich election does not violate a basic notion of sincerity. The 
low number of violations of sincerity is related to the fact that the number 
of candidates is very close to the number of seats.
The standard definition of sincerity (Brams 1982) does not make a 
TABLE 9.6. Distribution of the Number of Pairs Violating Sincerity per Ballot
Number of Pairs in a Ballot That  
Violate Sincerity
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
% of ballots 90.2 3.2 3.6 2.0 0.6 0.4 100
Revised Pages
 Strategic Voting in Multiwinner Elections with Approval Balloting 195
unique precise recommendation regarding the ballot a voter should cast. 
Indeed, it does not specify where voters should draw the line between 
approved candidates and unapproved candidates. Building a model of 
sincere voting that delivers unique predictions requires some additional 
assumptions regarding the drawing of this line. Appendix B proposes sev-
eral such sincere voting models and assesses their performance with the 
Zurich data.
Conclusion
The way canton governments are elected in Switzerland provides an inter-
esting case study of multinominal approval- type voting. We studied the 
rational voting paradigm using data from the 2011 Zurich cantonal elec-
tion. Following Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016), rational optimization 
often suggests that voters should approve of many candidates, a theoretical 
conclusion that matches our observations. In the details of the individual 
approvals, the explanatory power of the strategic voting model that we 
tested is on the order of 70%.
These results are encouraging in the sense that a purely theoretical 
model rendered a good number of nontrivial facts. But the election we 
studied has some quite specific and unusual features, and caution must be 
used when generalizing our findings to other contexts. Because the number 
of candidates (nine) was only slightly larger than the number of seats avail-
able (seven), the strategic model’s predictions rarely contradict some basic 
notion of sincerity. In addition, no candidate was clearly sure to be elected: 
the final score of the best- elected candidate was not so different from the 
score of the eighth- ranked candidate. Further analysis using the model in 
other situations would be welcome.
A P P E N D I X  A :  A LT E R N AT I V E  A S S U M P T I O N S  A B O U T  T H E  A N T I C I PAT I O N S
In the strategic voting model, the weakest expected winner and the stron-
gest expected loser play key roles. Voters’ decisions are based on a com-
parison of the expected winners with the strongest expected loser and of 
the expected losers with the weakest expected winner. In the official results 
of the 2011 Zurich election, the scores received by the different candidates 
were very close. In particular, the weakest winner (Martin Graf) receives 
votes from 44% of the voters, while the strongest loser (Hans Hollenstein) 
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the scores of the other candidates are also quite close, since the candidate 
with the highest score (Mario Fehr) receives the votes of 50% of the voters. 
Only the weakest candidate (Maja Ingold) receives substantially fewer votes 
(25%). So it might have been very difficult for voters to correctly predict 
the expected scores of the different candidates. Indeed, some evidence for 
this difficulty is provided by the results of a poll conducted by IsoPublic on 
March 22, 2011, two weeks before the first round of the election. Table A9.1 
reports the results of this poll along with the official election results.
The poll correctly predicts Ingold’s low score, ranking her last. It also 
correctly puts Martin Graf as the weakest expected winner. However, the 
poll suggests that Markus Kägi should be the strongest expected loser 
(although he was elected and finished fifth). These results indicate that vot-
ers probably had difficulty correctly predicting the candidates’ scores and 
the resulting priority order used to derive the strategic recommendation. 
Table A9.1 also provides the identity of each candidate’s main contender as 
well as that candidate’s priority rank based on both the official results and 
the poll results.
We have replicated the main analysis using these poll results instead of 
the official results as the basis for the anticipations. (Detailed results avail-
able upon request.) The overall numbers of correct predictions at the indi-
vidual level are very similar in both analyses. The overall average percent-
age of correct predictions with the polls is 68%, versus 69% with official 
results. However, using the official results, we predicted an average of 4.23 
votes per ballot, which is only slightly below the observed average of 4.39 
votes, while using poll results, the model predicts an average of 4.9. The 
poll results predicted a substantially larger number of full or almost full 
ballots (with 6 or 7 votes). This is a consequence of having a far- right can-
didate (Markus Kägi) rather than a centrist candidate (Hans Hollenstein) 
as the strongest expected loser. The strongest expected loser is the main 
contender for most candidates. Since Kägi enjoys a lower level of sympathy 
than does Hollenstein in our sample, the strategic voting model predicts 
more votes on average for the other candidates and thus more votes per 
ballot. This finding highlights the fact that the precise consequences of 
the strategic recommendations (e.g., number of votes per ballot) are quite 
sensitive to the identity of the two critical candidates.
A P P E N D I X  B :  M O D E L S  O F  S I N C E R E  V O T I N G
To develop a model of sincere voting that delivers unique predictions, one 
possibility is to consider that when voters have up to M (the size of the 
198 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
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committee) votes to cast, as is the case in Zurich, they use all of these votes 
to state their preferences about the best possible committee. This possibil-
ity is refuted by the observation that many of the ballots in our sample 
featured fewer than seven positive votes.
Alternatively, rather than considering the whole committee, voters may 
evaluate the candidates separately and vote only for candidates considered 
“good enough.” There thus must be some (possibly voter- specific) thresh-
old a candidate has to pass to receive a vote. In practice, that threshold 
could be a utility level (e.g., 5 in our data where voters evaluate candidates 
on a 0– 10 scale). Or voters could use the average evaluation that they give 
to the different candidates, in which case voters would vote for candidates 
who are above average. The problem for evaluating the performance of 











Mario Fehr (SP) 59 63 59 55 61
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 53 63 57 50 58
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 44 48 45 42 44
Ursula Gut (FDP) 51 59 52 44 50
Markus Kägi (SVP) 40 47 43 37 41
Regine Aeppli (SP) 54 61 55 50 55
Martin Graf (GPS) 54 60 55 50 54
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 52 63 55 46 55
Maja Ingold (EVP) 31 47 41 34 39
Correlation  0.90 0.96 0.96 0.95
TABLE B9.2. Distribution of the Predicted Number of Votes per Ballot 











0 0 1,4 2,1 4,4 0
1 6,9 2,2 3,1 4,2 0,8
2 15,5 6,0 7,9 12,5 3,5
3 13,5 9,2 13,1 17,1 13,9
4 15,7 15,3 19,6 21,1 28,7
5 14,7 19,7 19,8 15,5 33,1
6 10,6 13,9 13,2 9,8 13,8
7 22,9 15,3 21,2 15,3 6,3
Mean 4,39 5,11 4,63 4,01 4,56
Correlation  0.70 0.83 0.77 0.38
TABLE B9.3. Correct predictions, among positive predictions, negative predictions and on 
average, per candidate, Various Sincere Voting models
 
% of positive 
predictions





% of negative 
predictions









Mario Fehr (SP) 63 86 37 86 86
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 63 72 37 80 75
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 48 82 52 92 87
Ursula Gut (FDP) 59 69 41 75 72
Markus Kägi (SVP) 47 78 53 93 86
Regine Aeppli (SP) 61 80 39 85 82
Martin Graf (GPS) 60 80 40 85 82
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 63 71 37 79 74
Maja Ingold (EVP) 47 52 53 88 71
Average 57 75 43 85 79
Threshold = 5
Mario Fehr (SP) 59 89 41 83 87
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 57 75 43 76 75
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 45 84 55 90 87
Ursula Gut (FDP) 52 73 48 72 73
Markus Kägi (SVP) 43 81 57 90 86
Regine Aeppli (SP) 55 83 45 81 82
Martin Graf (GPS) 55 82 45 82 82
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 55 74 45 75 74
Maja Ingold (EVP) 41 56 59 87 74
Average 51 78 49 82 80
Threshold = 5.5
Mario Fehr (SP) 55 92 45 81 87
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 50 79 50 72 76
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 42 88 58 88 88
Ursula Gut (FDP) 44 78 56 70 74
Markus Kägi (SVP) 37 86 63 87 86
Regine Aeppli (SP) 50 87 50 78 83
Martin Graf (GPS) 50 86 50 79 82
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 46 80 54 71 75
Maja Ingold (EVP) 34 62 66 86 78
Average 45 83 55 80 81
Threshold = mean
Mario Fehr (SP) 61 89 39 86 88
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 58 75 42 76 75
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 44 87 56 89 88
Ursula Gut (FDP) 50 75 50 73 74
Markus Kägi (SVP) 41 83 59 89 87
Regine Aeppli (SP) 55 83 45 82 82
Martin Graf (GPS) 54 83 46 82 82
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 55 74 45 74 74
Maja Ingold (EVP) 39 60 61 87 77
Average 51 79 49 82 81
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“sincere voting” is that many models, and therefore many predictions, are 
consistent with this general idea of sincere voting.
We replicate the main analysis for four such sincere models, three with 
some absolute utility thresholds (4.5, 5, and 5.5), and one with a voter- 
specific threshold equal to the average of the evaluations given to the dif-
ferent candidates by the voter. Table B9.1 shows the predicted scores of 
the candidates (analogous to figure 9.2 for the strategic model). Table B9.2 
shows the predicted number of votes per ballot (analogous to figure 9.3 for 
the strategic model). Table B9.3 shows the percentage of correct predic-
tions at the voter- candidate level (analogous to table 9.5 for the strategic 
model).
Table B9.1 shows that all sincere models perform quite well in explain-
ing the aggregate scores of the candidates, with a correlation coefficient 
above 0.90 (0.97 for the strategic model). However, the performance of 
the sincere models is quite heterogeneous regarding the number of votes 
cast per ballot (table B9.2); in particular, the model using the voter- specific 
threshold of the mean evaluation seems to perform quite poorly (correla-
tion coefficient of 0.38), whereas the best- performing sincere model uses 
as a threshold the absolute value of 5. Finally, table B9.3 shows that these 
models are consistent with roughly 80% of the individual decisions on can-
didates, a slightly higher number than the strategic model obtained (70%).
These analyses suggest that the best- performing sincere voting models 
use as a utility threshold the absolute value of 5 or 5.5 (on the 0– 10 scale). 
The performance of these sincere models depends heavily on specific ad 
hoc assumptions about how voters draw the line between the candidates 
they like and those they do not. In addition, because the votes and evalu-
ations were obtained simultaneously, some voters may not have derived 
their votes from their numerical sincere evaluations but rather scaled their 
personal evaluation scheme to make the middle grade (5) the threshold 
of approbation. This makes the comparison with the performance of the 
more parsimonious strategic model difficult.
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 1. In the election on which we focus, the majority threshold corresponded to 
31% of voters.
 2. This holds for general elections, which take place every four years. How-
ever, in the case of partial elections following a government member’s resignation, 
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second rounds are more common.While most other Swiss cantons use a similar 
electoral system to elect their government, the way in which the first round major-
ity threshold is set varies among cantons (Vatter 2002). Most common is a more 
restrictive threshold equal to the number of valid ballots (rather than candidate 
votes cast) divided by two and rounded up to the next integer. With this alternative 
system, a second round is usually necessary.
 3. This observation proves useful when checking whether we can apply the stra-
tegic voting theory of Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016), which pertains to one- 
round elections, to the election under study here.
 4. The voting rules studied in Laslier and Van der Straeten (2016) have only one 
round of votes, whereas the Zurich election potentially has two.
 5. For strategic considerations about how elected officials will interact once 
elected, see Daoust, this vol.; Verthé and Beyens, this vol.
 6. These figures exclude respondents who started but did not complete the 
questionnaire as well as respondents who appeared unengaged— for example, 
because they gave illogical responses or completed the survey too quickly.
 7. A similar question was asked in the preelectoral wave for voters who used 
advanced postal voting.
 8. If nonregistered candidates are included, the average number of votes per 
ballot is 4.3.
 9. Because a voter’s anticipations are defined as taking into account all other 
votes but not the voter’s own vote, full rigor would require a table for each voter 
with computations excluding his or her own vote. Given the scores obtained by the 
candidates, however, doing so would not change the ordering of candidates or the 
strategic recommendation, so we reason for all voters based on the figures in table 
9.4.
 10. In some cases in our sample, respondents give the same evaluation (on a 0– 10 
scale) to a candidate and to the main contender This situation has two possible 
interpretations: the voter either is perfectly and exactly indifferent between the 
two candidates or actually prefers one candidate over the other but given the finite 
11- point scale is bound to give them the same evaluation. We consider the latter 
explanation more plausible and consequently transform these cases into strict pref-
erences. Since we do not know which candidate the voter prefers, we simply assume 
that with probability ½ she likes one candidate better, and with probability ½ she 
likes the other candidate better. Each voter in the sample who exhibits such an 
indifference is decomposed into 100 observations, each given a weight of 1/100 in 
the sample. For each of these 100 observations corresponding to one single voter, 
if the voter happens to give the same evaluation to any two candidates c and c′, the 
reported indifference between candidates c and c′ is broken randomly, where each 
strict preference is assigned the same probability.
 11. The only candidate below the majority threshold is Maja Ingold. For this 
candidate, the most likely first- type events involve her tying (or almost tying) with 
the weakest expected winner (Martin Graf), and that she receives more votes that 
Hans Hollenstein, in which case she will cross the majority threshold. The sec-
ond type of event requires both the seventh- and eighth- ranked candidates to fall 
below the majority threshold, which requires many more mistakes and is therefore 
much less likely than the first type of event. Our arguments here are quite infor-
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mal: developing more formal arguments would be complicated by the fact that any 
mistake (misrecorded vote) on a candidate affects both the candidate’s individual 
score and the majority threshold. More precisely, if a positive vote for a candidate 
is wrongly recorded as a negative vote, the candidate’s score decreases by one vote 
and the majority threshold decreases by about 1/14. For this analysis, we consider 
voters as neglecting the possibility of a second round when deciding whether to 
vote for Ingold.
 12. Indeed, the M + 1 rule typically applies to party- list PR systems, in which vot-
ers can vote for only one list (see chapter 1). The electoral system considered here 
is quite different in that voters can cast more than one vote and candidates with the 
highest number of votes are elected.
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Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting
A Laboratory Experiment Using Alternative  
Proportional Systems
Isabelle Lebon, Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, 
Herrade Igersheim, and Jean- François Laslier
Voters vote sincerely when they vote systematically according to their 
preferences; they vote strategically if they try to influence the outcome of 
the election by adapting their behavior to what they anticipate concerning 
other voters’ behavior as well as to the voting rule— that is, if their votes 
are influenced by their expectations about attainable outcomes. As chapter 
1 points out, in a given election, strategic considerations may not conflict 
with sincerity. However, the political science literature usually uses the 
adjective strategic for what should really be called nonsincere or strategic 
and nonsincere. This chapter sheds some light on the distinctions among 
strategic, sincere, and nonsincere voting.
As soon as three or more options are available, voting becomes a com-
plex decision. The question of strategic nonsincere voting has attracted 
much attention from economists concerned with the theoretical aspects of 
elections. The definition of a sincere vote is unambiguous when the form 
of the ballot and the possible votes match precisely what can be termed the 
opinion or the preference of the voter. Such is the case when the voter is 
required to provide the name of a single candidate or party. In such cases, 
a sincere vote consists of selecting the voter’s first preference, whatever the 
context, and an incentive for voting strategically is to “desert non- viable 
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candidates” (Cox 1997, 80). Such is also the case in the setting of Arrovian 
preferences, where voters are required to submit as their vote their ranking 
of the candidates from best to worse. The formal social choice literature 
has reached the conclusion that, in this setting, rationality cannot always 
match sincerity (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975).
But the definition of sincerity and therefore the study of the question of 
strategic voting, is not so straightforward with other forms of voting. For 
example, the literature on strategic voting in mixed- member systems has 
concentrated on the ticket- splitting phenomenon, an issue that is obviously 
absent from the study of single- winner elections but that raises new ques-
tions about expressive voting (see Harfst, Blais, and Bol, this vol.). Another 
instance is approval voting, which this chapter studies: if voters can vote for 
as many candidates as they want, then even sincere voters must decide— 
and this is already a kind of strategic decision— how many candidates to 
approve: only her single- most- preferred candidate, or the best two, the 
best three, and so forth (see Lachat, Laslier, and Van der Straeten, this vol.).
Conversely, the notion of strategic voting (sincere or not) is also not 
straightforward outside of the first- past- the- post context. The concep-
tual guidelines are provided by the theory of rational behavior as used in 
game theory. Rational behavior is characterized by intentions (in general 
expressed as preferences about outcomes) and by reasonable beliefs about 
how possible outcomes derive from possible actions. It is difficult to test 
the predictability of formal models of strategic behavior, since surveys can 
hardly provide all the necessary information on the original preferences 
(Sauger et al. 2012). By offering a way to control preferences (through 
monetary incentives), laboratory experiments have helped to bring to 
light what actual strategic behavior is and what type of cognitive process it 
involves (Rietz 2008; Blais, Laslier, and Van der Straeten 2016).
But some ambiguities remain. First, monetary incentives in the labora-
tory are likely to overstate strategic behavior compared to a real political 
context (Igersheim et al 2016). Second, the substantive definition of strate-
gic behavior is fuzzy insofar as it heavily depends on the voting rule and the 
political context (Baujard et al. 2014). Showing that a gap exists between 
the basic political preference and the observed voting behavior is a first 
step but is not sufficient. To characterize strategic behavior, this gap must 
also reflect an intention to individually influence the collective decision.
Third, the theory of rationality is intrinsically linked to the idea that 
rational actors have a unique goal in making their decisions (expressed by 
their preference relation or utility function), probably because they are 
weighing in a consistent manner their conflicting objectives. But once again, 
Revised Pages
 Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting 205
some voting rules seem to offer the possibility of fulfilling several goals at 
one time. Mixed- member systems, two- round elections, and approval vot-
ing are all institutions that might be understood this way by voters.
These three points frame this chapter’s study. The experiment is run in 
the laboratory, but rather than using monetary- induced preferences, it is 
based on a real political situation: the 2014 European Parliament election. 
We first asked participants to directly give their opinion on the various 
lists. Then we asked them how they would vote under three variants of 
proportional representation: voting for one (and only one) list; approving 
several lists; and a kind of cumulative voting. In this way, all participants 
offered four opinions on the actual lists proposed in the official election.
This protocol allows us to compare the votes with the opinions at the 
individual level for the three rules. We describe large amounts of not- 
simply- sincere voting and launch a debate on whether these selective 
choices can uncontroversially be explained by strategic intentions, even for 
a larger definition of preferences.
The chapter first presents the contextualized experiment and the issues 
it raises before analyzing how voters use the voting rules and the opin-
ion grades. We then highlight the sincerity or nonsincerity of the voters’ 
behavior from one voting system to the next and clarify and measure the 
choices that can be considered strategic before judging the consistency 
between sincere and strategic voting.
Design of the Experiment
The experimental data used in this chapter were collected during 11 labo-
ratory sessions, each with 21 participants. Six sessions were held in Rennes 
and 5 in Ecully, in suburban Lyon, France, on the sidelines of a noncontex-
tualized monetarily controlled experimentation. Anonymity of responses 
was guaranteed by the fact that all participants used paper ballots that they 
slipped into an urn before leaving the room.
Political Context
The experiment was performed during the campaign period preceding the 
May 2014 European Parliamentary elections. Members of the European 
Parliament (MEP) are elected under proportional systems that vary across 
countries. France uses a typical closed- list system and is divided into eight 
districts. The electoral rule is proportional, with a threshold of 5%. French 
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citizens, and thus probably most participants in the survey, are used to the 
closed- list system, which is common in there.
Elections are independent from one district to the other. The main par-
ties propose lists in all districts, but some other lists— for example, regional 
ones— are specific. The city of Rennes (Brittany) belongs to the West elec-
toral region, which would elect 9 MEPs and which had 25 lists on the 
ballots. The city of Ecully- Lyon (Rhône- Alpes) belongs to the Southeast 
electoral region, which would elect 13 MEPs and which had 23 lists.
Despite the different numbers of MEPs to be elected, only six lists 
can be considered viable in each district— the ones presented by the six 
main French political parties (see appendix A). These lists are also the ones 
whose scores exceeded 5% of votes in the real official vote,1 a result pre-
dicted by the polls. Because no other list could hope to elect candidates in 
either region, these were quite clearly the only viable lists.
Experimental Protocol
At the beginning of the session, each participant received a leaflet contain-
ing the official campaign material of the various lists (one page for each 
list) and time to read these documents. The three voting rules were then 
explained to the participants, and they were asked to vote under each of 
the three rules. They were also asked to evaluate the different parties on a 
scale of 0 to 20.
Participants were presented with paper ballots (see appendix A) and 
invited to first express their opinion on the various lists (OP21) and then 
to vote in the following order: (1) for a single list as in the official voting 
(ONE), (2) by providing support to as many lists as they want, knowing 
they bring a full vote to each of them (LAppr), (3) by providing support for 
as many lists as they want knowing they share their unique vote between 
them (LSplit). Participants received specific instructions:
OP21: Evaluations of the Parties. The variable OP21 contains either 
the evaluation of each party on the 21- step numerical scale (0– 20) or the 
answer No opinion. The “Opinion” page of the ballot pointed: “Apart from 
any voting procedure, we wish to know anonymously your opinion of the 
different French political parties presenting lists for the European elec-
tions of May 2014. At the extremes, you will give 20/20 to a party whose 
program perfectly matches your opinion and 0/20 to a party that is totally 
opposite to what you think. If you cannot decide on a political party, write 
NOP (no opinion) in the box.” Given the way we phrased the question, 
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there are reasons to think that OP21 conveys reliable information about 
the voters’ true political rankings of parties in terms of ideological congru-
ence. The 0– 20 scale is the standard scale in used in France to grade school 
essays and exams, so it is a familiar way for the participants to evaluate 
quality: 10/20 is usually the minimum grade (or average rating) required to 
pass a test. Second, the scale is sufficiently wide to express precise opinions, 
even with a large number of competing lists. Third, voters have the option 
to declare that they have no opinion.
ONE: One- Name Voting (the Official Voting Rule). Here the voter simply 
votes for one list. As the participants were reminded, the number of seats 
allocated to a party depends on the number of votes that party receives. 
The seats are allocated to the parties that pass the threshold in proportion 
to their vote shares.
LAppr: List- Approval Rule. Here, voters approve as many lists as they 
want. Voting for two or more lists gives one full point to each list: the 
approval score of a list is the number of voters who approved the list. The 
seats are allocated to the parties that pass the threshold in proportion to 
their approval scores.2
LSplit: Split- My- Vote Rule. Here, voters can split their unique vote 
among as many lists as they want. Voting for two lists gives half a point to 
each list, voting for three lists gives a third of a point to each, and so on. 
The vote score of a party is the sum of points received this way. The seats 
are allocated to the parties that pass the threshold in proportion to their 
vote scores.
Definitions and Expectations
We trusted that even in the absence of monetary incentives, participants 
would play the game and answer the fake vote questions by really trying 
to imagine how they would vote in these hypothetical scenarios.3 Similarly, 
we can hope that our opinion question (OP21) was an opportunity for 
participants to honestly express their perceptions of the lists. This direct 
access to voter preferences and the three voting procedures tested allow us 
to raise several issues related to sincere and strategic voting.
The simplest issue is to estimate the amount of sincere and strategic 
voting in the official vote, which forces the voter to select a single list, via 
an analysis of the types of parties that participants select. When the vote 
has to be unique, voters are considered sincere if they choose the party 
to which they give the highest evaluation (or one of the parties to which 
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they give the highest evaluation) and are considered strategic (in the broad 
sense) if they choose a viable party. However, more complex questions arise 
from the two original voting rules that we used, which have not, to our 
knowledge, been studied in the literature.
Under both the LAppr and LSplit rules, voters can vote for as many 
parties as they want. Under these conditions, sincere voters should support 
all parties that have a grade higher than or equal to a threshold that they 
set. The multiplication of votes is more costly under LSplit, where the sup-
port given to each party weakens as the number of parties increases, than 
under LAppr, where the voter gives an entire vote to each selected party. 
We thus expect the selection of parties to be slimmer under LSplit than 
under LAppr. The proportion of sincere voters should therefore be higher 
under LAppr than under LSplit and, a fortiori, than under ONE.
The notion of strategic behavior is more difficult to grasp under pro-
cedures with multiple votes. Under the LSplit rule, which discourages the 
dispersion of votes, rational voters might at first glance always wish to con-
centrate their votes on a single party to maximize the efficiency of the vote. 
However, ballots on which voters take advantage of the opportunity to 
support multiple parties can also be interpreted strategically. We regard as 
strategic two types of ballots: those in which only viable parties are sup-
ported (type 1 strategy), and those in which the only excluded parties are 
nonviable parties that are at least as well evaluated as the supported parties 
(type 2 strategy).
Under the LAppr rule, the same choices between supported and unsup-
ported parties seem more difficult to justify insofar as supports have the 
same weight regardless of their number. Nevertheless, these choices can 
be rationalized: we call this behavior the sophisticated strategy, and as for 
the LSplit rule, we distinguish type 1 and type 2 sophisticated strategies. 
Logically, such behavior should be rare.
The rational theory provides three expectations:
 1. The proportion of sincere voters should be the largest in LAppr  
and the lowest in ONE. More generally, the coincidence be tween 
preferences and votes should be the best under LAppr and the 
worst under ONE.
 2. The proportion of strategic voters should be the highest in 
ONE and the lowest in LAppr.
 3. The number of supported parties should be smaller under 
LSplit than under LAppr.
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Examples of Sincere and Nonsincere and Strategic and 
Nonstrategic Ballots under Multivote Systems
We delineate our definitions of sincere voting and of strategic voting by 
examining examples of ballots that can be cast when multiple voting is pos-
sible for given political preferences. In the example in table 10.1, parties B 
and C are equally preferred (grade 18), as are D, E, and F (grade 15). Four 
parties are viable.
Concerning sincerity:
• On ballots 1 and 2, voters are simply sincere. All supported candi-
dates have a strictly better opinion grade than unsupported ones.
• On ballot 3, the voter is sincere but selective: She does not support 
candidate B, who has the same grade (18) as the lowest- graded 
supported candidate, C.
• On ballots 4 and 5, voters are insincere. Some of the unsupported 
candidates have better opinion grades than supported ones (on 
ballot 4, B is better evaluated than D; on ballot 5, A is better evalu-
ated than B).
Concerning strategy:
• On ballots 1 and 3, only viable parties are supported. Voters thus 
show a type 1 strategic behavior.
TABLE 10.1. Examples of Ballot Types
Party List
Opinion 
Grade Viabilitya Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 3 Ballot 4 Ballot 5
A 20 V X X X X
B 18 NV X X
C 18 V X X X X
D 15 V X
E 15 NV




J 0 NV      
Sincerity Sincere Sincere Sincere but 
Selective
Insin cere Insincere







aV = viable; NV = nonviable.
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• On ballot 4, the voter supports both viable and nonviable par-
ties, but she deserts nonviable parties (B and E) that have at least 
the same opinion grade as supported ones. Because this behavior 
benefits the viable parties she prefers and sustains, it is considered 
strategic (type 2).
• On ballots 2 and 5, voters are nonstrategic. Either they support 
their preferred candidates indifferently whether they are viable or 
nonviable or they do not support viable lists that are strictly better 
evaluated than supported ones.
Use of Voting Rules and Expression of Opinions
Consistency among Rules
The experimental sessions provided 126 ballots in Rennes (3 of which were 
not filled and thus are not valid) and 105 ballots in Lyon, for a total of 228 
useful ballots.
The multiple- votes rules, LSplit and LAppr, introduce flexibility, but it 
seems reasonable to expect that voters would not, under these rules, stop 
voting for the unique party they select under the official rule. We therefore 
call ballots inconsistent where the party chosen under the official rule is 
no longer chosen under the alternative rule. There are very few such bal-
lots. The chosen candidate according to ONE is also among the supported 
candidates in LAppr or in LSplit on between 96 and 99% of the ballots 
(table 10.2).
In addition, the prospect of sharing a single vote should lead partici-
pants to support fewer lists under the LSplit rule than under the LAppr 
rule, with the lists supported under LSplit also supported under LAppr. 
Table 10.2 shows that 96.05% of ballots demonstrate this type of consis-
tency. All these observations regarding consistency confirm the quality of 
the collected data.
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The Use of Opinion Grades
Despite the documents at their disposal and the time that they had to study 
them, participants often experienced difficulties in evaluating all the pre-
sented lists. Only 54 of the 228 participants graded all the lists. On average, 
a ballot contains 5.1 “no opinion” answers.
Table 10.3 summarizes the information about opinion grades. As 
expected, participants generally used the whole 0– 20 scale to express their 
preferences for the proposed political parties. The average difference 
between the lowest and highest grades is 15.5. Beyond the size of this gap, 
most participants chose to precisely specify their opinion about the lists, 
using on average 8.8 different grades.
We call the party that attracted the best grade in OP21 the preferred 
party. Given the meaning of the 0– 20 scale, it is unsurprising to observe 
that all the participants attributed a grade of at least 10 to their preferred 
party (minimax). In addition, no participant gave the worst- rated party a 
score above 10 (maximin). The distribution of the grades leads to an aver-
age awarded grade of 7.84, well below this threshold.
Multiple Votes under LSplit and LAppr
Figure 10.1 portrays the voting behavior of participants in the experiments. 
A large proportion of participants used the possibilities offered by both 
alternative voting rules to support multiple lists simultaneously. Unsur-
prisingly, all but six participants supported as many or more parties under 
LAppr as under LSplit. The average number of supported lists is 1.84 with 
LSplit and 3.3 with LAppr.
Looking at the ballots in more detail shows that 32.89% of partici-
pants exactly reproduced their official vote under the LSplit rule. A total 
of 28.53% of voters also chose to express exactly the same support under 
LSplit and LAppr. Eighteen participants (7.89%) chose to retain the same 
single list under all three voting rules.
TABLE 10.3. Evaluations of the Lists
Proportion of 




78.95% 7.84 10 10 15.5
212 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages
Because the average number of supported lists is significantly larger 
than one under LSplit, the average level of opinion scores for supported 
lists is lower under the LSplit rule (15.51) than under the official rule 
(16.10). This means that, with LSplit, participants have extended their sup-
port to lower- rated parties— that is, parties ranked lower in their prefer-
ence order. As figure 10.2 shows, the increase in the number of supported 
parties from LSplit to LAappr translates into a further decrease in the aver-
age score (to 14.56).
All these elements reinforce our assessment that participants approached 
our experiment with seriousness and precision, validating our decision to 
undertake behavioral analysis based on these opinion grades. We now turn 
to the sincerity of the voters’ choices under the different voting rules and 
the extent to which these choices can be considered strategic in relation to 
the viability of the lists.
Fig. 10.1. Distribution of the Number of Supported Lists under the LSplit and 
LAppr Rules
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Evidence of Sincere Voting
Voting Rules and Proportion of Sincere Ballots
The analysis of sincerity is based on the comparison between the prefer-
ences of participants, which we assume to be captured by OP21, and the 
choices they expressed through each of the voting rules (see table 10.4). 
We distinguish three categories of ballots: (1) “sincere” ballots, on which 
all unsupported list(s) have lower opinion grades than the supported ones; 
(2) “insincere” ballots, on which some unsupported list(s) have better opin-
ion grades than supported ones; and (3) “sincere but selective” ballots, on 
which some unsupported list(s) have the same opinion grade as the worst- 
rated of the supported lists.
In the “sincere but selective” category, a significant difference exists 
between the ONE rule and the others. Under ONE, sincere voters are 
Fig. 10.2. Average Opinion Grade of Supported Lists under the Different 
Voting Rules
TABLE 10.4. Voting Rules and Sincere Voting
 ONE LSplit LAppr
Sincere 62.7% 60.1% 50.9%
Sincere but Selective 25.9% 17.1% 21.5%
Insincere 11.4% 22.8% 27.6%
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forced to choose between their favorite lists, so they are obliged to be 
selective. This is not the case under LSplit and LAppr, which confer the 
possibility of supporting as many lists as desired and thus do not oblige 
voters to be selective.
The Possibility of Multiple Votes Does Not  
Promote Sincere Voting
The single- list vote results indicate that only 11.4% of voters cast non-
sincere ballots and that 25.9% had to choose one among their favorite 
parties. Table 10.4 provides more details about participants’ decisions 
under the LSplit rule compared with the ONE rule. As the decline in the 
average rating indicates, voters have not used the opportunity to support 
multiple lists solely to make their votes exactly match their stated prefer-
ences. In fact, the proportion of ballots on which the supported lists have 
strictly better opinion grades than unsupported lists (sincere ballots) has 
slightly decreased. The percentage of ballots on which at least one unsup-
ported party has a higher grade than the least- favorite supported parties 
(insincere ballots) increased to 22.8%. Many participants clearly chose to 
give additional votes to parties without following the order of their prefer-
ence, deliberately selecting parties with lower grades for (part of) the vote.
Under the LSplit rule, many ballots therefore seem to reflect some 
degree of insincere choice. In addition to the insincere ballots, some ballots 
(17.1%) gave the same opinion grade to the lowest of the supported and 
unsupported parties, insofar as the rule allows voters to support all parties 
simultaneously.
Thus, the importance of this “selective” voting (sincere or not) can be 
estimated at around 40%. This is obviously very high, and it is legitimate to 
ask whether the obligation to share a single vote could cause such behavior. 
The comparison with the list- approval rule may now help to determine 
whether LAppr frees voters from precisely this constraint.
As for the LSplit rule, the usual definition of “sincere” behavior under 
approval voting simply requires that the voter approves all candidates above 
a threshold and none below. It is logically possible that strategic inten-
tions should lead to nonsincere ballots (Brams and Fishburn 1978), but 
this phenomenon is rather counterintuitive, and some models even rule it 
out for large electorates (Laslier 2009). If approval balloting is used to elect 
several candidates, nonsincere rational behavior should also be quite rare 
(Laslier and Van der Straeten 2016). The same thing should occur in the 
case of list- approval voting, even if the detailed strategic considerations are 
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complex. It therefore seems reasonable to expect a large majority of voters 
to be perfectly sincere— that is, to cast ballots such that all the approved 
candidates all have better opinion grades than the nonapproved ones.
Nevertheless, this is not what we observe. On 49.1% of the ballots, 
approval behaviors cannot be said to reflect opinions through a simple 
threshold. More precisely, 21.5% of the participants approve parties for 
which they have the same opinion as parties they do not approve, and 
27.6% approve parties to which they assign lower grades than parties they 
do not approve. Some participants exclude their preferred party from their 
vote under all systems, including under the LAppr rule. In Rennes, for 
example, 2 voters choose not to approve the unique party to which they 
give their best opinion grade, and in 7 other cases, one of the parties with 
the highest grade is not approved.
These results are especially puzzling. Voters are most frequently not 
sincere (27.6% under LAppr, 22.8% under LSplit, 11.4% under ONE) 
under approval voting. The possibility of multiple voting seems to gener-
ate a greater selectivity than the single vote (49.1% under LAppr, 39.9% 
under LSplit, 37.3% under ONE). After a cross- sectional study of the 
(in)sincerity of voters, an analysis of the viability of the supported par-
ties should enable us to verify whether this selectivity is based on strategic 
considerations.
Sincerity: Fairly Stable Behavior from  
One Voting System to the Next
Under list- approval voting, only 72.4% of the voters do not rate an unsup-
ported party strictly better than a supported party. This observation leads 
us to inquire into the stability of sincere behavior from one voting system 
to the next. Stability is indeed dominant, since 61.8% of voters are sincere 
(selective or not) regardless of the proposed voting rule, and 85.3% of vot-
ers are sincere under the LAppr rule. In contrast, only 6.5% of voters are 
always insincere— 56.8% of insincere voters under the ONE rule.
Evidence of Strategic Voting
Voting Rules and Proportion of Strategic Ballots
It is fairly simple to define strategic voting when voters are forced to choose 
a single list. If this list is viable, the choice is considered strategic; in the 
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opposite case, the choice is nonstrategic. The issue becomes more complex 
under LSplit and LAppr.
Under the LSplit rule, because voters have to split their unique vote, it 
makes sense to anticipate that they will make strategic choices by deserting 
nonviable parties. But it is still necessary to precisely define the decisions 
that will be considered strategic. Overall, a selection of parties can be con-
sidered strategic when it increases the support received by a set of parties 
that are viable and can be labeled as among that voter’s favorites. Compar-
ing opinion grades and LSplit votes allows us to determine these favorite 
viable parties, which are the viable parties that achieve at least a support 
threshold— the lowest opinion grade voters give to parties they support. In 
this logic, two types of ballots can be labeled strategic:
• ballots that support only viable parties (type 1 strategic ballots)
• ballots on which unsupported parties are at least as well rated as 
the most poorly evaluated of the supported parties but are nonvi-
able (type 2 strategic ballots)
We now turn to the strategic question under LAppr. In standard 
approval voting (for the election of a single candidate), an additional vote 
for a nonviable candidate is harmless in the sense that the other votes (e.g., 
for viable candidate) remain equally influential with or without the vote 
for the nonviable candidate. But this argument needs to be amended when 
approval voting is used for proportional representation, as in this experi-
ment.
In the proportional representation context, voters may be primarily 
concerned about increasing the gap between the share of votes obtained by 
supported parties and the share obtained by unsupported parties. Because 
seats are allocated in proportion to the total votes received, giving one 
more vote to a party has two effects. First, it increases the party’s score by 
one— that is, it directly increases the targeted party’s vote share, and the 
size of this effect (for a large electorate) is inversely proportional to the 
total number of votes. Second, the voter also increases by one the total 
number of votes, which serves as the denominator in the computation of 
all the vote shares— that is, it decreases the share of all parties, and the size 
of this effect is inversely proportional to the square of the total number of 
votes (a second- order effect, smaller than the main effect). Consequently, 
such voters (whom we label sophisticated strategic) are better off not voting 
for small parties that they like but that do not get a sufficient proportion of 
votes to be elected (see appendix B). The idea of avoiding wasted votes for 
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nonviable candidates, which is eliminated by approval voting when used 
for the election of a single candidate, comes back as a second- order effect 
for sophisticated voters when several candidates are elected.
Under the LAppr rule, two types of ballots are considered sophisticated 
strategic:
• ballots that give support only to viable parties (type 1 sophisti-
cated strategy)
• ballots on which unsupported parties are at least as well rated as 
the most poorly evaluated of the supported parties but are nonvi-
able (type 2 sophisticated strategy)
Given these definitions, table 10.5 presents the proportion of strategic 
votes under the different rules.
More Strategic Behavior under Single Voting
It is logical to assume that the official requirement to support only one 
list constrains some voters, necessitating strategic choices. For efficiency 
concerns, they can favor parties that will garner enough votes to be rep-
resented in the European Parliament even if those parties are not their 
preferred party.
Table 10.5 shows that the single- vote rule generates more strategic 
choices than do multivote rules. Under ONE, 73.3% of voters support 
viable parties. The opportunity to support several parties under LSplit 
TABLE 10.5. Voting Rules and Strategic Voting
 Sincere (%)
Sincere but 
Selective (%) Insincere (%) Total (%)
ONE Rule
Strategic 48.2 17.1 7.9 73.2
Nonstrategic 14.5 8.8 3.5 26.8
LSplit Rule
Type 1 Strategic 39.9 10.2 7.3 57.4
Type 2 Strategic — 4 3.5 7.5
Nonstrategic 19.7 3.1 12.3 35.1
LAppr Rule
Type 1 Strategic 20.2 5.3 2.6 28.1
Type 2 Strategic — 7 7 14
Nonstrategic 30.7 9.2 18 57.9
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leads to an increase of more than 8 percentage points in nonstrategic bal-
lots. When required to share their unique votes, the vast majority of voters 
continue to support only viable parties (57.4% cast type 1 strategic ballots). 
But under LAppr, when multiplying votes is less costly, only 28.1% of vot-
ers implement a type 1 sophisticated strategy. Conversely, under LAppr, 
voters are nearly twice as likely as to exclude some well- rated but nonviable 
parties (14% cast type 2 strategic ballots) as voters under LAppr (7.5%). 
Overall, more than 42% of the ballots remain strategic under LAppr.
However, the implementation of a sophisticated strategy in this sense is 
not the only possible explanation for such behavior. More simply, partici-
pants may distinguish between having a good opinion of a party (i.e., it is 
good for a voter personally) and supporting the party in the election (i.e., it 
should supply members of parliament). A political preference may presup-
pose a dichotomous classification (acceptable/nonacceptable); a ranking of 
political parties from the most to the least preferred; a more sophisticated 
preference mixing ranking and dichotomous classification; or a quantita-
tive utility. But appreciating a party does not necessarily imply the belief 
that the party should actually be in charge. Voters may, for example, have 
a good opinion of a regional party only because they believe that the party 
is doing a good job as a regional lobby. This could explain why some spe-
cialized parties receive very high opinion grades but not many votes. Indi-
viduals may thus have different rankings in different contexts, implying a 
diversity of underlying preference relations for a single individual (see Sen 
1977; Igersheim 2007).
Whatever the true justification for strategic behavior under LAppr, this 
voting rule results in a greater proportion (18%) of nonrationalizable bal-
lots (in the sense that they are neither sincere nor strategic) than under 
LSplit (12.3%) or ONE (3.5%). More flexibility in the available ballots 
leads to more complex choices, and arbitration by voters between poten-
tially contradictory objectives may lead to this situation.
Strategic Voting Broadly Compatible with Sincerity
Table 10.5 also shows that sincere voting and strategic voting are not oppo-
sites. A very high proportion of voters who have shown strategic behavior 
with regard to the parties they select are also sincere in the broad sense 
(selective or not): 65.3% under ONE, 54.1% under LSplit, and 38.5% 
under LAppr.
Moreover, strategic behavior is much more frequent among voters who 
make sincere choices than among those who are insincere, regardless of the 
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method of voting: 73.7% versus 69.3% under ONE, 70% versus 47.4% 
under LSplit, and 39.7% versus 34.8% under LAppr. In addition, among 
the 32.5% of voters who are strategic under all three voting systems, 24.1% 
are also always sincere. Conversely, only 0.8% of the voters are strategic 
and insincere in all three cases.
However, it would be a little too hasty to conclude that voters do not 
express selective choices that can be considered strategic. Under LSplit 
and LAppr, voters who are sincere but selective (without obligation) are 
in fact more often strategic than those who are simply sincere (83% versus 
66.4% under LSplit, 57.2% versus 39.7% under LAppr).
Conclusion
Our experiment found many individual- level discrepancies between partic-
ipants’ opinions and their votes, revealing complex and partly unexpected 
choices. Contrary to intuition, ballots that are not merely sincere are more 
frequent when approval- type multiple votes are available than under a 
single- vote rule. In fact, voters used the flexibility of the LAppr and LSplit 
voting rules to give support to multiple parties and, perhaps surprisingly, 
often voted under these rules in apparent contradiction to their own evalu-
ations.
A large proportion of voters’ selections among their favorite parties can 
be interpreted as strategic voting in view of the viability of parties. This 
proportion is almost as high under LAppr (22%) as under LSplit (25%). 
Yet the dispersion of votes is less costly under the LAppr rule than when 
the voter has to split a unique vote, and the large increase in the average 
number of supported parties shows that voters are well aware of this fact. 
Two types of explanations could justify such a behavior under list approval 
voting:
 (1) A sophisticated strategy: In a proportional voting system, not 
voting for nonviable parties slightly increases the relative score 
of the viable parties.
 (2) Expressing an opinion and deciding to support a party for elec-
tion are distinct exercises: Voters may well appreciate small par-
ties, often linked to specific political issues, but may doubt their 
capacity to field effective members of parliament. Voters may 
consider a particular party as perfectly representing their ideas 
(as our opinion question explicitly asked) but believe that the 
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district candidates presented by this party would not make good 
MEPs.
In terms of strategic voting, our experiment confirmed the main 
expected result: the single- vote rule leads to more strategic voting than 
do multivote systems. Under the single- vote rule, almost all ballots (all 
but 3.5%) can be rationalized in terms of strategy and/or sincerity. Con-
versely, when voters’ choices become more complicated, the share of such 
insincere and nonstrategic ballots markedly increases, reaching 12% under 
LSplit and 18% under LAappr.
This does not mean, however, that some voters simply become illogi-
cal: the comparison of votes across rules demonstrates voters’ consistency 
throughout the experiment. Rather, it means that other elements can influ-
ence voters’ decisions.
In particular, in France, the European Parliament election is an oppor-
tunity for a large number of protest votes. In fact, a number of ballots gave 
good evaluations to the party in government in 2014 (a viable party) but 
did not provide votes for that party. Voters show that they are ideologically 
close to this party but oppose its governance practice. The experimental 
protocol, which allows participants to both express their opinion and vote, 
may have reinforced this behavior.
Neither the sincere voting nor the strategic voting paradigm entirely 
explains how opinions translate into votes in our experiment. Having a 
good or bad opinion of a party is not always sufficient to explain a vote in a 
certain context. Voting behavior may capture the opinion or the expression 
of a protest message, or it may capture the willingness to support a party 
in an election.
A P P E N D I X  A :  E X P E R I M E N TA L  B A L L O T S
Figures A10.1 and A10.2 show the two ballots used in our experiment The 
lists appear in the official order (randomly) determined by the Constitu-
tional Council. The six lists considered viable are:
• Choisir Notre Europe
• Front de Gauche— Rompre avec l’Austérité pour Refonder 
l’Europe
• Liste Bleu Marine— Non à Bruxelles, Oui à la France
• Liste Europe Ecologie
• Pour la France, Agir en Europe
• UDI MoDem Les Européens
Fig. A10.1. Experimental Ballot from Lyon, Southeast Region (printed on both 





Fig. A10.2. Experimental Ballot from Rennes, West region (printed on both 
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A P P E N D I X  B :  S O P H I S T I C AT E D  S T R AT E G I C  B E H AV I O R  
U N D E R  L I S T-  A P P R O VA L  V O T I N G
Sophisticated strategic voters seek to increase the difference in vote share 
between the main parties they like and the parties they reject. Such voters 
distinguish among the n proposed lists:
• lists that they appreciate and think may be elected (because they 
are likely to pass the 5% threshold); let n1 be the number of such 
lists
• lists that they appreciate and think cannot be elected (because they 
probably will not pass the 5% threshold); let n2 be the number of 
such lists
• lists that they do not support (i.e., they reject); let n3 be the num-
ber of such lists
Voters seek to increase the gap between the percentage of votes obtained 
by the type 1 lists and that obtained by the type 3 lists, taking as given the 
approvals granted by other voters. Let A be the overall number of approv-
als granted by other voters. Among these, A1 go to type 1 lists, and A3 to 
type 3 lists:
• if this voter only approves the type 1 lists, the gap of the propor-










• if this voter approves all the lists he likes (type 1 and type 2), the 











The first difference is larger than the second even if the effect is small, of 
the order of magnitude of the inverse of A2. The voter thus should not sup-
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N O T E S
Experiments funded by the project ANR DynaMITE ANR13- BSH1- 0010.
 1. No candidate from the extreme left’s main list was elected in the West Region. 
Although this list passed the 5% threshold, only nine MEPs from the area were 
elected.
 2. We use the list- approval rule for this experiment even if such a rule might be 
quite silly in practice because list- approval offers obvious incentives for a (main) 
party to present several lists simultaneously in the same district.
 3. As is usually the case in experimental economics, we made no effort to have 
representative samples of participants. Most of our participants are students, and 
their social status and political opinions are what they are. We are not interested in 
predicting electoral results; rather, we wish to compare the participants’ behavior 
under the three rules with their evaluation of the parties.
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